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 PREFACE 
 
 
There are four countries where one can find British records regarding the Kuki-
Chin people: Burma, India, Bangladesh and Britain. The documents used in this thesis 
are mainly from the Oriental and India Office Collections (OIOC) in the British Library, 
London and the National Archives of India in New Delhi.  
 
I quote a document by the name of the author (sender), receiver, date of 
composition, and the title given in the letter, if applicable, rather than by the call 
numbers alone. This is the way in which official letters were written and quoted by the 
administrators during the colonial period and therefore the most definite way to identify 
a document even when copies of the same document appear in different places. For the 
same reason, I have used paragraph numbers, or dates in the case of diaries, rather than 
the page numbers when pointing to specific parts within documents. The details of the 
archives or published books in which the documents are found are included in brackets. 
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 GLOSSARY 
 
 
NOTE: The following terms are Anglo-Indian words unless specified. 
 
Ahmú-dàn: (Burmese) Specialised servicemen. They provided service to the crown on a 
fixed, rotational basis. In modern usage, it means someone in the service of an 
institutional authority or non-gazetted government employee. 
Athi: (Burmese) Free non-service taxpayers. 
Burkundazee: Mercenaries composed of freebooters or soldiers of the disbanded 
Mughal army, who carried their own weapons. They were usually hired under 
zemindars as private guards but British administrators also hired them in the 
early days in Bengal. Some of these were later organised under the military as 
„militia‟ or „sebundy‟(irregular) corps. 
Chuklah: A territorial subdivision under the Mughals. 
Chowkidar: A watchman. 
Chowky: An out-post. 
Dah: Dagger widely used in the hills of North East India and Burma. 
Dak: Post transported by relays of men and horses. 
Darogah: A chief native officer in various departments of native government. It was also 
an Indian term for the Superintendent of Police. 
Diwan: The head financial minister, whether of the state or a province, charged with the 
collection of the revenue, the remittance of it to the imperial treasury, and 
invested with extensive judicial powers in all civil and financial causes. It was 
also used to mean a minister under a rajah in a broader sense. 
Diwani: The office of diwan and especially the right of receiving as diwan the revenue 
of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. 
Duar: (Assamese) Passes through which the hill people communicate with the plains. It 
also meant, the belt of fertile land at the foot of the hills. 
Ghat: A landing place on the bank of a river. 
Havildar: A sepoy non-commissioned officer corresponding to a sergeant. 
 
  
 xi 
Jemadar: A leader in a general sense. In the Indian army, it is the title of the second in 
rank of the native officers in a company of sepoys, subadar being the first. It is 
also applied to certain officers of police (under the darogah), of the customs, and 
of other civil departments. 
Jhoom: Mode of cultivation widely practised in the hills of Eastern Bengal and Burma –
swidden farming, shifting farming, or slash and burn cultivation – where farmers 
clear a portion of jungle by burning it, cultivate on it until the strength of the soil 
cannot sustain the crop, then move to another plot. It is called toung-ya in 
Burmese. 
Kyoung: (Burmese) River. It was also used for the hill circles in Arakan. (cf. Kyun) 
Kyun: (Burmese) Island. It was also used for the circles in the plains of Arakan. (cf. 
Kyoung) 
Mooktear: An authorised agent or an attorney. 
Munshee: A Language teacher. 
Muntri: Minister or delegation representing government or chiefs. 
Myo: (Burmese) Township. In most nuclear zone districts of Burma the gentry consisted 
of two tiers: headmen of townships (myo) and subordinate villages (ywa). There 
were at least fifty townships (myo) in the nuclear zone, each of which included 
anywhere from 12 to 145 villages (ywa). 
Myo-thugyi: (Burmese) From Burmese myo (town) and thugyi (chief, headman), 
therefore, township headman, an overseer for the servile classes in his area. 
Myo-tza: (Burmese) A collector of revenue. 
Myo-wun: (Burmese) A governor appointed by the King. 
Nawab: A Governor. The plural of Arabic na‟ib, which means a deputy. 
Naib-diwan: A deputy collector. 
Naik: A native officer corresponding to the rank of corporal. 
Nullah: Stream, or rivulet. 
Pathian: (Kuki-Chin) A common word in Kuki-Chin tongues meaning the supreme-
being, who created the world. Before the coming of Christianity, Pathian was 
seldom worshipped in rituals while other „lesser‟ gods were more frequently 
invoked. Nowadays, Pathian is used as the term for God among the Kuki-Chin 
Christians. 
Pergunnah: A subdivision of a district. 
Pundit: A scholar or teacher, also an expert in law during the Mughal period. 
 
  
 xii 
Pyee : (Burmese) Country, with emphasis on the territory rather than the government; 
therefore, can be used for the integral part of the Burmese Kingdom (such as 
Yaw Pyee) as well as to the foreign lands (such as Tayoup Pyee, or China).  
Rawa-goung: (Arakanese pronunciation for Burmese: Ywa-Gain) Village headmen. 
Ryot: A tenant of the soil, or a (tax-paying) subject of a government. 
Sawbwa: (Burmese) Shan chiefs or kings. 
Sayer (or sair): Internal transit duty. 
Sebundy: Irregular native soldiers, a sort of militia, or imperfectly disciplined troops for 
revenue or police duties. 
Sirdar: A leader, a commander, an officer; a chief or a lord. 
Subadar: First rank among native officers. 
Sudder Diwani Adawlut: Chief Civil Court. One of the three supreme Muslim courts. 
The other two were Nizamut Adawlut or the Criminal Court and Fujdari 
Adawlut, which can be translated as a Police Court. 
Thana : A fortified city with garrison, the word meant a police station in British India. 
Toungya: See „jhoom’ above. 
Wun-gyi : (Burmese) minister of the Hlutdaw (Burmese ruling council) 
Zemindar: A Landholder. In Bengal they were also the agents of the Mughal 
government collecting taxes from the cultivators or ryots. Nevertheless, the ryots 
also had their hereditary rights to cultivate lands, which could not be easily 
dispossessed by zemindars. Therefore, the land did not wholly belong to the 
zemindar and his position was a mixture of landlord and tax collector of the 
lands. They had police and magisterial powers over their lands as well. 
Zemindari: Land held by a zemindar or the right with which a zemindar held the land. 
Zillah: A district. 
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Map 1. Current Area Inhabited by the Kuki-Chin People 
Note: Kuki-Chin inhabited area is shown as supposed by ZORO (Zo Reunification 
Organisation). It is taken from a map „Zo Inhabited Area‟ found in the ZORO 
internet homepage (http://www.zogam.org) and redrawn here to show it in relation 
to current administrative divisions. 
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Map 2. British Territorial Possessions around the Kuki-Chin Land (1765-1860) 
Note: The Boundaries are taken from R. B. Pemberton‟s Map of the Eastern 
Frontier of British India with the Adjacent Countries (1838), and H. Yule‟s New 
Map of Burma (1857) accompanying his Narrative of the Mission to the Court of 
Ava in 1855. Most of the boundaries towards the Kuki-Chin land were not 
surveyed and therefore this map represents British perception rather than reality. 
(see Chapter 4, pp.149-50 and Chapter 5, pp.202-10 below for further discussions.) 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. The Ethnic Categories of the Kuki-Chin People 
 
a) Identities of the Kuki-Chin People 
 
The history of the Kuki-Chin people during the last half a century has been 
dominated by the political issues surrounding their positions within the states to which 
they belong. In the early 1960s, Geertz observed similar issues in other „new states‟ and 
explained them in terms of the tensions between „civil sentiments‟, or attachment to the 
state, and „primordial attachments‟, which stem from „givens‟ such as blood ties, race, 
language, region, religion, and custom.
1
 In this essay, his analysis focused on the 
problems caused to the national integration of various countries by the „primordial 
attachments‟ of minorities, but he also pointed out that for the peoples of new states, it 
was „a search for an identity and a demand that the identity be publicly acknowledged 
as having import‟.2  
 
The political struggles of the Kuki-Chin people both in India and Burma still have 
not finished, but they have brought some noticeable effects on the identities of the Kuki-
Chin people. To describe the situation, it is convenient to conceive Kuki-Chin identities 
                                                 
1
 Clifford Geertz, „The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New 
States‟, in the Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 259. (Originally published 
under the same title in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States, 105-57, London: Collier-
MacMillan, 1963.) 
2
 Ibid.,. 258. 
  
 2 
as having three layers: first, the clan identity; second, separated identities of Kuki, Chin 
and Mizo; and third, the united identity of the whole of the „Kuki-Chin‟ people. I hastily 
add that such division of „layers‟ is only adopted for the sake of convenience of 
arranging the discussion: there are no natural and clearly separable „layers‟, or agreed 
ways of classifying different identities among the Kuki-Chin people. 
 
In the first layer are the clan identities, such as, Haka, Sizang (Siyin), Thantlang 
(Tlangtlang) and Matu of Chin State; Haokip, Kipgens, and Vaipheis of Manipur; 
Hualngo, Sailu, and Mara of Mizoram, and so on. Sometimes called „tribes‟, „clans‟ or 
„villages‟, these constitute the lowest rung of the group identities of the Kuki-Chin 
people. Yet these are the largest units through which lineages are traced into the past and 
the description „primordial attachment‟ fits these categories the best, with common 
history, similarity in language and culture, and assumed blood ties with experience of 
being under one political system at a certain point of time in the past. As in the case of 
the Nagas, these were probably the primary identities of the Kuki-Chin people before 
the colonial period.
3
 
                                                 
3
 H. N. C. Stevenson, The Economics of the Central Chin Tribes (Bombay: The Times of India Press, 
1943; reprint Farnborough Hants: Gregg Press Ltd., 1968), 12; C. Nunthara, Mizoram: Society and 
Polity(New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company, 1996), 64; cf. Andrew West, „Nagas in the Museum: An 
Anthropological Study of the Material Culture of the Hill Peoples of the Assam-Burma Border‟ (Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Hull, 1992), 287.  
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Mongolian 
Mon-Khmer                                 Tibeto-Burman                               Tay-Chinese 
 
Burman Old-Burman Chin Kachin Naga Lolo 
 
Asho Cho 
(Sho) 
Kuami 
(Mro) 
 
Laimi Mizo 
(Lushai) 
Zomi 
(Kuki) 
 
Nangkha 
Khaizo 
Pansaizo 
Suleizo 
Pang 
Langzo 
 
Matu 
Muan(Myhn) 
M’Kang 
Ruangtu 
Zuangtu 
Ng’men 
Limro 
Yhppy 
Ngaleng 
 
Khami 
Khumi 
Masho 
Anu 
Khuangsu 
Pansu 
Pawnan 
 
Laizo 
Khuangli 
Khualsim 
Zahau 
Zanngiat 
Lente 
Ngawn 
Zophei 
Mara(Lakher) 
Lautu 
Senthang 
Zokhua 
Zotung 
Mi-E 
Thawr(Torr) 
Bawmzo 
Pawih 
 
 
Hualngo 
Fanai 
Khawlb 
Ring 
Ralte 
Chawte 
Khiangte 
Ngente 
Hmar 
Thlau 
Vanchhai 
Renthle 
 
Sizang 
Thado 
Jo 
Theizang 
Saizang 
Khuano 
Dim 
Guite 
Nginte 
Simte 
Baite 
Vaiphei 
Gangte 
Fig. 1. The Division of Chin Tribal Groups (from Lian Sakhong, Religion, 83) 
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This, however, does not mean that the clan identities are natural blocks into which 
the Kuki-Chin people can be divided. The number as well as mode of classification 
varies. In a table provided by Lian Sakhong, there are 64 names mentioned as sub-
groups of the Kuki-Chin people (see Fig.1 on the previous page). On the other hand, 
Nunthara, a Mizo author, divides the Mizo into two large groups of Lusei and non-Lusei 
clans and mentions „twelve or more major clans of the Luseis‟ and „sixteen or more 
major clans belong to non-Lusei groups‟.4 Regarding the Kuki in Manipur, Haokip 
provides anecdotal history of 29 tribes of Kuki.
5
 It is impossible to come up with an 
exact number of different identities at this level. What Leach observed of the Kachin 
Hills also applies here: „the assiduous ethnographer can find just as many different 
“tribes” as he cares to look for.‟6  
 
Among these traditional identities there are also some recognised supra-village or 
supra-clan identities. „Lai‟ in the figure provided by Lian Sakhong, and the division of 
„Lusei‟ and „non-Lusei‟ among the Mizo are examples. There are also different 
interpretations regarding one identity. For example, Lian Sakhong regards the „Paite‟ as 
the same as the „Poitoo‟, frequently mentioned in the British documents during the 
nineteenth century,
7
 but the same group has pleaded to be called „Zomi‟,8 while in the 
                                                 
4
 Nunthara, Mizoram Society, 34 
5
 P. S. Haokip, Zale’n-Gam: The Kuki Nation (Manipur?: private publication by KNO, 1998), 31-60. 
6
 Edmund Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma : a study of Kachin Social Structure 
(London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1954; reprint, London: Continuum, 2001) 291 (page citations are to the 
reprint edition) 
7
 Lian Hmung Sakhong, Religion and Politics among the Chin People in Burma (1896-1949) 
(Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2000), 165. 
8
 Vumson, Zo History, (Aizawl: Privately published, 1986), 3; T. S. Gangte, The Kukis of Manipur: a 
Historical Analysis, (New Delhi; Gyan Publishing House, 2003), 226; see also Memorandum submitted 
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publication by the Kuki National Organisation (KNO), the Paite are regarded as a 
conglomeration of different clans of the Kuki, who invented this identity for the purpose 
of receiving development funds as a separate tribe – therefore, not a genuine clan 
traceable through genealogy.
9
 Circumstantial changes of their identities are also noted: 
Nunthara mentions that the small number of Hmar, Lakhers (Mara), and Pawis in the 
census report of 1961 was due to these clans returning themselves as „Lusei‟ with which 
they often identity themselves according to circumstances, though they are not regarded 
as such by the other Luseis.
10
 
 
The second level of identities, or the identities of the „Kuki‟, „Chin‟, and „Mizo‟, 
are based on the geo-administrative interpretation of „Kuki-Chin‟ identities during the 
British colonial period. Of the three terms, the words „Kuki‟ and „Chin‟ are definitely of 
foreign origin. The etymological origin of these terms has been discussed for more than 
a century without any clear answer
11
; however, it is clear that the word „Kuki‟ was a 
term used widely by the Bengalis and their neighbours,
12
 and „Chin‟ by the Burmese 
with its dialectical form „Khyen‟ by the Arakanese.13 The Kuki-Chin people might have 
                                                                                                                                               
by the Paite National Council found in the ZORO Homepage (http://www.zogam.org/documents). 
9
 Haokip, Zale’n-Gam, 55-6. 
10
 Nunthara, Mizoram, 31-3.  
11
 see for example Brian H. Hodgson „On the Indo-Chinese Borders and Their Connexion with the 
Himalayans and Tibetans‟, JASB, vol.22, no.1, (1853) 14.; C. A. Soppitt, A Short Account of the Kuki-
Lushai Tribes on the North-East Frontier (Shillong: Assam Secretariat Press, 1887), 1-2; Anthony 
Gilchrist McCall, Lushai Chrysalis (London : Luzac and Co., 1949; reprint, Aizawl: Tribal Research 
Institute, 1977), 19-20 (page citations are to the reprint edition); G. H. Luce, Phases of Pre-Pagán Burma: 
Languages and History (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), 80-1; Vumson, Zo History, 3; Sing 
Khaw Khai, „The Theological Concept of Zo in the Chin Tradition and Culture.‟ (B.R.E. thesis, Burma 
Institute of Theology, 1984), 1-6; Gangte, Kukis 19-21, 226; Lian Sakhong, Religion, 58-64 
12
 Thomas Lewin, Wild Races of the Eastern Frontier of India (London: W.H. Allen & Co, 1870; 
reprint, New Delhi: Mittal, 2004), 247 (page citations are to the reprint edition); Gangte, Kukis, 19. 
13
 Lian Sakhong, Religion, 61-2. 
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answered to these names but it was largely because those who had frequent contact with 
the lowlanders recognised these terms. 
 
The word „Mizo‟ has a slightly different background: it was known to have been 
used by the people themselves
14
 and immediately after independence the leaders of the 
Lushai Hills changed their name from the former colonial designation „Lushai‟ to 
„Mizo‟. On this, Gangte, a Kuki author, quotes a widespread interpretation that this 
word means „hill-man‟ (from „mi‟ meaning people and „zo’, meaning high or cold 
places) and argues that the word „Mizo‟ is no less derogatory and foreign than Kuki, for 
this word means „man that looks like a hill‟ rather than „the hill-man‟. The latter should 
be either „Zomi‟ or „Tlangmi‟.15 Thanga rejects this view, saying that the interpretation 
of „Mizo‟ as meaning „hillman‟ is an „absolute misconception‟, but he does not give an 
alternative interpretation except for an allusion to the fact that it is customary with all 
the groups of Tibeto-Burman origin in the hills of Burma and India, to name their clans 
after one of their forefathers.
16
 
 
In any case, a more important point is that current usages of these terms derived 
from colonial practice. For example, the preamble to the Fourth Initial Draft of the 
Future Chinland Constitution, drafted by the exiled Chin political leaders, defines the 
term Chin „as the same as it was in 1896‟, which was „also codified under the Chin 
                                                 
14
 E. B. Elly, Military Report on the Chin-Lushai Country(Simla: Government Central Print Office, 
1893), 6 
15
 „Tlang‟ means hill: see Gangte, Kukis, 227; cf. Nunthara, Mizoram, 33. 
16
 Lal Biak Thanga, „Traditional Self-Governing Institutions Among the Tuhal Groups of Mizoram,‟ 
in Traditional Self-Governing Institutions Among the Hill Tribes of North-East India, ed. Atul Goswami 
(New Delhi: Akansha Publishing House, 2002), 115. 
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Special Division Act of 1948, by the Chin representatives to the Union of Burma‟.17 The 
1896 Chin Hills Regulations had defined Chin as to include „(a) Lushais, (b) Kukis, (c) 
Nagas, (d) Burmans domiciled in the Chin Hills, (e) any persons who have adopted the 
customs and language of the Chins and are habitually resident in the Chin Hills‟.18 Here 
it has to be noted that the „Chin‟ in this context was equated to the residents of the geo-
administrative unit of the Chin Hills. Likewise, in the case of the Mizo, though the 
name itself was used among the people before the colonial period, the current ethnic 
boundary is framed from the geo-administrative unit of Mizoram, which had been 
known as the Lushai Hills during the colonial period.  
 
Above these two levels of identity, there is another that represents the ideal unity of 
the whole of the „Kuki-Chin people‟. Whether this identity had ever been active among 
the Kuki-Chin people before the colonial period cannot be satisfactorily answered, but 
the lack of an agreed name for this ideological unit seems to suggest that even if a sense 
of common identity existed among the Kuki-Chin people, it must have been very vague 
and different from what it is understood to be nowadays.  
 
Many attempts have been made to promote one or another name. Of these, „Zo‟ has 
been most successful so far, but the Haka Chin people shun this word because it was a 
derogatory term they adopted for those conquered by them.
19
 The Paite people of 
                                                 
17
 Chinland Constitution Initial Draft Committee, The Fourth Initial Draft of the Future Chinland 
Constitution, ed. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe and Lian H. Sakhong, Peaceful Co-Existence towards Federal 
Union of Burma no.6. (Chiang Mai: United Nationalities League for Democracy, 2003), 41, 71 
18
 Chin Hills Regulation 1896, I, Section 2(3); printed in the Chin Hills Manual 1915 (OIOC 
v/27/244/7) 
19
 Vumson, Zo History, 6; A. Bareigts, Les Lautu: Contribution á l’Étude de l’Organisation Sociale 
d’une Ethnie Chin de Haute-Birmanie (Contribution to the Study of Social Organization of an Ethnie 
Chin of Highland Burma) (Paris: Selaf, 1981), 34; c.f. F. K. Lehman, The Structure of Chin Society: a 
Tribal People of Burma Adapted to a Non-Western Civilisation (Urbana: the University of Illinois Press, 
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Manipur advocated the term „Zomi‟ by linking the suffix „-mi‟ meaning people to the 
word „zo‟, but this also failed to receive any recognition from others and ended up being 
recognised as the name for the people who advocated this view.
20
 Still others coined a 
totally new word by taking „Ch‟ from „Chin‟, „ki‟ from „Kuki‟, and „m‟ from „Mizo‟ to 
conjure up „Chikim‟, but it is doubtful that this word would be even as successful as the 
others.
21
 Recently there is a tendency among the writers to adopt Kuki, Mizo or Chin to 
mean the whole nation of the Kuki-Chin people. Lian Sakhong‟s usage of Chin 
exemplifies this tendency clearly,
22
 but there is no reason to believe that others would 
regard such practise as anything more than being whimsical.  
 
Of these three „layers‟, it was the last layer of identity that was most active 
politically in the years immediately after independence. When the Mizo Union Council 
was formed in 1947, one of its most important aims was „secession from India‟ and 
joining with the Chin people. The same aim was held by a contending party called „The 
United Mizo Freedom Organisation‟.23 Outside Mizoram, the Paite of Lamka district in 
Manipur formed the Paite National Council in 1963 and wrote a letter to the Prime 
Minister of India requesting that „Chin people be unified into one territory.‟24 Obviously, 
in this context, „Chin‟ meant all the Kuki-Chin people. As in these examples, 
unification-oriented political ideas were mixed with secessionist aims. The Mizo 
                                                                                                                                               
1963), 54-5. 
20
 Gangte, Kukis 226; see also Lian Sakhong, Religion, 165; Haokip, Zale’n-Gam, 55. 
21
 Gangte, Kukis, 226. 
22
 Lian Sakhong, Religion; see related discussion in Gangte, Kukis 226-34.  
23
 Nunthara, Mizoram, 129-30 
24
 Vumson, Zo History, 3; see also „Memorandum submitted by the Paite National Council‟ found in 
the ZORO Internet Homepage (http://www.zogam.org/documnets) 
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National Front (MNF) that carried out underground activities against the Indian 
government during the 1970s was also an example of this.
25
 In Geertz‟s terms, these 
were attempts to assert the identity of a people in the modern world, even against the 
international divisions that had been imposed on that people. 
 
The situation changed when the „Mizo Accord‟ was signed between the Indian 
Government and the MNF. With this, Mizoram became an autonomous state in 1986 
and the MNF abandoned its secessionist aims.
26
 Barua commented that this was a 
partial fulfilment of the „pan-Zo‟ identity,27 but in reality, its imperfect fulfilment made 
the achievement of the ideal even harder. In the same year, a Zo Re-unification 
Organisation (ZORO) was formed to promote pan-Zo identity. Yet as Vumson, the 
coordinator for the ZORO, stated recently, there was not much the ZORO could do to 
promote its political aims and therefore public support died down.
28
 Since then, the 
main momentum for political movement has shifted to the political parties formed on 
the basis of the separated identities of Kuki, Chin and Mizo.  
 
In recent years, despite frequently raised questions regarding who is exactly Chin, 
Kuki, or Mizo, the Kuki-Chin people increasingly accept the separate identities of Kuki, 
Chin and Mizo as the primary means of identification. This is also evident in the 
academic works on the Kuki-Chin people. Until the 1980s there were authors like 
                                                 
25
 Nunthara, Mizoram, 152, 196. 
26
 Ibid., 151, 290-3 (Appendix XI, „Mizo Accord‟). 
27
 Sanjib Barua, India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1999; reprint, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001) 108 (page citations are 
to the reprint edition). 
28
 Chinland Guardian, 16 March 2005, „The Living Dream of Re-Unification: Interview with Dr. 
Vumson Suantak‟ (http://www.chinlandguardian.net/index.php/interviews/28) 
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Vumson and Sing Khaw Khai writing the history of the whole of the „Kuki-Chin people‟ 
or „Zo‟.29 Yet, in more recent years, the trend has changed and Lian Sakhong, a Chin 
author, writes exclusively of the events in the Chin Hills: in doing so, he describes 
events in the Chin Hills (or the current Chin State) in comparison, in contrast, or in 
relation to the events in Burma, while those in the neighbouring Lushai Hills (Mizoram) 
or Manipur are seldom noted.
30
 The same tendency can also be found among the authors 
from within India who write either on the Mizo or the Kuki.
 31
 
 
Ironically, the political struggles of the Kuki-Chin people in independent Burma 
and India have resulted in strengthening the identities based on the colonial epithet, 
which in turn was based on the names given by the outsiders. The exact process by 
which the external epithets became the identities of the people needs further study. For 
this purpose, the whole process of identification of the Kuki-Chin people can be divided 
into three phases: first, when the terms used by the outsiders became known to the 
British; second, when this knowledge was applied to the Kuki-Chin people in their 
administration, leading to the internalisation of that identity; and third, the politicisation 
of the identity. Chronologically, the first phase can be equated to the period of the East 
India Company when the British first made contact with the Kuki-Chin people and their 
neighbours, on taking over the administration in Bengal; then, after an interim period of 
wars in the 1870s and the 1890s, the second period starts from the annexation of the 
                                                 
29
 Vumson, Zo History; Sing Khaw Khai, „Theological Concept‟; idem, Zo People and Their 
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30
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Kuki-Chin Land and the establishment of the administrative districts of the Chin Hills 
and the Lushai Hills in the 1890s; the third phase starts from the independence of 
Burma and India. Internalisation of the external definitions could have happened to a 
limited extent among those Kuki-Chin people who lived nearer to the plains of Burma, 
Bengal and Assam during the first phase; however, it could have been fully effective, 
amounting to ethnic division, only after the establishment of the British administration 
in the hills; then, through subsequent political struggles, these internalised identities 
have been consolidated.  
 
Of these phases, this thesis focuses on the first phase, when the names used by 
other natives around the Kuki-Chin land became a standard term for the British to call 
the people. It is only a part of the whole change that the identities Kuki-Chin people 
went through, but an important part, when the usages of local „others‟ were accepted as 
the standard terminology by the British administrators, and in turn became a standard 
division when the Kuki-Chin hills came under the British administration.  
 
Before continuing, it is important to think what „Kuki‟, „Chin‟, and „Lushai‟ meant 
at this period. As stated earlier, the British administrators in the early nineteenth century 
acquired these terms from the people in Bengal, Burma and Assam. They were not the 
terms used by the people themselves at this time. Therefore, when the words „Kuki‟, 
„Chin‟ and „Lushai‟ appear in the British documents of this period, these do not 
designate thus named „groups‟ of people who identify themselves as belonging to one 
group and act as a unit. In fact, the mere existence of these terms does not guarantee the 
existence of actual groups that can be equated to the terms. It does not even guarantee 
that different people used this term to mean the same group of people. Rather, what was 
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actually meant by these labels itself should be the main subject of investigation. To be 
able to describe the situation better, it is necessary to clarify the concept of „ethnic 
category‟. 
 
 
b) The Concept of Ethnic Category 
 
Since Geertz‟s essay in 1963, his choice of „primordial‟ has drawn severe criticism 
and many have accused him of misconceiving ethnicity as a static „given‟, pre-
determined out of social context, imposed on individuals, something that is ineffable, 
overpowering and coercive.
32
 Some even regarded him as the most representative 
member of the „primordialist school‟ of thought on ethnicity, or even its progenitor.33 
Such criticisms were in line with the growing number of anthropological studies that 
argued for the flexible, changing, unfixed, fuzzy, and vague nature of ethnicity.
34
  
 
Despite the sound basis of the critics of primordialism, whether Geertz can be 
accused of such misinterpretation is another matter. As Tilly (1997) and Jenkins (1997) 
pointed out in separate works, Geertz used „primordial attachment‟ to describe far wider 
                                                 
32
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phenomena than those immediately identifiable as „ethnic‟ issues. He used the word 
„primordial‟ as a contrast to the attachments to the newer construction of the collective 
identity based on the state. The „givens‟ are justified in the sense that individuals did not 
weave the whole web of meanings themselves. Moreover, in contrasting „primordial‟ 
ties to „civil sentiments‟, he clearly emphasised that these ties were assumed by 
individuals as primordial givens, and wrote that the strength of such ties and the types 
of them that are important, „differ from person to person, from society to society, and 
from time to time‟.35  
 
Nevertheless, it is true that the dominant view in the western literature regarding 
mankind has been similar to what critics accuse primordialism of: that people are 
divided into natural groups of culturally homogenous units, living in geographically 
definable clusters.
36
 Lehman pointed to this attitude, held by the government officials as 
well as social scientists, as the most serious obstacle in solving the problems in Burma.
 
From this point of view, ethnic or national groups were regarded as inherently 
irreconcilable units, which hindered the process of nation-building in Burma. The 
practical solution, Lehman continued, was unlikely to be discovered until the exact 
definition of the problems had become understood.
37
 Then he proposed an alternative 
attitude to „ethnic categories‟ by regarding them as „role systems‟: 
I suggest that when people identify themselves as members of some 
„ethnic‟ category, e.g. Jinghpaw, Kayah, Chin, Sgaw Karen, they are taking 
positions in culturally defined systems of inter-group relations. . .  These 
systems of inter-group relations comprise, at least in the case of Burma, 
                                                 
35
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complexly interdependent complementary categories. I claim in particular that, 
in reality, ethnic categories are formally like roles and are, in that sense, only 
very indirectly descriptive of the empirical characteristics of substantive 
groups of people.
38
  
 
In this definition, ethnic categories were not entities but a reference system or 
cognitive models at varying levels of awareness. Actual groups of people make selective 
use of these models, and the models generate meaningful interpretations to situations 
and things and a range of possible behaviour in these contexts. In such 
conceptualisation, individuals do not derive identity from the naturally existing 
categories but identify themselves with different models according to the situation.
39
 
 
For the next forty years, the notions of „ethnicity‟ used by the social scientists have 
moved in the direction Lehman had suggested and came to accommodate the 
multiplicity of ethnic identities in different contexts as well as fluid and ambiguous 
ethnic relations. Yet this also brought a tremendous increase in different usages of the 
same term related to „ethnicity‟ by different authors, which made it both challenging and 
dangerous for anyone only partly interested in the topic to use these terms without 
incurring the danger of contradicting one or more established usages. 
 
The term „ethnic category‟ is one such term. Different authors use this term 
focusing on different aspects. For example, McKay and Lewins, arguing for the need to 
distinguish the terms such as ethnic group, ethnic category and ethnicity, define ethnic 
group as „a certain number of people who meaningfully interact on the basis of similar 
ethnic traits‟ and distinguish it from ethnic category which is „a certain number of 
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people sharing ethnic traits without sense of belonging among them and the common 
attribute being not regarded as the basis for any sort of meaningful social interaction‟. 
The key to their distinction is the existence of interaction, as they summarise: „if there is 
no interaction there is no group.‟ 40  On the other hand, Jenkins focuses on the 
„transactional nature‟ of ethnicity and for him, the distinction between ethnic group and 
category is based on the two „basic kinds of the transaction‟: the internal definition and 
the external definition. Here, the ethnic group or „groupness‟ is related to the internal 
definition of „us‟ while ethnic category is viewed as a product of external definition of 
„them.‟41 
 
Both of these definitions still regard ethnic group and ethnic category as two 
different types of demographic conglomeration, or human collectives. McKay and 
Lewins, starting from the division between the individual level and group level of 
analysis, placed both „ethnic group‟ and „ethnic category‟ into the „group level‟ 
phenomenon and discussed them as two types of collectives.
42
 This attitude was less 
pronounced in Jenkins‟s work but he also accepts the view that the two can be 
„understood as different kinds of collectivities in the actual social world‟ (emphasis in 
the original).
43
 Therefore, the distinction between „group‟ and „category‟ becomes a 
matter of degree – the degree of cohesion among the members of the identified 
collectivity; and if the distinction is about the degree of cohesion, then there is no 
reason why there should be only two types. Indeed many others came up with more than 
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two typologies for human groupings, distinguishable on the basis of the degree of 
integration, such as Handelman‟s four-way distinction of „category‟, „network‟, 
„association‟ and „community‟.44 Moreover, such definitions cannot be applied to the 
categories of Kuki-Chin people in the nineteenth century, when the „group‟ that was 
defined by a „category‟ might not have existed at all. 
 
Lehman‟s previous definition, in this sense, makes a clearer distinction between 
„group‟ and „category‟. He pointed to the fact that individuals „identify‟ themselves with 
„categories‟, which are cognitive models. In this concept, the category exists as a 
cognitive model in the minds of the identifier. In other words, the role model, and the 
system woven into the categories must already be in the cognition of the „identifier‟. A 
little modification, or clarification, is needed to apply this concept to the Kuki-Chin 
categories in the early nineteenth century, because the categories were used by others 
only, and therefore, the role models or categories were not in the minds of the „oneself‟ 
who identified with them, but in the minds of others.  
 
Each of these definitions highlights slightly different aspects of ethnic category and 
ethnic group. To accommodate these, I suggest regarding categories purely as words. 
Thus, what matters is its application, not the group of individuals or the entity it 
designates. It could be used both in identifying oneself (the internal identification of 
Jenkins) or others (the external categorisation of Jenkins) and does not even have to be 
known to those designated by the category.  
 
Any usage of an ethnic category, however, entails a sense of distinction between 
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 T. H. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London: Pluto Press, 
1993) 42-4. 
  
 17 
those who are within the category and who are not. This can be called the „extension‟ of 
the category, which is comparable to the „boundary‟ of an „ethnic group‟. As the 
boundary of an „ethnic group‟ can be fuzzy and vague, the extension of one ethnic 
category can also be vague and not clearly defined. In fact, this is not a typical trait for 
ethnic category, but many words have no clear-cut boundaries of application – what 
linguists call „fuzzy concepts‟. For example, as one individual can change his identity 
from, say „Pawi‟ to „Lusei‟, or „Peranakan‟ to „Malay‟ according to circumstances,45 
what can be called „beautiful‟ or „ugly‟, „rich‟ or „poor‟ can change according to the 
situation. Another useful concept of the linguists regarding the extension of a word is 
the „graded membership‟: the membership of a concept can be graded in terms of 
typicality.
46
 Thus, a thrush is a more typical bird than, say, an ostrich, and a Hakha Chin 
person is more typical Chin than, say, an Asho person. 
 
„Intension‟, or the inherent traits of a word, also applies to ethnic categories as 
traits that are supposed, recognised, or imposed by the users of the categories. The „role 
model‟ as mentioned by Lehman is one such trait. Stereotypes attached to the ethnic 
categories are a typical example of the „role model‟ held by others and are another 
example of the intension of ethnic categories. The „cultural stuffs‟, as Barth called them, 
are in fact related to the intension of an ethnic category and therefore, as Barth rightly 
pointed out, do not define the boundary of ethnic category. Rather, it is the „extension‟ 
that is directly related to the boundary. 
 
Different individuals may use one and the same word with different extension and 
                                                 
45
 Nagata, „What is a Malay?‟. 
46
 William O‟Grady, Michael Dobrovolsky, Francis Katamba, Contemporary Linguistics: An 
Introduction, 3
rd
 ed. (London: Longman, 1996), 276-7. 
  
 18 
intension. The same is true of ethnic category. The category „Asian‟ used in British local 
newspapers is quite different from the same word used in, say, the „Asian value‟ debates, 
both in intension and extension. Nevertheless, a word is a social product, and despite the 
variation, there is a certain consensus of usage within a certain range of people in close 
interaction and the same can be said of the ethnic categories. 
 
Also, a category does not stand on its own, but in relation to the other categories 
used within a certain context. „Chin‟ used in Burma is used as against other categories 
such as Kachin, Shan, Karen, Burma, and so on, and „Kuki‟ is used in Manipur vis-à-vis 
Naga, Meithei, and so on. The relationship of different categories can be systematised 
into hierarchy. One example of such understanding is shown in the figure provided by 
Lian Sakhong (see Fig. 1 on page 3 above), in which all the sub-categories of the Kuki-
Chin people are arranged under 6 mid-level categories, which are then subsumed to the 
category „Chin‟ which is attached to the Tibeto-Burman branch of Mongolian. This fine 
system of global human categories was a construction of the past two centuries of 
western literature on mankind and the real beginning for such a compilation came with 
the rise of ethnology in the mid-nineteenth century. Yet, if not on the global scale, there 
were also local systems, or taxonomies of categories in various parts of India and 
Burma in different periods. 
 
All these – extension, intension, and the system of ethnic categories – go through 
changes in time and this is the main focus in the following chapters: whether and how 
the standardisation of categories in these three aspects took place during the developing 
period of British administration. Yet, a historical study is necessarily limited by the 
sources available for research. The specific aspect a researcher wants to focus on may 
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not be researchable due to the lack of adequate evidence. Moreover, as Elton warns us, 
when a researcher begins to ask complex questions, the origins of which are 
independent of his immediate subject of study, he incurs the danger of misrepresenting 
the events of the past to back his own hypothesis. A focus is necessary because no one 
can transcribe the whole universality of life onto paper, but once a focus is chosen, a 
researcher has to become a servant of the sources and concentrate on the establishment 
of the facts.
47
 Therefore, it is important to know the characteristics of the available 
sources, and a good understanding of sources also enables a researcher to recognise and 
avoid possible prejudice inscribed in them through the way in which the evidence was 
produced and preserved. 
 
 
2. The History of the Kuki-Chin People in the Nineteenth Century 
 
a) Sources of history 
 
The Kuki-Chin people did not have a written language until the early twentieth 
century, so the best source to show the internal situation of the Kuki-Chin land from the 
people‟s own perspective, is the oral tradition passed down in the hills. There is still a 
slim chance that more information might be revealed through the verses of ancestors or 
genealogy passed down to current generations.
48
 Some of the published works have also 
incorporated the oral traditions, and genealogies. Carey and Tuck, Vum Ko Hau, 
Vanlawma, Vumson and Haokip are among them.
49
 Of these, only Carey and Tuck, and 
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Vanlawma deal with early nineteenth century history in any detail; but otherwise the 
interest did not stretch so far back in time.  
 
Therefore the most important source for Kuki-Chin history in the nineteenth 
century is the documents. It should be noted that the British were not the only ones who 
left records along this frontier. Before the British entered the scene, the Kuki-Chin 
people had complicated relationships with the people surrounding them: to the north 
there was the kingdom of the Manipuris; west of the Manipuris were the Cacharis; to 
the west was the great Mughal empire which had three provinces that bordered the 
Kuki-Chin hills, namely Sylhet, Tripura and Chittagong; to the south of Chittagong was 
the Kingdom of Arakan which was annexed by the expanding Burmese in the late 18
th
 
century; then, lastly, to the east of Arakan and stretching along the eastern outskirts of 
the hills up to Manipur was the Kingdom of Burma (see Map 2. on page xiv above). 
This is only a broad outline as there were numerous other smaller chiefs distinct from 
the Kuki-Chin people in the Chittagong Hills. 
 
Many of these kingdoms had writing systems and left records that contain 
information on the Kuki-Chin people.
50
 These sources are, however, totally ignored by 
anyone writing on the Kuki-Chin people. In fact, not only is the history of the 
relationships between these peoples and the Kuki-Chin people still unexplored, but also 
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the histories of these kingdoms themselves have not received enough academic attention. 
It will take someone with great linguistic abilities, to go through these sources and 
compile the history of the Kuki-Chin people‟s relationship with the neighbours. I have 
only included a very general sketch of the relationships as can be found in the secondary 
literatures on these kingdoms in the following chapter. 
 
Thus, the most approachable source for the Kuki-Chin history for the time being is 
that left by the British. A historical study of the 19th century „Kuki-Chin‟ people 
through the documentary sources has long been overdue. Except for Alexander 
Mackenzie, who published a book on the Eastern Frontier of Bengal in 1884,
51
 the 
original British documents have been long neglected by historians writing on the Kuki-
Chin people. Those who included a part of the nineteenth century history have done so 
by quoting what British colonial authors had written, and in their turn, most of the 
British colonial authors relied on Mackenzie for the part before the 1870s. So much so 
that some of the misquotations from Mackenzie are being circulated as facts.
52
 
 
This is one of the most important aims of this thesis, i.e. to construct history from 
the documentary sources left by the British. The British encroachment into the outskirts 
of the Kuki-Chin hills began in the late eighteenth century when they annexed Bengal, 
which included Chittagong, Tripura, and Sylhet, all of which were adjacent to the hills 
where the Kuki-Chin people lived. As these territorial rights gradually morphed into an 
administrative structure, official correspondence between various levels of the 
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Company‟s employees increased. This official correspondence provides the main source 
for the investigation of the past. 
 
To understand the documents, it is helpful to reflect on the process by which a 
document is created and preseved. This can be illustrated by considering a typical line 
of communication, for example, in the case of a raid in Cachar committed by the Kuki 
people in the 1830s. In such a case, the Superintendent of Cachar, within whose charge 
the incident happened, would investigate the case and then report the circumstances 
with the recommended course of action to his immediate superior, the Agent to the 
Governor General in the North East Frontier of Bengal, stationed at the regional centre, 
Gauhati. The Agent would then review the situation and send recommendations to the 
Government of India in Calcutta, usually together with the original letter written by the 
Superintendent of Cachar. In the colonial centre, Calcutta, a Secretary to the 
Government would analyse the situation or, if necessary, request more information from 
those regional officers, and bring the matter to the notice of the Governor General in 
Council with suggestions; who would then either make the final decision or refer it to 
the Directors in London. 
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Fig. 2. The Line of Communication from Cachar to London in the 1830s and the Locations of the 
Archival Sources 
 
 
 
If the matter under consideration needed an urgent reply and the season was 
favourable, the whole process from the frontier to the Government of India and back to 
the frontier could take about three weeks thanks to the dak runners and river 
communications. The amount of time the Superintendent of Cachar had to wait for a 
reply could be lengthened if the matter had to be addressed to Leadenhall Street in 
London. The Governor-General also sent copies of letters, and any other attachments 
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such as maps, drawings, and photographs to London for consideration. Yet the return of 
such items was not always guaranteed, and he usually ordered copies of the important 
ones to be made and kept in India. This was the same with the lower administration of 
the provincial centres. Remnants of these are what we now see in the archives and fig. 2 
above summarises the process and shows the location where the documents are found 
nowadays. 
 
Throughout British rule in India, the details of lines of correspondence went 
through various changes, and during the earlier period of the Company‟s rule, such a 
refined process only emerged gradually. Some general points, however, can be made 
regarding the characteristics of the sources, and the limitations they impose on historical 
research. 
 
First, the authors of the documents, even the officers at the very frontier, were 
outsiders and often ignorant of the internal situation of the Kuki-Chin. Therefore, the 
only events that can be traced through the British documents are those concerning the 
relationship between the Kuki-Chin people and the British territories in India, seen from 
the British point of view. 
 
Second, and related to the above, the only aspects of the life in the frontier area that 
can be researched are those that came to the notice of frontier officers. Therefore, those 
events that disturbed or threatened the peaceful working of the administration were 
more likely to be reported than peaceful or ordinary situations. Besides, most of the 
individual officers had praise and promotion in mind, and those cases that illustrated the 
reporting administrators‟ able management would be highlighted while the opposite 
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would even be intentionally hidden.  
 
Third, as the sources for the thesis are those from the colonial and metropolitan 
centres, the documents are top heavy: there are more records of how the top authorities 
reached certain decisions than the details of the activities of the frontier officers. They 
are also opinion-heavy: as the original report by a frontier officer moved through the 
administrative hierarchy, more opinions were added and naturally the opinion part grew 
larger than the details of the observed event. Because of this, the sources illustrate better 
the formation of ideas and their relationship to the workings of the British Indian 
administration than the events on the frontier themselves. 
 
Fourth, until an administrative unit was established that exclusively dealt with the 
Kuki-Chin people, there could not be a constant source of information that regularly 
made reports on the people. Thus documents regarding the people outside the normal 
working of the administration, which was the case of the Kuki-Chin people for the most 
part of the nineteenth century, appear rarely and at irregular intervals. The number of 
documents is at its lowest during a period of prolonged peace but suddenly soars when 
an aggressive event takes place. This causes a practical problem in keeping a consistent 
narrative over a period. One way of coping with this problem is to narrow the focus to 
one well-documented event. Another way is broadening the range of time and place to 
arrange seemingly isolated events under a theme that develops gradually. I have taken 
this latter strategy for this thesis. This strategy is also necessary to be able to draw a 
meaningful interpretation of historical events as they relate to the development of 
categories.  
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b) Issues of Kuki-Chin History 
 
Nevertheless, both the lack of accounts on Kuki-Chin history in the nineteenth 
century, and the necessity of historical research to concentrate on the establishment of 
facts, make it imperative to focus on the broad relationship between the British and the 
Kuki-Chin people in order that a proper study of the development of Kuki-Chin 
categories can be made. Therefore, in the following chapters, I will take a two-stage 
approach: first reconstruct narratives regarding the British relationship with the Kuki-
Chin people, and then, based on the reconstruction, analyse the transfer and changes of 
the Kuki-Chin categories from the local usages into British usages.  
 
Several points need to be highlighted regarding the development of the British 
relationship with the Kuki-Chin people. The few events of the nineteenth century that 
have appeared so far in the publications on the Kuki-Chin people are seldom more than 
disconnected lists of raids by the Kuki-Chin people and retaliatory expeditions by the 
British Indian Government.
53
 In this respect, the authors of the post-independence 
period do not differ from the colonial authors. The only difference is the tone of the 
narratives: while colonial authors highlighted the savage and unprovoked nautre of the 
Kuki-Chin raids that „earned‟ British retaliation, the post-colonial works focused on the 
illegitimacy of British colonial encroachment and the legitimate defence of territorial 
rights by the Kuki-Chin people. This encouraged a tendency to interpret all the events as 
if they were exclusively between the British and the Kuki-Chin people. 
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It has to be made clear, firstly, that neither the British, nor the Kuki-Chin people, 
were one uniform entity. British India was just emerging as an administrative structure 
during the period of the Company with varying degrees of cohesion between centre and 
periphery. Within the administration of British India were various different individuals 
including not only the natives of Britain but also the natives of India – such as clerks, 
police, soldiers, interpreters and guides. As Fisher warns, „we must avoid the tendency 
to regard either the Company or the British as a whole to have been unified or acting in 
perfect harmony.‟54 
 
Moreover, the boundary of British India had not been demarcated clearly during 
the Company‟s rule. In relation to the provinces adjacent to the Kuki-Chin hills, the 
boundary was mostly vague and British influence gradually disappeared in the hills. 
Thus rather than a well-defined boundary, British India had a broad frontier area 
through which they interacted with the Kuki-Chin people. Besides, there were other 
parties on the frontier than British India and the Kuki-Chin people. During the 
Company‟s period, Manipur and Tripura kept nominal independence, though under 
British influence, and other than these better known entities, there were also smaller 
lords of the Chittagong Hills such as Marma and Chakma who had friendly 
relationships with the Company, paying nominal tribute but largely left untouched by 
the British.  
 
Before the coming of the British all of these had had long relationships with the 
Kuki-Chin people through trade, military alliance or wars. This continued through the 
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Company‟s period and was an important factor in the development of the relationship 
between the British and the Kuki-Chin people. Thus, understanding the intricate 
network of relationships between these various parties is vital to the understanding of 
the relationship between the Kuki-Chin people and the British Indian administration.  
 
All the above points can be summed up under one heading: the British 
management of the frontier. One important factor for British management of the frontier 
was information about the area. It was all the more important for the British 
administration, as they were alien to the country and to the people under their rule. The 
Kuki-Chin frontier was no exception. Particularly after the end of the first Anglo-
Burmese war, the sudden increase in territory made it necessary for the British Indian 
Government to conduct thorough surveys of it, and this newly kindled interest produced 
a sudden influx of information regarding the Kuki-Chin people. This is also the issue 
most closely related to the British categorisation of the Kuki-Chin people.  
 
The relationship between knowledge and colonial administration, in a general 
sense, has been subjected to interesting debates. Various authors have pointed out the 
close relationship between the development of knowledge or „sciences‟ and the 
colonialism of the 19
th
 century.
55
 There is no denying that the development of ethnology 
in Britain during the Victorian period had much to do with colonial expansion. For 
instance, wherever the British colonial rule extended there followed an army of 
administrators, soldiers, missionaries, and travellers collecting information, specimens 
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and data – geographic, botanical, zoological, religious, linguistic, and ethnological – 
which eventually found their way back to the home country where they nourished the 
fledging modern science of Britain and Europe.
56
 
 
Not surprisingly, in a post-colonial world, many have criticised the morality of a 
science that grew under the immorality of imperialism. Anthropology, and its 
predecessor, ethnology, faced the harshest criticism as a study of colonised „others‟. For 
instance, Feuchtwang maintains that anthropology could not have been unaffected by its 
sponsors, the colonial institutions and the government, that reaped benefits from 
colonial practice. Therefore, he argues, anthropological researches were bound to 
produce knowledge supportive of the colonial policy.
57
  
 
In more recent researches, those views that regard the development of science at 
this period as a by-product of the colonial activities, or even as a result of strategic 
calculation by the colonial administration and therefore intrinsically subjected to the 
interest of colonial manipulation, have been criticised as too narrow and misleading.
58
 
For example, Brown argues that the administrator-scholars who collected the data in 
India were actually engaged in the „pan-European scientific debates of the day‟; 
therefore, were concerned with more than simply colonial organisation.
59
 For another 
example, Vicziany criticises the works of Francis Buchanan, the author of a vast range 
of survey works in India in the early 19
th
 century, not because of his linkage to the 
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colonial administration, but because of his excessive personal ambition to enter the 
academic world.
60
 
 
The key issue here is whether the agents of science, the administrator-scholars in 
the nineteenth century and the anthropologists of the twentieth century, had 
independence from the colonial institutions in their scientific activities – including the 
collection, interpretation and transmission of knowledge. Two contrasting conclusions 
have been drawn, partly due to the difference in the period under investigation: whereas 
Feuchtwang and most of the other critics of colonial anthropology consider the late 
nineteenth to the early twentieth century, Brown and Vicziany focus on the earlier, more 
developmental period of science when amateurism dominated. 
 
Zaheer Baber has included the whole period from the eighteenth century to the 
independence of India in his analysis of the relationship between science, technology, 
and colonialism.
61
. He asserts that, in the context of British India, scientific knowledge, 
technology, institutions, colonialism and (even) the world-system influenced and shaped 
one another in a „co-productive‟ way,62 and particular processes were influenced both by 
the long-term structural changes and by the agencies of amateur scientists in India.
63
  
 
The relevance of this inclusionist view to the current topic is that, in analysing the 
relationship between knowledge and colonial administration, no part should be reduced 
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to be a subjective part of the other; though their close, or „co-producing‟ relationship 
should be noted in the particular historical circumstances. The influence of theoretical 
developments at home and of scientific institutions should also form part of the analysis 
of the knowledge acquired by the British administrators of the Kuki-Chin frontier. 
 
 
3. Scope and Structure of the Thesis 
 
I have used the term „Kuki-Chin‟ for the whole of the Kuki, Chin and Mizo people, 
in a similar extension as „Zo‟. I do not, however, intend to make any clear definition of 
the Kuki-Chin people, nor even the individual Kuki, Chin or Lushai, as a starting point 
for the work. As the study itself deals with the development of the categories and their 
definitions, the adequate starting point is the unknown state of the Kuki-Chin people to 
the British. 
 
In terms of period, the starting point is set at the time when the first mention of the 
people was made by the British, i.e. in the late 18
th
 century. To describe this process in 
relation to the British administration of India and scientific developments in Europe, 
many pages have been allocated to describe what would have otherwise been regarded 
as background information: the characteristics of the administrators, their purposes, 
their relationship with the central administration and with the home country, the 
development of the colonial administrative structure, the development of scientific 
trends at home, and so on.  
 
Geographically, the areas under consideration are, first, the districts of Sylhet, 
Tripura, Cachar, and Manipur in the north, and Chittagong and Arakan in the South. Of 
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these, Sylhet, Tripura and Chittagong came under British control in the 1760s, and 
Cachar, Manipur and Arakan were incorporated after the termination of the First Anglo-
Burmese war in 1826. 
 
The next chapter starts with an overview of the relationships among different 
polities in the frontier area before the coming of the British in the plains of Bengal as 
the background for the whole thesis. I have then included the establishment of the 
British presence in Bengal until the 1780s, the period of Hastings as Governor-General. 
Even at this early period of British rule in Bengal, when all the machinery of 
government was yet to take shape, there were British administrators in the far outposts 
through whom some hearsay information on the Kuki-Chin people was acquired.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with the period of reform in the administrative structure of the 
Indian Government under Cornwallis up to the 1820s. Most of the narratives, however, 
are focused on the early administrator-scholars who wrote the first publications on the 
Kuki-Chin people through the Asiatic Society of Bengal. One of the most distinctive 
figures in Kuki-Chin ethnography, and perhaps the whole ethnography of the 
Chittagong and Burma frontier, was Francis Buchanan, who travelled in this period and 
left manuscript journals. I have paid particular attention to his works as they reveal 
more of the situation of the ethnic categories before the British than any other sources.  
 
Chapter 4 is devoted to the First Anglo-Burmese War and the surveys during and 
after the war. In terms of period it is from 1824 to the mid 1830s. More attention is paid 
to the administrative changes caused by the war than to the actual course of the war 
itself. The surveys during this period had increased information regarding the frontier 
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area more than any other events during the period of the Company, and these are dealt 
with in detail. Not all the changes that were brought in around this period were related 
to events on the frontier, and the changes in the attitudes of the British in general also 
had some important repercussions on the relationship between the British and the Kuki-
Chin people during this period, and are therefore discussed in the chapter.  
 
In Chapter 5, I deal with the administrative measures taken for the defence of the 
newly acquired territories. Period-wise, it overlaps with the surveys mentioned in the 
previous chapter, so there is no more to mention in terms of British knowledge of the 
Kuki-Chin; but one of the important issues of this time was the question of the boundary, 
and I have brought together all the items relative to this question in this chapter, even 
from outside that period.  
 
Around the 1840s, British troops in both the northern and southern districts of the 
Kuki-Chin frontier attempted several expeditions against the Kuki-Chin people. Chapter 
6 deals with these expeditions, but, again, this chapter is not restricted to this particular 
decade and other events relating to the expeditions are discussed here. These 
expeditions resulted in more knowledge of the Kuki-Chin people, including the first 
mention of the so-called „northward movement‟ of the people, which is discussed in 
detail in this chapter.  
 
After this series of expeditions in the 1840s, the British readopted their former 
defensive policy in both the northern and southern frontiers. In the meantime, the Kuki-
Chin people initiated peaceful intercourse with the British. These diplomatic exchanges 
are the main focus of Chapter 7. Around this time Brian Hodgson wrote a series of 
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articles relating to the ethnic groups in India. The influence of ethnology was apparent 
by this time in the literature on the Kuki-Chin people. This is also included in this 
chapter.  
 
Lastly, it has to be mentioned that a purist approach to the spellings has been 
abandoned in this account of a complicated frontier. Rather, I have adopted what seems 
to be the most widely accepted form in the British documents to allow easy comparison 
with other works and documents. The resulting choice is necessarily arbitrary, as there 
are numerous different ways in which one word has been spelt by different 
administrators and scholars. Some of these confusions have important implications in 
the development of ethnic categories. A simple difference in spellings could also mean a 
wide difference in the extension and intension of the category. In quotations, my 
principle was to preserve the original spelling of names of people as they appear in the 
original text, but in my own narrative I use the most commonly used terms of the period 
– Kuki, Chin and Lushai. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE BEGINNING OF THE BRITISH INVOLVEMENT 
IN THE KUKI-CHIN FRONTIER AREA: 1760s-1780s 
 
 
1. Pre-Colonial Polities on the Kuki-Chin Frontier 
 
a) The Mughal Empire: Sylhet, Tripura and Chittagong 
 
The Mughal Empire was the largest among the polities around the Kuki-Chin land 
before the coming of the British. In general, different regions of the Mughal Empire had 
been loosely connected to the centre. Apart from regular tributes and the supply of 
soldiers to the Emperor, local administrations were left in the hands of their regional 
authorities with minimal interference from the state.
1
 The tendency for localisation grew 
stronger after the death of Aurangzeb in the early eighteenth century: as central 
authority declined, the relatively strengthened local rulers began to rule their provinces 
as if they were independent.
2
 Bengal was the first province to slip out of the Mughal 
emperor‟s authority; soon, the nawab of Oudh followed the example of Bengal; Nizam-
ul-Mulk, a minister (vesir) of the Mughal Empire, left Delhi and established a dynasty 
of his own in Hyderabad; the Marathas dominated Western India; and petty rulers 
prevailed in the Southern parts. The great Mughal Emperor continued to reside in Delhi 
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as a supreme but nominal head.
3
  
 
Under such circumstances, the relationship between the Kuki-Chin people and 
their neighbouring Mughal subjects depended on the local circumstances. Among the 
vast territories under the Mughal Empire, the districts that formed the frontier with the 
Kuki-Chin people were Sylhet, Tripura and Chittagong all of which were under the 
Nawab of Bengal in the eighteenth century. 
 
Sylhet (Srihatta) consisted of a fertile valley created by the Surma River, which ran 
from Cachar in the east and continued into the Meghna River in the west. To the north, 
Sylhet was bounded by the Khasi and Jaintia hills, and to the south, by the hilly domain 
of the Tripura Rajah and the Kuki-Chin people. The valley, or the Sylhet Proper, had 
been divided between kingdoms called Gor and Laur, both of which were added to 
Bengal during the time of Akbar in the sixteenth century. A substantial portion of the 
plains, however, was ruled by two independent kings based on the hills: the Jaintia 
kings of the northern hills governed the northern plains of the Surma River, and the 
rajahs of Tripura often claimed rights over the plains adjacent to the hills.
4
 
 
According to Robert Lindsay, the first British Collector at Sylhet, the Mughals 
regarded the defence of Sylhet as important and stationed a considerable military force 
there commanded by a close relation of the Nawab of Bengal.
5
 Nevertheless, local 
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zemindars of Sylhet had been paying yearly presents to the Kuki chiefs as a kind of 
protection money for those who entered the southern hills to cut wood. These gifts, 
according to Mackenzie, also served as inducements for the Kuki-Chin people to bring 
down their forest products to the markets for trade and barter.
6
 
 
Tripura (or Tipperah) was located in the hills between the Surma Valley in the 
north and Chittagong in the south. To the east, the limit of the Tripura Rajah‟s authority 
had never been definite but gradually merged into a part of the Kuki-Chin land now 
called Mizoram. The Rajah‟s territory included a substantial portion of the plains that 
stretched west from the Tripura Hills to the Meghna River. In 1733, the Nawab of 
Bengal, Shuja-ud-din annexed this portion and made it a pergunnah called 
‘Roushanabad’. Nevertheless, as his main interest was the supply of elephants and 
horses for war purposes, he retained the Rajah of Tripura in charge of the plains, 
rendering him a zemindar of the pergunnah. From this time on, the Rajah of Tripura had 
the dual position as a zemindar under the Mughals and the independent rajah of the 
remaining part of his kingdom.
7
 
 
Of the relationship between the Tripura and Kuki-Chin people Dalton wrote: 
That the Kúkis were known of old in Tripura is apparent from the Ráj 
Mála, as it represents Shiva falling in love with a Kúki girl who was in 
consequence put to death by his shrew of a wife. In another place the Kúkis 
are represented as allies of the Rájá of Udaipur who invaded Tripura, but was 
defeated, and Udaipur became the capital of Tripura. Again, the Kúkis are 
brought forward as accusing the Tripura general Raja Chachag of a design to 
make Tamul, which he had subjugated in the name of his master, an 
independent state. This general flourished in A.D. 1512.
8
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From the above quotation, it can be gathered that the Kuki had been regarded as an 
important factor in the politics of Tripura for a long time. This is also supported by 
Mackenzie who noted that the Kuki people were often implicated in the feuds among 
the contenders for the Tripuri throne; in his own words: „every rebellious member of the 
Rajah‟s family sought refuge among the Kukis and incited them to outrage.‟9 Thus, 
whenever possible, the Tripura Rajah tried to put the Kuki people under control by 
imposing allegiance, or by appointing officers over the Kuki, as the following quotation 
from the reports of an Assamese delegation to Tripura in the early eighteenth century 
suggests: 
The hills on both sides of the Barak River are inhabited by a tribe called the 
Kukis who are like the Daflas and Nagas here [in Assam]. There will be about 
three hundred men at the place; their weapons are arrows, bows and shields 
and Naga spears. The Tripura Raja appoints a governor over this place, and he 
is called Halamcha, who is like the Naga Khunbaos in our country. He has 
under him one Galim, one Gabar, one Chapia and one Doloi. They eat and 
dress like the Nagas, but they do not eat beef.
10
 
 
What exactly was meant by the names „Halamcha‟, „Galim‟, „Gabar‟, „Chapia‟ and 
„Doloi‟ needs further research, but when a British officer visited the Tripura Hills in the 
late 18
th
 century, he reported that the names of the chiefs among the Kuki were „Roys, 
Ghalims, Chuppiahs, and Govoors‟11 which, correspond with „Doloi‟, „Galim‟, „Chapia‟ 
and „Gabar‟. Without further knowledge about the political and demographic 
constitution of the Tripura at this period, it is difficult to conclude anything about these 
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names or the supposed „governor‟ called „Halamcha‟. It has to be added, however, that 
the boundary of Tripura could not have been delimitated clearly, as the distinction 
between the subjects of Tripura Rajah and those independent of his authority was also 
obscure. The control any one Rajah had over the outlying villages depended on the 
strength of that particular Rajah.
12
 
 
South of Tripura, across the Fenny River, was Chittagong. It consisted of coastal 
plains that stretched down to Arakan and a succession of chains of mountains that ran 
parallel to the coastline. Located between the kingdoms of Tripura, Arakan and the 
Mughal territories, Chittagong frequently changed its rulers. In addition, Portuguese 
freebooters overran the country in the sixteenth century. They were at first hired by the 
King of Arakan to assist him in controlling the province, but in 1605 the King of Arakan 
drove them into an island called Sandwip. The Portuguese, however, continued to raid 
the coasts of Chittagong and Bengal from this island, which induced the Nawab of 
Bengal to make a determined attack on the island in 1664, wipe out the pirates, and re-
annex Chittagong.
13
 
 
Further east into the mountain ranges of the Chittagong Hills were the Kuki-Chin 
people. In between the Mughal lands of Chittagong and the Kuki-Chin were the 
transitory hill powers of Chakma and Marma. These were organised in larger political 
units than the Kuki-Chin people and shared the religions, customs and languages of the 
Bengalis and the Arakanese.
14
 In the relationships between the Kuki-Chin and the 
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dwellers of the plains in Chittagong, they worked as intermediaries in both trading and 
raids. This topic, however, still calls for further research, as Bessaignet observed fifty 
years ago.
15
 
 
 
b) Assam, Cachar and Manipur 
 
Another important kingdom of the region was Assam, established by the Ahoms, a 
group of Tai, in the 13
th
 century. It occupied the Brahmputra valley and, except to the 
west, Assam was encircled by the hills and was constantly under threat from the various 
groups of hill people such as Bor, Singphos or Kachins, Garos, Daflas, Mishmis, Mikirs 
and Nagas. The management of the hills, therefore, was vital for the success of the 
Assamese dynasty, and authorities were appointed in each tract for the protection of the 
people.
16
 Nevertheless, protection thus provided was only reliable when the Assamese 
government was strong enough. As Bhuyan wrote: 
[W]hen the government was weak the hill men swept down the plains in 
marauding excursions, and carried off property and men from the Duars [the 
belt of land at the foot of the hills]; and they did not even hesitate to claim 
ownership over this zone. Most of the tribesmen were deficit in labourers and 
certain necessaries of life, and the Duar people were forced into compulsory 
servitude in the hills and their crops, cattle and other property were constantly 
at the mercy of the needy and rapacious hill men.
17
 
 
During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Assamese Government 
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continued to decline: central authority imploded with a series of succession struggles; 
rebels and bandits rampaged throughout the country; and the loosely held polities of the 
hills broke off, turning hostile. In such circumstances, normal working of the 
government in the frontier area was not possible and people deserted the fertile but 
unprotected tracts under the hills, which crippled the capabilities of the state further.
18
 
Assam was not in direct contact with the Kuki-Chin people, but the example of Assam 
illustrates the situation that could happen to other polities in the frontier that were in 
closer contact with the Kuki-Chin while these were under similar political instability. 
 
South of Assam, across the Barail Range and hills inhabited by the Nagas, were the 
Kingdoms of Manipur and Cachar. Manipur was totally surrounded by hills on every 
side and its history had been closely knitted with that of the surrounding hill people; 
namely, the Nagas and the Kukis.
19
 The dominant population of Manipur, the Meitheis, 
were also closely related to the Kukis in ethnic terms. The Meithei emerged from seven 
different groups all of which traced their origins to the hills.
20
 Lehman regarded the 
language of the Meithei as the Kuki-Chin language of „long-Hinduised people‟ in the 
plains of Manipur, and the Linguistic Survey of India also classified Meithei under the 
Kuki-Chin group, while Hodson argued that before the 18
th
 century the Meitheis were 
the same as the hill people in internal organisation, in religion, in habits and manners.
21
 
                                                 
18
 H.K. Barpujari, Assam in the Days of the Company: 1826-58 (Gauhati: Spectrum Publications, 
1980), 4-5; Edward Gait. History of Assam (Calcutta: Thacker Spink & co. 1933), 192-206. 
19
 T. C. Hodson, The Nagas of Tribes of Manipur (London: Macmillan, 1911; reprint, New Delhi: 
Low Price Publications, 1996), 1-2 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 
20
 Ibid., 9-10; idem, The Meitheis (London: David Nutt, 1908; reprint, New Delhi: Low Price 
Publications, 1997), 5-6 (page citations are to the reprint edition); N. N. Acharyya, „Evolution of Meitei 
Polity in Ancient and Mediaeval Manipur‟, in Studies in the History of North-East India, ed. J. B. 
Bhatacharjee (Shillong: North-Eastern Hill University Publications, 1986), 75-6. 
21
 Lehman, Structure, 5; Grierson, Linguistic Survey, vol. 1 „Introduction‟, 72; Hodson, Meitheis, 11; 
see also Frank M. Lebar, Gerald Cannon Hickey, and John K. Musgrave, Ethnic Groups of Mainland 
  
 42 
 
According to Gait, it was from 1714 that the history of Manipur became reliable. 
In this year a Naga named Pamheiba became rajah, taking a Hindu name of Gharib 
Nawaz. During his rule, Hinduism became the major religion of the people of Manipur, 
distancing the Meithei further from the hill people; he then waged series of successful 
wars against the Burmese and captured many important towns, but after he was 
murdered by his own son in 1754, the country degenerated into a civil war among his 
many sons.
22
 
 
To the west of Manipur was Cachar, located in the Surma Valley. When the 
Mughals conquered Sylhet in the sixteenth century, the remaining portion of the Surma 
Valley to the east was ruled by petty tributaries to Tripura. In the later half of the 
sixteenth century, the Dimasa rulers of Maibong, having been chased out of their former 
lands in the Brahmputra Valley by the Ahoms, expanded towards the plains of Cachar 
and pushed their boundary to Sylhet with Badarpur as the boundary. The population of 
the plains of Cachar was predominantly Bengali, with a particular dialect they shared 
with the people of Sylhet. The Dimasa rulers of Cachar preserved the Bengali system of 
administration and even patronised Bengali and Sanskrit education.
23
 Apart from the 
Kukis in the southern hills, there were a number of Kuki villages in the northern hills, in 
central Cachar.
 
These are known to have been settled by the Cachar kings in the early 
nineteenth century. There is no direct evidence available to show the relationship 
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between the Cacharis or Manipuri and the Kuki-Chin before the British annexation, but 
from the later evidence it seems that the rulers of these countries also maintained similar 
relationships of hostilities and alliances with the Kuki-Chin chiefs as the Rajahs of 
Tripura.
24
 
 
 
c) Arakan and Burma 
 
To the south and east of the Kuki-Chin land were the kingdoms of Arakan and 
Burma. Both of these kingdoms had Buddhism as their religion and had a common 
written script though there were substantial dialectal differences in the pronunciation of 
words.
25
 Yet towards the middle of the eighteenth century, these two kingdoms were 
undergoing opposite fates.  
 
In the eighteenth century Burma, the newly risen Konbaung dynasty held tighter 
control over its territory than the rulers of any of the other polities of the region. After 
the short rule of the Mon had been overthrown and the territories of the restored 
Toungoo dynasty regained, the kings of the Konbaung dynasty marched their army into 
the neighbouring countries: first, they subdued the Shan people in the north; then 
devastated Manipur many times over (in the years 1755, 1758-9, 1764-5, 1770) 
annexing part of it; waged war with Siam (1760, 1764-7, 1785-6, 1809-11); twice laid 
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siege to Ayuthia; and defended Burma against a Chinese invasion (1765-9).
26
 
 
The Arakanese court, on the other hand, suffered endless rounds of bloody 
intrigues from the early eighteenth century, which saw a new king on the throne every 
few years.
27
 Some discontented nobles of Arakan, according to Phayre, „flocked to Ava, 
beseeching aid to restore order‟ for years28; then, in 1784, Burmese King Bodawhpaya 
marched his troops to Arakan to „help the local people to get good rulers‟ and „to clear 
the place of all bad characters so that the Religion might prosper‟.29 The conclusion of 
this expedition was different from all the other successful campaigns that the kings of 
Burma waged with their neighbours. The Burmese invasion of Manipur and Siam had 
ended with extensive slave raiding (and the installation of a friendly pretender on the 
throne in the case of Manipur), but they annexed the territories of Arakan and 
reorganised the administration after the Burmese style: scattering outposts throughout 
the country and appointing Burmese governors.
30
 
 
Various groups of Kuki-Chin people had been known in Arakan. The chronicles of 
the kingdom of Arakan have records of legendary history that associate the early kings 
of Arakan with the Kuki-Chin. For example, according to Paton, there are occasions 
when the „Jumah caste‟ of people came to the aid of Arakan against Burmese incursions. 
                                                 
26
 G. E. Harvey, History of Burma: from the Earliest Times to 10 March 1824 the Beginning of the 
English Conquest (London: Longman, 1925, reprint, London: Frank Cass & Co. 1967), 238-82. 
27
 Victor B. Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, c. 1580-1760 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 226. 
28
 Arthur P. Phayre, History of Burma including Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim and 
Arakan (London: Trübner, 1883, reprint, London: Susil Gupta, 1967), 212 (page citations are from the 
reprint edition). 
29
 ROB, vol.4, xvii, 83(16 October 1784), 182(4 October 1787). 
30
 Harvey, History, 280; Thant Myint, The Making of Modern Burma. (Edinburgh: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) 14. 
  
 45 
In another instance a man of „Jumah caste, inhabitants of the Koladyne hills‟ married 
the princess of Arakan and became king.
31
 The word „Jumah caste‟ came from Jhoom, 
which is the Bengali equivalent of Burmese Toungya, meaning slash and burn 
cultivation, or land cultivated by such methods. Thus, „Jumah caste‟ can be equated to 
hill people in contrast to the sedentary cultivators of the plains, and the upper part of the 
Koladyne River was known to have been inhabited by the Kuki-Chin people as it is 
nowadays. Therefore, the „Jumah caste‟ of the „Koladyne Hills‟ can safely be equated to 
the Kuki-Chin. Phayre also mentions an episode from the chronicles, which traces the 
ancestry of the kings of Arakan to a son of a hill chief of the „Toung-mru.‟32 „Toung‟ 
(______) in Burmese means „mountain‟. It was used in contrast to „Chaung‟ (_______: 
river) to designate the people living in the higher and remoter hills as in Toug-
tha(_________: sons of mountains) and Chaung-tha(__________: sons of rivers). 
Therefore „Toung-mru‟ designates the Mru people, with an emphasis on their 
remoteness. 
 
Judging from the political chaos Arakan was in during the eighteenth century, it 
can be assumed that government control over relationships between the Arakanese and 
the Kuki-Chin people would not have existed. This, however, was not the case with 
Burma, which, unlike any other polities mentioned thus far, was still expanding towards 
the zenith of its power. A closer look into the situation in Burma, and the Burmese 
relationship with the Kuki-Chin people can provide an idea of the sort of relationship 
that existed between the Kuki-Chin people and those in the plains. 
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In general the central authority of the Burmese kingdom tended to devolve towards 
lower levels of administrative hierarchy located further away from the centre 
geographically.
33
 Local administration was dominated by various types of headman, or 
the gentry class who derived their authority from their hereditary position in the local 
community despite the semblance of appointments by royal decree. Like zemindars of 
Bengal, their income came primarily from commissions on tax collections and periodic 
gratuities from local inhabitants rather than salaries from the government.
34
 Thus, as in 
the case of Mughal India, central rule did not penetrate into this lowest rung of the 
administration and village life was governed by anonymous customs administered by 
village elders.
35
 
 
Lieberman, as well as Taylor, distinguished three zones in the Burmese kingdom: 
the „central‟ or „nuclear‟ zone where the ahmú-dàn (specialised servicemen) population 
were concentrated; the „dependent‟ or „secondary‟ zone which was dominated by athi 
(free non-service taxpayers) population; and the „tributary zone‟, often composed of 
ethnic non-Burman populations with their own rulers, but under the obligation to 
provide the king with tribute and military service at his request.
36
 Burmese control over 
the diverse area of the „tributary zone‟ was military in character: it was done by 
manipulating existing local cleavages and supporting the rule of those friendly to 
Burma.
37
 Taylor described the tributary zone in general as follows: 
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[The rulers of the tributary zone] paid allegiance to the central court through 
tribute, missions, marriage alliances, military forces and similar non-
permanent, non-bureaucratic displays of obligation. When these tributaries 
posed no serious threat to the central state, kings allowed them to conduct 
their affairs undisturbed. Their economic surplus was so marginal that until 
their minerals and timber became valuable in the nineteenth century security 
was the king‟s only concern.38 
 
The Burmese relationship with the Chin people also fell into the category of the 
„tributary zone‟. Apart from this general description, we also have a few other sources 
that show some actual instances of relationships. Harvey and Hall mention the inclusion 
of a Chin levy in the army of Alaung-hpaya.
39
 Both of these authors do not make clear 
whether the Chin levy mentioned were men recruited as a result of a tributary 
relationship between a Chin chief and the king of Burma, or a duty imposed on Chin 
ahmú-dàn settlers. Yet, a record found in the Royal Orders of Burma suggests that it was 
a form of tributary relationship mediated by the Mogaung Sawbwa or the Shan ruler of 
Mogaung. In March 1788, the Mogaung Sawbwa reported that: 
Many Chins, Kayins(Karens) and Khanti Shans had been recruited from 
his area to serve in the fighting forces during 1785 and 1786 when „the King 
needed most their services‟ but unfortunately many of them deserted and 
some officers like Kyi Wun (officer of granaries) had been helping these 
absconders.
40
 
 
Even within the tributary zone there were varying degrees of integration to the 
Burmese court. The above quote shows that the Burmese kings controlled those people 
further away from them through the Shans. In fact, the most important tributaries of all 
in Burma were the Shans, who were, unlike the others, sedentary farmers, had written 
characters, professed Buddhism and were organised in large political units united, 
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though loosely, under Sawbwas.
41
  
 
A more detailed account of this tributary relationship between the Chin and Burma 
was made available after the annexation of the Upper Burma a century after the above 
quotation. Despite the intervention of a hundred years, the observations made by the 
British officers of the frontier between the Chin people and the Burmese in the Kale and 
the Yaw Valley are worth mentioning here as a general illustration. 
 
In 1887, Major Raikes, the Deputy Commissioner of Chindwin, who was 
responsible for negotiations with and subjugation of the Chin people west of Kale, made 
various intelligence reports regarding the Chins. In one of his early reports he mentions 
tributes formerly paid to the Kale Sawbwa by the Minledaung and Tawyan Chins
42
 who 
lived in the hills nearer to Kale: 
Until the present Sawbwa was declared Governor of the Kale State the 
Minlèdaung and Tawyan Chins used to pay tribute to the Sawbwa. This tribute 
consisted of four cotton sheets, two baskets of tobacco, and two baskets of 
chilies given annually, and one Chin slave (not exceeding two cubits and one 
span in height) given triennially. No tribute has been paid by Minlèdaung or 
Tawyan Chins since deposition of the ex-Sawbwa.
43
 
 
It is worth noting that this tributary relationship was not between the Chin people 
and the Burmese government but between the Chin people and the Sawbwa of Kale; 
therefore, not only did the Shan Sawbwas act as intermediaries between the King of 
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Burma and the Chin, but they also exacted tribute on their own account. Raikes 
indicates that the reason why the Minledaung and Tawyan Chins paid such tribute was 
in order to be allowed to trade in the markets of Kale, from which they acquired goods 
which were then traded to the other Chins further west. Moreover, both Minledaung and 
Tawyan Chins were subordinate to a Tlaisun chief and were bound to pay him certain 
tributes as well as free service to carry salt from Kale to his village.
44
 Thus, there was a 
network of tributary relationships surrounding the trade between the hills and the plains; 
and whoever was in power seems to have attempted to benefit by controlling that trade 
or imposing taxes on it. 
 
One factor that complicated the relationship between the Chins and other dwellers 
in the lowlands such as the Burmese or the Shans was the existence of enmities among 
the Chin people themselves. In this matter, a report by Captain Eyre reveals an 
interesting situation. Captain Eyre was the Deputy Commissioner of Pagan. As in the 
case of Major Raikes in the Kale Valley, Captain Eyre was assigned to the duties of 
controlling the Chins in the Myittha Valley. He observed that most of the Chin chiefs 
maintained a friendly relationship with one or more Burmese villages at the same time 
as raiding other adjoining villages. Interestingly, according to his report, rival Chin 
villages of the Yokwas and the Hakas systematically raided each others‟ trading 
partners: the Yokwas were enemies of the people of the Gangaw circle, but friends with 
those in Minywa, while the Hakas were friends with those in Gangaw and raided the 
Minywa circle.
45
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Hostilities, in fact, dominated the relationship between the Chin and the Burmese 
and the paramount interest of the Burmese government regarding the Chin was to 
subjugate them. In January 1788 the Mogaung Sawbwa was ordered to „use force 
wherever necessary‟ to keep the Chins and Kachins in his territory under close control, 
and to keep the road from the Amber Mines to Mong Long open by „attacking, 
capturing, and killing‟ Chins and Kachins on that route „whenever necessary‟. 46 
Similarly in July 1795, the Myo-thugyi (Town Headman) of Mindon, a town on the 
eastern slope of Arakan Yoma, west of Thayetmyo, requested guns to defend against 
„Chin Ayain‟ or the independent Chins.47 Afeter this request, 50 guns were ordered to be 
retained at Mindon out of the 90 that had been seized there by the same Myo-thugyi.  
 
So far, two types of relationship have been mentioned: Chin as tributaries to the 
Burmese, and as raiders on Burmese territories. These two, however, are similar in that 
the Chins in these relationships were seen as independent neighbours by the Burmese 
government, the only difference being the ability of the Burmese government to impose 
their authority over the particular Chin group in question. If the word „wild Chins‟ (Chin 
Yain _____________, or Chin Ayain _______________)
48
 in the above quotation was 
used to designate collectively those Chins independent of Burma, then it is probable that 
there would have been a counterpart to the „Chin-Yain‟: that is, subjugated or „tamed‟ 
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Chins. Buchanan, who travelled with Symes in the first embassy to the court of Ava,
49
 
does indeed refer to such „subjected Chins‟ as „Kiayn Yeen‟. The Burmese word that 
Buchanan transliterated as „Yeen‟ presumably was „_____‟ meaning „cultured or gentle‟. 
Later in the 1840s, Lieutenant Hopkins used „Aroeng‟ and „Ayeng‟ as the two different 
categories of the Chin.
50
 These could only be Arakanese pronunciations of the same 
words „Ayain‟ and „Ayeen‟ since „y‟ (spelt ___ in Burmese script) in „Ayain‟ would be 
pronounced „r‟ in Arakanese, while the „y‟(spelt ___) in „Yeen‟ is not affected by this 
dialectal difference in pronunciation. 
 
There seems, therefore, to have been varying degrees of „subjection‟ of the Chins 
in Burma. The „Chin Yeen‟ Buchanan met during his trip were those settled within the 
administered area by the Burmese government, presumably after being conquered and 
moved to the plains, paying taxes to a Burmese headman.
51
 In the aftermath of the war 
with Arakan, there seem to have been Chin settlements newly established around the 
Arakan Yoma through forced resettlement and the Chins lived like the Mon Athi, paying 
taxes of cash and produce without duties for service. The same term, however, was also 
applied to those independent Chins with whom the Burmese had friendly intercourse, 
especially those nearer to the plains of Arakan, who, in the later British colonial period, 
were classified as the „Southern Chins‟.52  
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In a short article published in 1914, Furnivall discusses a close connection between 
the Chin and Myingyan.
53
 There were relics of the Chin which he argued were signs of 
the „aboriginal‟ Chin settlements before the Burmese conquest of the territory during the 
Pagan dynasty. There was also a Chin population in Myingyan that came from the hills 
either through voluntary migrations or through forced resettlements by Burmese kings, 
notably king Narathu(1167-1170) who appointed his brother to manage the Chins. 
Furthermore, there were people termed „half cast Chins‟ living east of Popa54  who 
integrated with the Burmese. Furnivall wrote: 
. . . it is said that within the last two generations they still spoke Chin. The old 
people of the present day still wore Chin ornaments and Chin attire when they 
were young. At present however they all call themselves Burman, although 13 
people in the district returned themselves as Chin at the last census.
55
 
 
 
d) Overview of the Kuki-Chin Frontier 
 
There are great dangers of simplification in making general observations from such 
fragmented observations over such a wide and varied area as that of the Kuki-Chin 
frontier. Nevertheless it is helpful, before moving towards the British engagement in 
this frontier, to summarise the pieces of information narrated above to form a general 
view of relationships within the frontier area.  
 
First, the Kuki-Chin people as well as their neighbours in this frontier area were 
organised in political units of widely varying sizes and forms. Their neighbours 
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included the super-states of the Mughals and Burma, as well as the smaller kingdoms of 
Manipur and Tripura, and even smaller entities such as Chakma and Marma. Neither the 
Kuki-Chin nor any of these neighbours lived as unified political units: they were all 
divisible into smaller parts. In other words, even though we recognise the kingdoms and 
name them as units, in reality the central authorities of each kingdom did not have full 
control over their frontier relationships. Due to this, the relationships in this frontier 
tended to become fragmented into village-to-village relationships, especially when the 
powers of the central governments were undermined by an internal crisis.  
 
Second, though they did not have total control, the supra-village authorities did 
project their influence over the centre-periphery relationship, as in the case of the 
Burmese Kings; also, even among the Kuki-Chin, the existence of supra-village 
authorities, however feeble and volatile, could not be ignored. The tributary 
relationships and alliances among different villages of the Kuki-Chin could have 
developed into a more institutionalised form if they had continued over a long period; 
and, indeed, the northern Chin groups were known to have accomplished a state of 
federation when the British found them. The examples in Burma show that tributary 
relationships were imposed both by the King and by district officers – such as the Kale 
Sawbwa – adjacent to the Kuki-Chin people. Therefore, supra-village authority was 
often an added factor in village-to-village relationships rather than having full control 
over these frontier relationships. This made the situation more complicated, as the actual 
relationships were mediated both by the central, or higher, political elements and the 
provincial, or lower, elements.  
 
Third, the Kuki-Chin lived in varying degrees of independence from their 
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neighbours, and the boundaries between different polities were blurred. The Kuki-Chin 
people were generally regarded as politically separate from the dwellers of the plain, but 
there were also cases in which Kuki-Chin settlements were found within the boundaries 
of another kingdom, even as subjects and taxpayers of the King, or with a degree of 
acculturation to the host community. Regarding the Kuki-Chin who were generally 
independent of their neighbours, the balance of power between the Kuki-Chin people 
and their neighbouring cultivators differed from situation to situation and from period to 
period. In Burma we find Chin people paying tribute to a ruler in the plains but in 
Sylhet we find them exacting tribute from a zemindar. In Tripura we hear of Kuki 
people being mobilised in a coup d’etat as well as being subservient to the Rajah. 
Headmen were appointed to control the Kuki-Chin people by Tripuri as well as 
Burmese rulers while, at the same time, raids by the Kuki-Chin people were the main 
security threat to the rulers of the plains. 
 
Fourthly, despite the diversity there was one central element in these relationships: 
the „economic intercourse‟ to borrow Lehman‟s term. He proposed using this term since 
„trade and raid were often combined in the expeditions into Burma‟56 and both of these 
were the same means of gaining outside goods: 
The Chin had no particular source of income for purchasing outside goods, 
and still have none. They simply sold what goods or services they could from 
time to time and raided and looted when payment was not possible.
57
 
This was true not only between the Chin and Burma but also of the Kuki-Chin 
relationship with other societies in the plains. Tributary relationships between the Kuki-
Chin people and the cultivators in the plains were largely for access to the markets and 
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resources, as in the case of Sylhet and Kale. It was not always that the Kuki-Chin were 
the poorer: in the case of Sylhet it was the Kuki-Chin people who received tribute from 
the zemindars to bring down forest products as well as to allow the people to cut wood 
in the forest that were under their influence. Relative power was obviously the factor 
that dominated the actual direction of the imposition of tributes and the multiple 
political layers among the Kuki-Chins as well as the societies in the plains complicated 
the actual pattern of relationships, since whoever had the power tried to tap into such 
economic interactions. 
 
Yet not all the political relationships were reducible to „economic intercourse‟: 
there were certain specifically political characteristics of the polities of the frontier that 
shaped the relationship between the Kuki-Chin and their neighbours. This leads to the 
fifth point: political interdependence among the polities within the frontier. The most 
striking feature of this frontier, especially in the eighteenth century was the chronic 
instability of the polities in the plains. Assam, Manipur, and Cachar in the north of the 
Kuki-Chin land as well as Arakan in the south, not to mention the ailing Mughals in the 
west, were all on the decline, losing control over their territories. Despite individual 
differences, there was one key reason for the prolonged instability: the implosion of the 
central authorities through unsettled power struggles among the contenders for their 
thrones. The existence of other independent or semi-independent polities and the rising 
power of Burma exacerbated the trouble. A closer look at the example of Manipur 
shows the political interdependence these polities were experiencing in these times of 
crisis.  
 
Manipur was the first in this frontier to face the expanding Burmese in the second 
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half of the eighteenth century. In the 1760s the Rajah of Manipur, Jai Singh, frequently 
lost his throne due to Burmese invasions but as often regained it when the Burmese 
withdrew from the country. In 1768 when he was forced again to flee to Cachar, he 
succeeded in obtaining assistance from the king of Assam, Rajesvar Singh, and regained 
the throne. In 1770 he was driven out again to Cachar where he made four attempts to 
regain the throne between 1775 and 1782. Only in 1782 did he manage to make peace 
with the Burmese and peace returned to Manipur until his death in 1799.
58
  
 
In this example, the destabilisation of Manipur did not stop when it came under the 
Burmese influence. With help from the neighbouring countries of Cachar and Assam, 
Jai Singh was able to retain the throne after some twenty years of struggle. From the 
Burmese point of view, they could not eliminate Jai Singh and had to negotiate peace 
with him in the end. This pattern continued in Manipur after Jai Singh‟s death and was 
also the case in Arakan, where discontented nobles involved the Burmese in their 
internal struggle. Therefore, one reason for the prolonged instability was that those who 
had lost the internal struggle were often not totally eliminated, but found refuge in 
neighbouring polities, where they raised support and returned to make another attempt 
for power. 
 
In sum, the last two points, economic and political interdependency, brought the 
polities in the frontier into a closely knit web of relationships, but the first three points, 
the diversities within and among the polities in the frontier made the web of 
relationships a very intricate, subtle and volatile one. Kuki-Chin involvement in this 
                                                 
58
 Gait, History, 323; Harvey, History, 261; E. W. Dun, Gazetteer of Manipur (Calcutta: 
Superintendent of Government Printing, 1886; reprint, New Delhi: Vivek Publishing, 1981), 41 (page 
citations are to the reprint edition.) 
  
 57 
web before the arrival of the British calls for further research, but in all probability they 
were important participants in this network of relationships. Further evidence for this 
emerged through the observations made by the British after they had entered this 
complicated political scene at the end of the eighteenth century. 
 
 
2. The Advent of the British 
 
a) The Fledgling Administration of Bengal 
 
British involvement in this frontier started with the territorial acquisitions of the 
East India Company in Bengal in the mid-eighteenth century. Following the Battle of 
Plassey, in 1757, between the Company and the Nawab of Bengal, Siraj-ud-Daula, the 
Company became the zemindar of the „Twenty-four Pergunas‟, nearly nine hundred 
square miles of territory south of Calcutta yielding substantial rents. Then in 1760, Mir 
Kasim gave Midnapur, Burdawan and Chittagong to the Company in return for the 
support to become the new Nawab of Bengal. Finally, after the defeat of the joint forces 
of the Nawab of Bengal and the Nawab of Oudh, who had taken arms in protest against 
the Company‟s „reckless plunder‟ of their country, the Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam, 
granted the Company the diwani, or the right to collect revenue with judicial power in 
civil and financial cases, over the whole of Bengal in 1765.
59
 
 
From this time on, the English East India Company ceased to be merely a company 
of merchants. The territorial revenues from Bengal combined with British military 
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power made the Company a formidable political power that dwarfed other Indian 
rulers.
60
 This fusion also enabled the British authorities in the later days to execute 
military campaigns without burdening the British taxpayers.
61
 The land revenues of 
thirty million rupees were deployed throughout the later part of the century to support 
the poorer Presidencies and were also used to support the Company‟s trade profits by 
investing in Bengal goods destined for the London markets, while the surplus rice of 
Bengal was shipped to support British inland garrisons.
62
 It was a prize that fuelled 
British empire-building in India. 
 
The growth of the British presence in India was not done „in a fit of absence of 
mind‟63: at every moment of decision there were people who seriously considered the 
situation and deliberately took action with firm determination. These individual actions, 
however, were not aimed at building the empire that resulted. It was rather the 
cumulative result of a series of actions taken by different individuals in India to cope 
with the problems at hand. None of the British who were involved foresaw the Empire 
that British India came to be in the heyday of Queen Victoria, nor were they prepared 
for the administrative duties that fell into their hands.  
 
In fact, when news of the annexation of Bengal reached London, the Directors of 
the Company were taken by surprise. In a letter to Clive dated April 1865, the directors 
reprimanded him for using „the authority of the Company to obtain, by a treaty exacted 
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by violence, a sanction for a trade to enrich themselves, without the least regard or 
advantage to the Company‟.64 They were especially shocked at the unprecedented treaty 
that conferred privilege of free inland trade of the country‟s own commodities „to the 
detriment of the country‟s revenues and the ruin of the country‟s own merchants‟, which 
was „unpractised and unthought of by the English‟ until the Company‟s own servants 
„invented it and afterwards supported it by violence.‟ Moreover, the Directors had no 
idea on how to manage the newly acquired territory in such an unknown country. Hence, 
the only course of action they could take was to rely on Clive‟s own „zeal and abilities‟ 
to remedy the „evils‟ he had created.65 
 
Robert Clive already knew that the Company did not have the capacity to 
administer such a large territory as Bengal. This was one reason he hesitated to accept 
the Mughal Emperor‟s offer of the diwani of Bengal earlier in 1758. As he stated in his 
letter to the Prime Minister, William Pitt, in 1759, „so large a sovereignty may possibly 
be an object too extensive for a mercantile Company and . . . they are not of themselves 
able, without the nation‟s assistance to maintain so wide a dominion.‟ 66  When he 
accepted the same offer in 1765, his answer was to place the actual administration in the 
hands of the natives, while the employees of the Company remained in the background. 
Thus the Company appointed a deputy-Nawab to oversee the collection of revenue, but 
in reality, the Company was the virtual ruler of Bengal since it already had military 
supremacy, and control of the judicial administration was also handed over.
67
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Yet, the lack of any administrative mechanism also meant a lack of central checks 
on the individual pursuit of private fortunes by the Company‟s own employees, who 
were widely regarded as „a pack of brutal bloodsuckers‟, guilty of „rapine and 
oppression‟ in Bengal. 68  This relentless pursuit of individual fortunes and the 
consequent corruption added to the financial devastation of the Company after the great 
Bengal famine of 1769 to 1770. In 1772 the Company, failing to extract a loan from the 
Bank of England, approached the government for a loan of a million pounds. This 
caused a government-led reform of the Company in the Regulating Act of 1773.  
 
The administrative bodies of the Company‟s rule in India were redefined and the 
supremacy of Parliament over the Company was established. Under the provisions of 
this act, a Governor-General and a Council of four counsellors were appointed as the 
ruling body, vested with the whole civil and military administration of the Presidency of 
Fort William and the kingdoms of Bengal, Behar and Orissa. They were also to 
superintend and control the Presidencies of Madras, Bombay, and Bencoolen. A 
Supreme Court was established consisting of a Chief Justice and three judges and all 
these authorities were strictly forbidden from taking bribes. As a measure to put the 
management of India under parliamentary control, the Directors in England were to 
supply Parliament with copies of all their correspondence and half-yearly accounts.
69
 
 
The first Governor-General, appointed in 1774, was Warren Hastings, who had 
been the Governor of Bengal from 1771. The change of British attitude had been 
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revealed on his appointment to Bengal when he was instructed to „stand forth as diwan‟, 
i.e. to take direct control of the administration, abolishing the dual system of Clive.
70
 It 
was during his time as Governor-General that the outlines of British India were formed. 
He was the first to suggest that the Company‟s territories in India were not just a place 
of investment for shareholders, but a responsibility, an obligation requiring sympathy, 
understanding and good government.
71
 Seeing the corruption and inadequacy of the 
administration as the main target for reform, he argued for a powerful and consistent 
hierarchy of authorities centred on the Governor-General, with a clear division of power 
between him and his subordinates.
72
  
 
Despite all these ambitious provisions, the actual working of the administration 
was far from orderly or smooth. The four counsellors sent from London could easily 
outvote Hastings, which made the Governor-General effectively subordinate to the 
Council, and this in turn led to vacillation in the decisions of central government. 
Besides, the supervision over subordinate presidencies proved extremely difficult and 
the Supreme Court he established led to endless complications, since its jurisdiction was 
not properly defined and came into conflict with the existing courts of law.
73
 The 
provincial administration could not have been any better. 
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b) The Frontier Districts of Bengal and the Early Information on the Kuki 
 
1) Sylhet 
 
Thanks to a memoir by Robert Lindsay, we have a closer view of the life of a 
collector and the working of the administration in Sylhet, a remote district of Bengal 
adjacent to the Kuki-Chin frontier.
74
 Lindsay was in India from 1772 to 1789 and was 
the Collector of Sylhet from 1778. His memoir was written by his daughters, who wrote 
down what Robert Lindsay dictated when he was aged sixty-five, or some thirty years 
after he had left India; therefore, some details are necessarily vague, but the candid 
manner in which the story was told makes this memoir a valuable source describing the 
life of a Company‟s administrator in a frontier district. 
 
Robert Lindsay was a youth of eighteen when he arrived at Calcutta in 1772. It was 
also the year when the Hastings abolished the Dual System of Clive, together with the 
native naib-diwans (deputy collectors), and established a Board of Revenue to deal with 
the revenue directly.
75
 Lindsay, on arrival, was appointed to this office as an assistant to 
the „accomptant-general‟, but he had only casual interest in learning the works at the 
office. All the drudgery of the office could be easily left to the native scribes, and he 
followed the tide with his colleagues in entertaining themselves.
76
  
 
After four years in Calcutta he was posted to the Dacca Council – one of the three 
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councils that controlled the revenue, internal policing and civil justice of the inland 
provinces of Bengal – with the help of his patron in Calcutta. The public business, as 
observed by Lindsay, was managed by few able hands, and young officers like Lindsay 
had full leisure to amuse themselves.
77
 Yet he was also quick to spot an opportunity to 
increase his personal wealth. He used his official position to win a public sale of salt on 
behalf of a wealthy Indian merchant in exchange for an advance, and this left him with 
enough money to clear all the debts he had accumulated and a few thousand more 
rupees to pocket.
78
  
 
Such was his life as a district collector: personal pursuit of wealth, manipulating 
his position and the loopholes of the fledgling system, and the politics of patronage. 
This continued when he was posted to Sylhet as the first British Collector in 1778. His 
appointment was in line with the central government‟s attempt to centralise the revenue 
collection by appointing European collectors in each district as figureheads.
79
 Lindsay 
was also content with his new post, because such a post guaranteed him sure credit, 
which he gladly manipulated and borrowed a large sum of money. His debt in later 
years amounted to 6,000 pounds and gave him a good reason to fight a decision to 
transfer him back to the Dacca Council: he preferred Sylhet where there was no other 
Englishman, and therefore, no one else to check his activities.
80
 
 
The only thing he needed to do to keep his superiors satisfied was the dutiful 
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collection of revenue. So he endeavoured to fulfil the revenue assessment – assessed at 
250,000 rupees by Mr. Holland, Lindsay‟s patron at the Dacca Council81 – and on many 
occasions he resorted to the military force under his disposal for this purpose, which 
even caused a partial revolt in the area below the hills.
82
 Apart from this, his activities 
were seldom checked by the central authorities in such an ad hoc administration, the 
early relationship between the districts of British India and the hill people also relied on 
the personal character of the officer in charge. In the case of Lindsay, it was the lime 
trade that brought him in contact with a hill chief. Lime was taken from the mountains 
inhabited by the Khasi. As soon as he saw an opportunity for his personal trade in 
limestone, he fixed a meeting with a Khasi chief and this led to a personal friendship 
between the two. 
 
Lindsay wrote of lowland Sylhet as a miserable place with coarse rice as the only 
produce; on the other hand, the hills and the lands adjacent to the hills were rich in 
various products of commercial potential such as spices, wood, cotton, sugar, minerals 
and mugha silk.
83
 In addition, the lands below the mountains furnished an abundance of 
the best elephants. Yet it was this rich land near the hills that was particularly vulnerable 
to raids by the hill people. There were about one hundred sepoys stationed for the 
defence of Sylhet, but he found them unfit for service in the hills, as their constitution 
was inadequate for the climate and terrain. Instead, he locally raised a militia corps, or 
burkundazee, which he personally commanded and accompanied in excursions into the 
interior of the country. These excursions, he wrote, were his chief amusement apart 
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from hunting in the territory of the Khasi chief whom he befriended.
84
 
 
These „excursions‟ does not seem to have had much defensive value in them. 
Lindsay mentioned one particularly serious invasion by a Jaintia chief, serious enough 
to report to Calcutta. It was occasioned when one of the sepoys guarding the Collector‟s 
office abused a chief of this tribe. Despite the fact that Lindsay had been warned of the 
attack and was prepared with a regiment of sepoys garrisoned for the defence, he could 
not prevent serious harm being caused to the defenceless inhabitants of the plain who 
were looted and murdered. Retaliation was impossible. He wrote: „you might as well 
attack the inhabitants of the moon as those on the mountain above.‟85 All he could do 
was to cut off all communication and passage of provisions by closing bazaars against 
all the hill people. Amity returned after a while but he was no longer eager to visit his 
favourite haunts on the hill. 
 
Towards the end of his appointment in Sylhet, he came upon a „small tribe of hill 
people well known by the name of Cookies [Kuki]‟ while visiting a country where the 
greater part of his elephants were caught. This is the only mention of Kuki in his 
memoir. Apparently, he was not as well acquainted with the hills to the south of Sylhet 
as with the Khasi-Jaintia hills in the north where his entrepreneurial interests lay. Yet he 
was equally curious about the people of the southern hills and on this occasion he 
„procured one child of the tribe‟ and tried to educate him to speak Bengali. In this he 
failed and found the boy‟s „capacity too little‟ as he could not learn even a single word 
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of the language of the country before he fled back into the hills.
86
 
 
 
2) Chittagong 
 
If Lindsay represented those officers who were more interested in personal wealth, 
derisively called Nabobs, because they tended to become gentrified when they returned 
home with the wealth they had acquired in India, Chittagong had another type of officer, 
more ambitious in his political career in India and also having some consideration for 
the future of the British in India. When Chittagong was ceded to the Company in 1760, 
an English Chief with a council was appointed for the administration.
87
 The first was 
Harry Verelst, a member of the Fort William Council, and who, according to Lewin, had 
a passionate belief that inland trade routes to China might be found through the hills of 
Chittagong.
88
  
 
In 1762 a chance came for him to make an investigation in that direction. In that 
year, Jai Singh, the Rajah of Manipur, sent an envoy to the Chittagong Factory asking 
for British support against the Burmese. Verelst regarded this as an opportunity to open 
up the eastern trade as well as to „contract an anti-Burmese alliance with Manipur so 
advantageous to the Company‟.89  
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The Company had never developed a close relationship with Burma: several efforts 
had been made to open and maintain a factory in Syriam from 1647 on, but interest 
declined, and after repeated closure and re-opening, the establishment was destroyed in 
1743 during the Mon rebellion. Then in 1753, another factory was established in the 
remote, flooded and sickly island of Negrais off Bassein, primarily to check alleged 
French activities in Pegu, but it was destroyed by Alaung-hpaya, who suspected British 
involvement with the Mons. In 1760, the Company sent Captain Alves to protest about 
this event but no further talks resulted from this mission despite the Burmese king‟s 
wish to reopen the English factory.
90
 
 
In the aftermath of the Negrais Affair and the failure of Captain Alves‟s mission, 
British sentiments stiffened against Burma. Thus, when the envoys from Jai Singh came 
to Verelst for help, a treaty was signed immediately between the two and under the 
terms of this treaty, British troops marched towards Manipur to assist Jai Singh in 
recovering the territories annexed by the Burmese.
91
 In January 1763, six companies of 
sepoys under three European commanders were despatched. They crossed the Fenny 
River into Tripura, proceeded to Sylhet and reached Khaspur, then capital of Cachar, in 
April, but could not penetrate the hills due to „violent rains, inclement weather, 
pestilential climate, swampy land and difficult terrain.‟ On the commencement of 
hostilities with Mir Kasim, the Nawab of Bengal, in the same year, these troops were 
recalled to Bengal, in effect withdrawing from the treaty with Jai Singh.
92
 
                                                 
90
 D. G. E. Hall, Early English Intercourse with Burma: 1587-1743 (London: Cass, 1968), 281-354. 
91
 Gait, History, 323. 
92
 K. K. Dutta, ed., Fort William India House Correspondence, vol. III (1760-63), 484-5 (Letter from 
Court, 22 February, 1764) in Gupta, „Eastern Trade‟, 95; Phillimore, Historical Records, vol.1, 82.; 
Pemberton, Report, 40-2. 
  
 68 
 
Although this mission failed, it was the first British attempt to cross the hills to the 
East of Bengal. As this affair shows, once they acquired territorial possessions, the 
British were beginning to be drawn further inland from the plains by the local political 
situation of other polities. On this particular occasion, nothing of importance resulted in 
relation to the Kuki-Chin people, but another dispute between the British and a chief of 
Chakma in the Chittagong Hills resulted in the first record of the Kukis in Chittagong.  
 
The British occupation of Chittagong in itself did not change the relationship 
between the people of Chittagong proper and the hill population. The hills were 
practically independent, while those in the nearer hills paid a yearly tribute in cotton as 
a way of ensuring trade in the bazaars in the plains, which was a continuation of the 
Mughal arrangements.
93
 Two of the notable hill chiefs were recognised by the Company 
as tributaries: one was a Chakma and the other a Marma called „Bohmong‟.94 These two 
chiefs enjoyed supremacy in their own territories, collectively called „Kapas Mehal‟, 
which literally means „Cotton District‟, presumably owing to the fact that they paid a 
tribute of cotton. Their territories divided the eastern frontier of Chittagong along the 
Kurnafuli, the north of which was under the Chakmas while the south was under the 
Phru.
95
  
 
The event usually cited as the earliest record of the Kuki by the British is that 
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associated with a Chakma chief known as Ramu Khan. In the year 1777 this person 
alarmed the Company‟s authorities with a „great violence‟ committed on the Company‟s 
landholders, „by exacting various taxes and imposing several claims on them with no 
grounds of authority or legal demands‟. When he met the opposition of the Company, 
Ramu Khan fled into the hills where he gathered a „large bodies of Kookie men, who 
have not the use of fire-arms, and whose bodies go unclothed‟. 96 
 
The beginning of this affair is known to have been Ramu Khan‟s aspiration to 
expand his authority over the landholders of the Company. In any case, Ramu Khan 
obtained the help of the Kuki people, in a similar manner as the Tripuri princes had 
done in their disputes. The Company could not deal with this „rebellion‟ of Ramu Khan 
by a punitive expedition; instead, as Lindsay did in the case of the raid by the Jaintia, 
they temporarily closed markets to hill tribes in order to starve out the rebellion. This 
measure does not seem to have been effective as the Kukis kept raiding the inhabitants 
of Chittagong and, in November 1777, the Chief of Chittagong had to ask for some men 
to be sent „for the protection of the inhabitants against some Kookies.‟97 
 
 
3) Tripura 
 
Tripura was another place in the proximity of Kuki-Chin land that came under 
British influence with the grant of the diwani of Bengal. The Mughal division between 
Hill Tripura and the plains continued into the British administration as well as the dual 
                                                 
96
 Ibid. 
97
 Ibid. 
  
 70 
position of the Rajah of Tripura. British administrative efforts in Tripura were 
concentrated exclusively on the plains or the zemindari called Roushanabad: two native 
officers of the Jalalpur Division administered Tripura and Noakhali Districts until 1769. 
From 1769 to 1772 three English supervisors were appointed. Then, in 1772 a Collector 
was appointed and in 1781, these two districts came under one revenue charge called 
Bhulua but separated again in 1822.
98
 
 
On the other hand, the Rajah kept his exclusive authority within the hills, though 
his power was often dependent on British support. In this manner the Hill Tripura was 
regarded as an independent „Native State‟ throughout the colonial period. This 
arrangement worked as a screen against the Kuki-Chin people and until the 1860s, when 
a serious raid by Kuki people disturbed „the peaceful monotony of British rule‟, vitually 
no contact was made from Tripura with the Kuki-Chin people.
99
  
 
 
c) Early British Knowledge of the Kuki-Chin people 
 
During this early period of British rule in Bengal, the Kuki-Chin people were 
hardly known to the British. Only a very few interactions took place between the Kuki-
Chin and the British – individually or administratively – and even fewer records were 
made in which a description of the people can be found. It is surprising that no mention 
is made of the Kuki-Chin people from Chittagong other than that they went naked and 
did not know the use of firearms. Verelst‟s failed venture towards Manipur in 1763 had 
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crossed into the Tripura Hills and some observations at least from hearsay could have 
been made regarding the Kuki during the march. In fact, this occasion was also taken as 
an opportunity to survey hitherto unknown territories in the hills, and a surveyor named 
Bartholemew Plaisted accompanied the British troops. Plaisted surveyed the road with a 
perambulator and recorded routes from Cachar through Manipur into Burma from the 
words of a guide while the mission was held up in Khaspur. The data thus collected 
were then sent to James Rennell, the first Surveyor-General of India, to be incorporated 
into the maps he compiled.
100
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Map 5. Part of Map of Hindoostan by J. Rennell 1782 (Phillimore, Historical Records, vol1, ii) 
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As the surveys done on this occasion were the only source for Rennell regarding 
Tripura, Cachar and Manipur, the information on Rennell‟s Map of Hindoostan 
regarding this area can be said to have been what Plaisted found out during the 
mission.
101
 (see Map 5 on the previous page) Yet, there is no mention of the Kuki-Chin 
on the map: the only names of people are „Reang‟ and „Roshaan‟: the former appears as 
a name of a place in Tripura and the latter – apparently the same as „Rohinga‟, a name 
given to the Muslim in Arakan, also spelt „Rossan‟ or „Roshan‟102 – as a people in the 
Chittagong hill tracts.  
 
In Sylhet, it was due to Lindsay and his memoir that we have a glimpse of what 
people understood of the Kuki-Chin people. His very short account of the Kuki (spelt 
„Cookies‟) tells us that they are „more like brute creatures than any other tribes in the 
hills‟: and that they made their habitations on spreading trees to defend themselves from 
wild animals, and lived on honey and fruits. This information, however, was apparently 
what he had heard from the local people, as he himself never had visited their villages.  
 
The description of the Kuki as „brutes‟ resembles closely the following description 
provided by a traveller in the eighteenth century: 
Not withstanding the extreme antiquity of most Indian nations, I am told 
that in India beyond the Ganges, on the confines of Aracan and Pegu, there is 
a people (if solitary savages roaming through woods in quest of prey, deserve 
the name of people) that appear to be in the very first stage of society. They 
are the only people in the known world that go absolutely naked, without the 
smallest covering on any part of their bodies . . . they live on fruit . . . and on 
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the flesh of animals . . . which they tear alive and devour raw . . . at the 
approach of men they fly into their woods.
103
 
 
The author specified the source of the above information as „several people‟ who 
had seen them. It seems, however, that such hearsay stories of fictitious „savages‟ was 
widespread among the British during the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century. 
Rennell, the earliest surveyor in India, also wrote about the forests east of Tripura as 
uninhabited except for the „Cookies, who are a kind of wild men and build their huts on 
trees for the greater security against wild Beasts,‟ and he too was relying on the 
information from „the Raja‟s people who had been to the place‟.104  
 
Commenting on the rumours of the „tree-living and fleshy-eating Kukis‟, Arthur 
Phayre suggested later that this belief originated from the practice of the Kuki-Chin 
people to sleep in temporary shelters up in trees to keep an eye on their jhoom fields 
while working in the forest far away from their own houses. Nevertheless, this 
description of Kuki-Chin people as „half human and half brute‟ was widely circulated 
among the population of Bengal even during Phayre‟s times. Here, he concluded that 
they are fables „received from Bengalee narrators incautiously received as correct.‟105  
 
In the early days of the Company‟s administration, the British district collectors 
posted at the remote frontier relied heavily on their native clerks to do most of the 
administrative chores. In the case of Lindsay, he was accompanied by two native clerks, 
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who had been confidential agents to his predecessor Mr. Holland, and these were the 
ones that conducted the business of the different offices under his charge.
106
 Naturally, 
the British officers also relied on these native clerks for local information. In addition to 
this, in the early days of the administration, British officers did not as yet have an 
accurate knowledge regarding the people within their own administrative charges. The 
revenue assessment, done through auction rather than measurement, made it 
unnecessary for British collectors to actually visit and investigate the circumstances of 
villages at the fringe of their charge as all they needed to do was collect the amount 
specified through the auctions; if necessary, as Lindsay said, by force. Thus, it is only 
natural that the popular beliefs held by the Bengalis were received as truth by the British. 
Also, for the same reason, it was the name used by Bengalis for the Kuki-Chin people, 
or „Kuki‟, which first came to the notice of the British. 
 
Changes were inevitable. As soon as the Company took up the management of the 
revenue directly, there were forces that inevitably dragged them closer into the local 
situation. As seen in the case of Chittagong, the political mechanism of the frontier, the 
interrelationships of polities in times of crisis, began to pull the Company into the 
interior. Moreover, with the assumption of administration, the British also incurred the 
duty to protect the people, and stable revenue collection and trade depended on it. Trade 
was what brought the British into this area, but once their rule began, the Company was 
changing, though slowly, into a government. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS AND EARLY SCHOLARLY ACTIVITIES:  
1780s-1820s 
 
 
1. Administrative Reforms and Information on the Kuki-Chin 
 
a) Central Reforms in the Mid-Eighteenth Century 
 
According to Spear, starting from a series of parliamentary enquiries in 1772 there 
had been ongoing controversy surrounding the position of the Company in India. The 
result was increasing awareness among the politicians in Britain of some sort of 
governmental duties towards India.
1
 When Edmund Burke impeached Hastings in 
Parliament it was based on the understanding that the Company had incurred 
governmental duties with the assumption of diwani. His main attacks were focused on 
the arbitrary use of power, corruption, and lawlessness on the part of the Company‟s 
servants in India; or the „letting loose‟ unqualified „school boys‟, encouraged with the 
powers of despots, to prey upon the people of India.
2
 Hastings was acquitted of the 
charges after nine years of trial, but similar concern regarding the Company‟s rule in 
India were embodied in the East India Company Act of 1784. 
 
The new Act addressed the problem by strengthening central control: the 
Parliament over the Company, London over Calcutta, and the Governor-General over 
the Council and the Presidencies. In London, a new department of state called the Board 
                                                 
1
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2
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of Control was formed with its members appointed by the Crown to supervise the affairs 
of the Company and the management of British territorial possessions in India. The 
President of this Board became the minister responsible to Parliament for the conduct of 
British relations with India. The Secret Committee was formed, with three members of 
the Board of Control and three from the Directors of the Company, and their decisions 
were to be binding on the Governor-General. In the meanwhile, the Governor-General 
was strengthened in India, as he was able to overrule the decisions of the Council or his 
subordinate Presidencies of Madras and Bombay.
3
 Thus, British India came to have a 
governmental structure founded on the authority and the control of British Parliament, 
and the Company became less of a mercantile institution and more of an instrument of 
British rule in India. 
 
Cornwallis, who became Governor-General in 1786, further imbued the 
administration of India with discipline and order. His principle was clearly that of the 
impersonal rule of law. First of all, he rationalised the administration by demarcating the 
roles of different branches of administration: he created a Supreme Court which 
administered English Law, produced a criminal code by adjusting the pre-existing 
Muslim and Hindu code, and separated judicial and executive powers in the district 
courts. Then he divided the Company‟s servants into two groups: one pursuing trade, 
and the other employed in administrative duties. The latter were strictly forbidden from 
engaging in private trade but were to be content with the salaries, which had been 
substantially increased in an attempt to stamp out corruption.
4
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Reforms were made in the provincial administration as well. He introduced a new, 
more rationalised system in the administration of revenue. In 1786, he reorganised 
districts into regular fiscal units, and the collector in each district was made responsible 
for settling the revenue as well as collecting it. The number of districts in Bengal was 
reduced from 37 to 23 and the Committee of Revenue was now reconstituted as a Board 
of Revenue with a member of the Council as its President. New revenue settlements 
were made in 1790 for a period of ten years, the process of assessment lasting from 
1789 until 1791. The amount to be paid, however, was not measured by the output, 
quantity of land, or quality of soil, but was determined by reference to what had been 
paid in the past.
5
 Then in 1793 the settlements thus made were declared to be permanent. 
This improved the government‟s budget with a fixed and foreseeable land revenue 
income. Yet, in doing so, Cornwallis applied his „preconceived English idea of a 
proprietor body‟, to the zemindari system of India, making zemindars hereditary owners 
of the lands and the cultivators, or ryots, mere tenants.
6
  
 
Twenty years after the assumption of diwani, the administration of Bengal finally 
began to take shape. The days of the freebooting Nabobs were drawing to a close, and 
were replaced by the administrators of British India. These reforms did not change the 
daily lives of the Indian people yet, but, as the machineries of British rule improved, it 
brought the administration and the administrators closer to the people, resulting in more 
intervention into daily lives and more knowledge of the country and its people.  
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b) The Effects of Reforms on Sylhet, Chittagong and Tripura 
 
1) Sylhet 
 
When Cornwallis ordered new assessments throughout Bengal, the Collector at 
Sylhet, who had replaced Lindsay, found the existing assessments at odds with reality 
and attempted to make new assessments based on proper measurements. It was a unique 
example, as most of the other collectors satisfied themselves with confirming what had 
been paid previously. Between 1789 and 1790, he travelled throughout the district and 
made settlements. Zemindars and other native officers who had benefited from the 
previous arrangements opposed him whenever possible. At the end of 1790, he reported 
himself to be fortunate to have „effected the measure, at a small expense to Government, 
with a considerable increase of revenue‟ against such opposition.7  
 
At the same time, more control was introduced regarding the relationship with the 
hill chiefs, notably the Khasis to the north. In November 1790, a public notice appeared 
in the Calcutta Gazette declaring it compulsory for any European, including Armenians 
and Greeks, to procure written permission from the Government before proceeding to 
Sylhet for trade in lime, or other articles of merchandise, such as wax, ivory, and iron, 
which were the typical hill products. At the same time, the lime trade was declared free 
to all natives of Sylhet.
8
 The most important reason for this declaration, to judge from 
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the context, was to prevent complications with the Khasi. Emphasis was placed on the 
control of firearms and ammunition: supplying arms, ammunition, or other articles for 
military purposes to „the Cossyahs [Khasis] or other hill tribes‟ was strictly forbidden. 
These items were not to pass the chowkies (or guard-posts) where all boats were to be 
searched for contraband. Armed escorts of sepoys and burkundazees, or anyone with 
arms, were also forbidden, except with the permission of the Collector.
9
 
 
As Lindsay shows us, the relationship with the Jaintia or Khasi was not always 
amicable. Therefore, European merchants, who had monopolised the lime trade till this 
proclamation, needed armed escorts when proceeding into the hills. In all probability, 
the arms carried by these merchants and their followers fell into the hands of the hill 
people – either through trade or plunder – to be used against the people of the plains. 
Private arms trading was a widespread phenomenon at this time. A similar declaration 
appeared again in 1793, publicly notifying that the sale of firearms or other warlike 
stores without express authority was strictly forbidden. Even though such a prohibition 
had been in force for a long time, the Government needed to publicise it again as these 
orders „may not be generally known‟.10  
 
The survey and the strengthened control over trade were instances in which the 
new administrative spirit, instilled by the reforms of the period, brought an 
administrator closer to the people and country. Yet until the 1820s, the administrative 
interest in Sylhet was too limited to allow any development of interaction with the 
Kuki-Chin. Unlike the northern hills from which they procured lime, the British had no 
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interest in the southern hills where the Kuki-Chin people lived. In fact, even the plains 
to the south of Sylhet had not come under administrative oversight as yet. The survey of 
1789 did not even cover half of the total area of Sylhet, and the areas towards the south 
of the district were left out as uncultivated lands. It was not until 1823 that these areas 
were re-surveyed and the boundary to the south demarcated through the work of 
Thomas Fisher.
11
 
 
 
2) Chittagong 
 
In Chittagong as well, the Permanent Settlement of 1793 did not reach the hills in 
Chittagong and another survey was needed to assess the remaining cultivated lands. In 
1814, John Cheape was appointed to survey the eastern frontier of Chittagong. This 
survey lasted three years but it was still restricted to the cultivated parts of the lands and 
no attempt was made to penetrate the hills to the east of the plains.
12
 Therefore, the 
situation in the Chittagong Hills was only vaguely known and no more development 
took place in the relationship between the Company and the people of the Chittagong 
Hills, except that between the Company and the chiefs of the Chakma and the Marma. 
 
The Company‟s relationship with the Chakma and Marma chiefs was rationalised 
to a degree in 1789 when the cotton tribute paid by the Chakma and Phru was replaced 
by cash payment which was fixed at 3 or 4 rupees for each married man, with 
exemption for bachelors and priests. A mooktear, or an agent, was appointed for the 
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arrangement and he derived his own profit from it. Even this form of collection was not 
strictly applied till later, and the Chakma and Marma chiefs continued to pay a 
fluctuating amount as a tribute or yearly gift in exchange for the privilege of trade 
between the hills and the plain.
13
 
 
 
3) Tripura 
 
Apart from the Permanent Settlement, Cornwallis also abolished the internal transit 
duty (sayer), which had been a fruitful source of income for zemindars; but he gave 
them compensation.
14
 In view of this, a Mr. Buller was sent to assess the amount and 
nature of income the Rajah of Tripura drew from this custom as a zemindar of the plains 
of Tripura in 1788. The resulting report contained a description of the trade between the 
dwellers of the plain and the hills, with some information on the Kuki-Chin people.
15
 
 
Mr. Buller introduced the inhabitants of the interior part of Tripura as „uncivilised 
tribes of people called Tipperee, Kookie, Lushia, Ruang, & c.‟ or the Tripuri, Kuki, 
Lushai and Riang. It is the earliest known notice of the Lushai by the British, but only 
names appear and no other information is given regarding each group other than that 
they were all „subjects to Tripura Raja and entirely independent of the English 
Government‟. The main focus of the report was trade, and, in this sense, all the hill 
people mentioned above were treated the same: they all brought „cotton, rice, pepper, 
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and different kinds of turkarry [vegetable]‟ to the lowland markets and bartered these 
for other necessities of life such as „salt, tobacco, dried-fish, earthen pots, and spirituous 
liquors‟. 
 
The Rajah charged duty both for the goods brought down and those taken up. 
There were a number of agents who lived near the markets for the collection of this duty. 
They were obliged to raise a fixed amount of duty every year regardless of the amount 
of cotton brought down but were allowed to exact arbitrary fines on anyone found 
smuggling. This customs duty fell heaviest on the hill people who were paid less for 
their cotton but paid more for the goods they bought in the markets. To remove this 
custom, the Government resolved to abolish this duty, and the Tripura Rajah was paid 
28,000 rupees as a remission on this account. Yet because of the Tripura Rajah‟s dual 
position as a zemindar as well as an Independent Prince of Hill Tripura, he continued to 
levy export duty on the products produced within his territory on the basis of his 
position as an independent Rajah.
16
  
 
Another investigation was made in 1808 by Mr. Melvill, Second Judge of the 
Dacca Provincial Court.
17
 In this report, the inhabitants of Tripura are distinguished into 
two classes: one which followed the Hindu religion but „doubtless came from China,‟ i.e. 
the Tripuris, and the other, a people called „Kookies or Coocis‟. The Hindu population 
dominated Tripura‟s government positions but the Kuki section of population had their 
own chiefs, named „Roys, Ghalims, Chuppiahs, and Govoors‟. The Kukis were called to 
fight for the Tripura Rajah, but they were still under the commands of their own 
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chiefs.
18
  
 
In the meantime, the sayer duty charged by the Rajah of Tripura was left under 
dispute until 1838 when the Governor-General, Lord Auckland, made a final declaration 
that any duty levied by the Rajah of Tripura in his hill territory could not be interfered 
with by the British Indian Government.
19
 Thus, the reform took more than forty years to 
take effect and even then, it did not bring any change for the Kukis within Tripura, who 
were regarded as being under the independent sovereignty of the Rajah of Tripura.  
 
As the case of Tripura shows, one of the main factors that blocked the development 
of relationship between the hill people and the British administration was that rather 
than having a delimitated boundary, British administrative influence gradually 
disappeared into the hills through the friendly semi-independent polities: Tripura Rajah, 
the Chakma and Phru chiefs, and perhaps, the zemindars in Sylhet. Thus, the frontier 
relationship between the British and the Kuki-Chin people relied on the British 
relationship with these powers in the hills friendly to the Company. Yet, for the time 
being, the only concern of the British administrators regarding these latter were taxes 
and tributes: as in the abolition of sayer duties charged by the Tripura Rajah, and the 
imposition of cash tributes on the chiefs of Chittagong Hills. Other than this, the 
Company left the management of the frontier to these friendly powers and did not 
interfere with the intercourse between them and the people from further inland. 
 
The only occasions of actual interactions between the British administration and 
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the Kuki-Chin would be when there were raids into the plains by the Kuki people. Even 
on these occasions, British responses remained passive: all they did was to close the 
markets from the whole of the Kuki people, regardless of who actually committed the 
raid. It was the same measure that Lindsay had taken against the Jaintia, and the same 
was the case with those Kuki who opposed the Company in alliance with a Chakma 
chief called „Ramu Khan‟. The effect of such measures could not have been positive, by 
any criteria. As Buller‟s inquest shows, the Kuki-Chin people had vigorous trade 
relationships with the plains and through this acquired many of the vital supplies and 
luxury items. Blocking this trade would only have resulted in their resorting to another 
method of acquisition, which meant more raids. 
 
Apart from the administrative effects, the investigations of Tripura at least 
produced some information on the Kuki-Chin people. Nevertheless, in terms of British 
knowledge of the Kuki-Chin people, these reports rendered only a minimal contribution, 
if at all. First, the main interests of the administrators were the trade and internal politics 
of Tripura: information on the Kuki-Chin people was a by-product rather than the main 
focus. Second, due to this, there was no continuity in the information on the Kuki 
between these two reports; therefore, no effort was made to confirm the information on 
the Kuki in Mr. Buller‟s report by the latter, which reduced the credibility and relevance 
of both of the papers in terms of Kuki ethnography. This contrasts with the continuing 
discussions on the transit duties and compensation to the Rajah of Tripura, with 
particular attention to what had been reported and done before. Third, the administrative 
reports had a limited range of circulation. Until someone who had access to these 
documents unearthed them and brought the facts buried in these documents under a new 
light, the information in these reports regarding the Kuki-Chin people could have easily 
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been forgotten in the cabinets of the offices of collectors and secretaries. 
 
There were, however, other channels beside the administrative hierarchy where an 
administrator could publish his general knowledge beyond particular administrative 
concerns. An administrator, as an individual, knew more than what he wrote in official 
correspondences. This was especially the case with those who came out to India and 
came into contact with an environment, people and culture so different from what his 
contemporaries in Britain were accustomed to. Some of these frontier officers 
developed deeper interest than just curiosity, and the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal 
was established as a hub for the transmission of knowledge on India and further east.  
 
 
2. Scholarly Activities of Early Administrators on the Kuki-Chin 
 
a) The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal and First Publications on the Kuki 
 
The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal was founded in 1784 by William Jones under 
the patronage of Warren Hastings. Both Hastings and Jones shared a keen interest on 
Indian culture and literature. There was an administrative undertone to this: Hastings 
believed that the translation of Sanskrit texts would provide the British administration 
with the ancient laws of India, which were interwoven with the religion of the people, 
and would therefore make it easier to exact their obedience and would therefore be 
preferable to any laws which could be substituted.
20
 Indeed, the first major work of 
William Jones was the translation of the ancient Law of Manu. Nevertheless, their 
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interest cannot be wholly reduced to administrative utility: it was also for the sake of the 
knowledge itself. Hastings himself understood this very well when he foresaw that such 
studies „independent of utility would outlast the British Empire in India itself‟.21 
 
Soon after the establishment of the society, it became a clearing house for budding 
scholarship on „the East‟.22 The publications of the society, Asiatic Researches from 
1788, and The Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal from 1832, put together 
contributions from the administrators and other Europeans in India, and made them 
available to a wider audience back in Europe. The demand for Asiatic Researches was 
such that a pirated edition of the first volume came into circulation in England in 1798, 
and some of the volumes of Asiatic Researches were translated into German and French. 
The publications of the Asiatic Society provided a channel for those administrators who 
had the privilege of direct contact with an unknown country and people to circulate their 
knowledge among the intellectuals in Europe. It was also through these that the first 
publications on the Kuki-Chin people were made.  
 
In the 2
nd 
(1799) and 7
th 
(1803) volumes of the Asiatic Researches there were 
articles on the Kuki.
23
 The first of these has an uncertain origin. The title of the article 
specifies the place of origin as Tripura, but there are disagreements on the identity of the 
actual author of the article. The name of the author appears as John Rawlins in Asiatic 
Researches, but with an additional note that he had communicated the original text in 
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Persian. Further explanation of this article is found in the second article published in 
1803. In this latter, the editors to Asiatic Researches wrote that it was William Jones 
who translated the Persian article of John Rawlins into English.
24
 On the other hand, 
Lewin, who included the whole of the same article in his book,
25
 wrote that he had 
translated it from what M. Boucheseiche had published in French in Leipsic in 1800. M. 
Boucheseiche, according to Lewin, had translated the article from the English of James 
Rennell: neither the name „John Rawlins‟ nor Asiatic Researches is mentioned as the 
source. The exact words of the article in Lewin‟s work differ from those in Asiatic 
Researches; but there can be no doubt that these two had one and the same original text, 
as the information given in the articles matches, sentence by sentence, without 
exception.  
 
From the fact that it was originally written in Persian, we can take it that the article 
was originally written by an anonymous native officer or a legal adviser (pundit), and 
John Rawlins had merely transmitted the original to the society. Most of the description 
is devoted to legal matters such as ownership of property, inheritance and divorce, 
punishments for criminals, and this makes it even more likely that it was written by 
someone who dealt with the law as a profession. Regarding the text Lewin had 
consulted, it could have been either from another copy that John Rawlins had given to 
James Rennell, which was translated by M. Boucheseiche, or from an unauthorised 
publication by M. Boucheseiche who translated the article from Asiatic Researches but 
merely added the authority of James Rennell to his publication. 
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Another curious circumstance in the article is a note inserted at the end of it that 
the Kukis had visited Charles Croftes at Jafarabad in the spring of 1776 and had 
entertained him with a dance. There were two places named Jafarabad at this period. 
One was a pergunnah in Tripura, also called „Lohaghar‟26 and another was a place in 
Chittagong north of Islamabad, where there was a government bungalow and a dak 
station. Francis Buchanan, who visited the latter place in 1798, wrote that there was „an 
excellent house in a most elegant situation, with some grounds round it cleared and 
planted like an English park‟.27 It is likely that the place mentioned here was the one in 
Chittagong, as Charles Croftes, in Lewin‟s version, is said to have been the 
Commandant for the English East India Company in that place. Unfortunately, there is 
no more information on this visit by the Kukis, which could have been the first recorded 
peaceful encounter. 
 
The article does not provide any definition of the term „Kuki‟ (or „Cuci‟ as it is 
spelt in the article) but starts with a statement that „the inhabitants of the mountainous 
districts to the east of Bengal give the name of Paityan to the Being who created the 
universe‟. Thereafter, the word „Cuci‟ is used as the name of the people being described. 
Therefore, the definition of the term „Cuci‟ used in this article seems to be „all the 
inhabitants to the east of Bengal‟. Assuming the local origin of the text, it can also be 
said that this was the general notion held by the Bengalis or Tripuri. 
 
In contrast to the first article, the second article has a definite origin. The author 
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was John Macrae, a surgeon at Chittagong, and the main source of information was „a 
native of Runganeeah (Rungania), who had been captured as a boy and lived among the 
Kukis for twenty years before he managed to return to his family‟.28 Thus, the article 
contains detailed descriptions of implements and ornaments, social institutions and 
external relationships. Kuki words are used in many places together with Bengali terms 
and a list of Kuki words – eleven words for kinship and ten numbers – is also attached 
at the end.  
 
As in the former article, the term „Kookie‟ is broadly applied to the „race of people 
that live among the mountains to the north east of Chittagong province‟, but, in this 
article, two different categories of Kuki-Chin people („Kookie‟ and „Banjoogee‟) and 
two other hill people („Choomea‟ and „Mug‟) are mentioned.  
 
The „Kookies‟, or „Lunctas‟ as they were also called, are described as the „least 
civilised of any of the people among the mountains‟. They are said to have been divided 
into a number of distinct tribes, which were totally independent of each other but 
acknowledged three paramount „Rajahs‟ named Th‟andon, Mankene, and Halcha. Other 
than these prominent chiefs, Macrae also mentions other chiefs subordinate to them. 
Each „Rajah‟ had authority over several tribes from whom he received tribute in kind. In 
case of danger, they could summon all the warriors to arms but each tribe was under the 
direct command of its own chief. In fact a chief‟s power was only absolute in his own 
village, and control over the tributaries was only nominal, since the so-called 
subordinate villages were under the authority of their own chiefs.
29
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Macrae mentions the „Banjoogees‟ (or more properly Bawm-zo) as a people living 
further inland from the Kukis. The Bawm-zo are in fact a section of the Lai group of the 
Kuki-Chin people currently in Mizoram, but throughout the British colonial period they 
were known by the Bengali corruption „Banjoogee‟ or „Bonjugi‟, and were regarded as a 
separate group in the Chittagong Hills.
30
 Macrae wrote that the Bonjugi were more 
powerful than the Kuki and exacted an annual tribute of salt from the two Kuki „rajas‟, 
Thandon and Mankene. In a sense, these latter Kuki chiefs were intermediaries in the 
trade of salt from the plains to the Bawm-zo, though the flow of goods was mediated 
through this tributary relationship. 
 
The „Choomeas‟ (or more properly Jumma) occupied the nearest ranges of hills 
from the plains of Chittagong and were tributary to the Company. It is not clear what 
Macrae meant by „Choomea‟; in fact, the category „Jumma‟ itself was a vague one 
containing several different groups, as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Nonetheless, since Macrae wrote they paid tributes to the Company, it is likely that he 
meant „Chakma‟ by this, rather than the Marma who were called the „Mug‟ in the same 
article.  
 
The „Mug‟ were another people between the Kuki and the plains. According to the 
Kuki myth introduced in this article, the Mug and the Kuki had been descendents of two 
half-brothers, the Kuki being the younger. While the progenitor of the Kuki was but an 
infant, his mother died and his stepmother neglected him, allowing him to go naked; 
hence, he was known as „Lunctas‟ – meaning „naked‟ – which was another word for the 
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Kuki. This close relationship between the Kuki and the Mug was, according to Macrae, 
backed by a linguistic similarity that allowed them to understand each other. Besides, 
the Kukis frequently visited a Mug chief, known as „Comlahpore Raja’. This makes it 
clear that the „Mug‟ of Macrae was in fact the Phru family of Marma: Comlapore (or 
Kaung-la-phru) was the chief of this people during the same period.
31
 
 
The Kuki maintained communication with the plains mostly through these two 
groups and they were rarely known to have had any intercourse directly with the 
Bengalis. The exceptions were when they occasionally visited the markets to purchase 
salt, dried fish, and tobacco. They were also a „great terror‟ to the Bengalis who had 
settled down on the borders of the jungles in Rungania and Aurangabad and particularly 
to the woodcutters. Yet since the Kuki did not know the use of fire-arms, the „raja of the 
Choomea‟ kept in his service a number of men with fire-arms to protect against them. 
 
The categorisation of the people of the Chittagong Hills to be found in Macrae‟s 
article – Kuki, Bonjugi, Jumma or Chakma, and Mug – was in fact the Bengali system 
of categorisation of the people in the Chittagong Hills.
32
 In this sense it is comparable to 
the former article, which was also based on the knowledge of a local person, 
presumably in the context of Tripura in that particular case. Therefore, these two articles 
are credible as long as they are regarded as the knowledge held by the Tripuri or the 
Bengali in Chittagong at the end of the eighteenth century. As such, it is significant to 
note the difference from the hearsay accounts discussed in the former chapter. As the 
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British approached nearer to the Kuki-Chin land, they were able to gather a more 
detailed description of the people, though still from others than the Kuki-Chin 
themselves. It is also important to note that, in both of the articles, the term „Kuki‟ was 
defined as a people living towards a certain direction from the point where the authors 
lived: „East of Bengal‟ and „North East of Chittagong‟ as it appeared in the texts. Thus, 
the people in the plains employed the term „Kuki‟ to designate those others that came 
from or lived towards certain directions, without any particular interest in the extent of 
the people thus called; in other words, the category was adopted without clear limits of 
extension. 
 
The situation of the ethnic categories, however, was far more complicated within 
the hills of Tripura or Chittagong. Thanks to a journal left by Francis Buchanan,
33
 who 
travelled the Chittagong Hills in 1798, we can have a glimpse of the situation at this 
period. Before this survey of the south-eastern frontier of Bengal, Buchanan had 
followed a diplomatic mission to Ava in 1795, which resulted in the first detailed 
description of the ethnic groups of Burma by a British person. These two journeys place 
Buchanan in an important position in the history of British categorisation of the Kuki-
Chin people, as well as the other ethnic groups of Burma and the Chittagong Hills. 
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b) An Administrator-Scholar: Francis Buchanan on the Kuki-Chin People 
 
1) Embassy to Ava, 1795 
 
Following the Burmese annexation of Arakan in 1784, a large number of 
Arakanese refugees migrated into Chittagong and were settled there by the British 
authorities. Based as they were in Chittagong, some of these refugees invaded Arakan 
with explicit object of re-conquest. In 1794 a particularly large-scale rebellion took 
place in Arakan, assisted by armed bands from Chittagong. King Bodaw-hpaya of 
Burma sent a force of 5,000 men to crush the rebellion and chased them into Chittagong. 
Calcutta replied to this by dispatching a battalion of European troops, sepoys and 
artillery under General Erskine. In the end, the matter was settled without skirmishes as 
the British handed over three culprits requested by the Burmese.
34
 
 
This event, however, alerted the British to the possible threat posed by their long-
neglected neighbour in the east. Some even viewed this under the heading of Anglo-
French rivalry. When the situation was reported in the Times in London some six 
months later, the number of the Burmese involved was doubled to ten thousand, some of 
whom were said to have been armed with „European arms, ordnance and firelocks‟ and 
behind them were „some Frenchmen, who directed their operations and were 
instrumental in prompting them to adopt their unwarrantable measure.‟35  
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Though French intrigues in the Burmese court were unfounded rumours, British 
fear of French influence in their neighbouring country was real. This situation 
necessitated a diplomatic mission to Ava to assess the truth and the extent of French 
influence, to prevent any further eruption of border troubles, and to conclude a treaty of 
commerce that would also promote mutual friendship.
36
 Besides, the British needed 
more knowledge of Burma in general and, more specifically, of the internal politics of 
the Burmese court, so as to increase British influence over the court by exploiting 
internal differences. 
 
With these objectives in mind, Captain Michael Symes was ordered to lead a 
diplomatic mission to the court of Ava. The Company was determined to make the most 
of this occasion, and provided a liberal number of assistants to perform various tasks 
other than the official mission. Apart from Symes, the mission included Thomas Wood 
as Symes‟s assistant and surveyor, Francis Buchanan as a surgeon, a Hindu pundit 
(scholar), a munshee (language teacher), a band of attendants and guards composed of a 
havildar (native sergeant), a naik (native corporal), 14 sepoys, and Indian painters who 
provided the original drawings included in his journal.
37
 
 
Symes and his group arrived in Rangoon in March 1795 and spent a total of eight 
months in Burma. It failed in achieving its political objectives. There was no treaty to 
guarantee friendship or commerce. The only tangible result Symes acquired was 
permission for a British Resident to be stationed in Rangoon, and Hiram Cox was sent 
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to take up this post in 1796; but he was withdrawn two years later due to his 
provocation of the Burmese court, which almost brought the two powers into 
collision.
38
  
 
The mission, however, produced many interesting accounts of Burma. Symes 
published An Account of the Embassy in 1800
39
: an impressive volume full of 
information of various kinds, with maps and illustrations, calculated to provoke public 
interest. Francis Buchanan also published what he had learned of Burmese religion, 
language, botany and geography in a number of journals.
40
 Thomas Wood charted the 
Irrawaddy River and made astronomical observations in major cities to establish their 
longitude and latitude, which provided vital information during the first Anglo Burmese 
war of 1824-6. According to Phillimore, Wood‟s map of the Irrawaddy River was more 
relied on than others even during the second war in 1852.
41
  
 
Among these, the works by Francis Buchanan were the richest in their account of 
the different peoples living in Burma. In fact, most of the ethnographic information in 
Symes‟s published journal was Buchanan‟s contribution. Buchanan‟s journal itself has 
never been published. Two manuscript copies of this journal can be found among the 
India Office Records of the British Library.
42
 These are extracts made by Buchanan 
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himself and, presumably, copied by Indian clerks – hence different handwritings and 
numerous errors – while he was at Lakkhipur (Lakshmipur) from 1796, where he 
learned the Burmese script to provide as a basis for the correct orthography of Burmese 
words.
43
 
 
According to the note that he submitted to the Company with his journal, 
Buchanan‟s original intention was: 
To have taken as a basis, Mr. Wood‟s survey of the Rivers Irrawady and 
Burampooter, Mr. Rennell‟s survey of Bengal, Mr. D‟Anville‟s Atlas de la 
Chine and the Sea Charts, and with the Assistance of these, to have formed a 
map of all the countries east from Bengal and south from China.
44
 
During his journey he often compared European works on the geography of the region 
such as those of „Du Halde‟, „Loubère‟, and the „Modern Universal History‟45 with 
what the people of Burma told him. He also carried a copy of the Map of Hindustan by 
Rennell and asked those he met on his journey to confirm the information on the map.  
 
As it turned out, however, accompanying the mission along the Irrawaddy River up 
to Amarapura and back was not enough to fill the gap in European geographic 
knowledge of the region. He kept his interest in geography, but this was soon 
subordinated to studying different groups of people. When he submitted his journal, he 
regarded it as the „most complete in the accounts of many different people of Burma of 
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whom Europeans had scarcely ever heard‟.46 
 
The most frequently used method in his enquiry on the people of Burma was 
interviews. It was the only method possible considering the limited time he spent in 
Burma and limited area covered. Despite this, his method of interviewing was different 
from the collection of hearsays that his contemporaries were satisfied with: he made 
careful judgements on the informants‟ reliability, endeavoured to confirm the truth of 
one piece of information by checking it with others, and, if possible, asked them to 
write the names down and draw sketch maps. 
 
In the early stages of the journey, his informants were Europeans or European 
descendants who were familiar with Burma. These include Panchoo, a Portuguese 
descendant who was attached to the mission as a translator and guide, and one Mr. 
Imbert, a former Lieutenant of the Dutch navy who had been enslaved by the King of 
Burma to serve on a ship of the Myo-wun (Governor) of Tenasserim. More important 
was Vincentius Sangermano, an Italian missionary who worked in Burma from 1787 to 
1808 and was the author of the earliest publication on Burma, which remained a 
valuable source till the end of nineteenth century.
47
 Sangermano also gave Buchanan 
three treatises on Burmese culture – works on cosmology, Buddhism and a Book of 
Ordination. Buchanan published these in the Asiatic Researches without change.
48
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Later on in the journey, as Buchanan went further inland, he had more chances to 
interview the local people. The Rangoon Myo-tsa (township officer) who accompanied 
the mission was the first one to provide a complete view of the different categories of 
people in Burma.
49
 A slave of the heir apparent, who became a close friend of Buchanan 
while he was at Amarapura, provided Buchanan with many draft maps of the parts of 
Burma he had travelled.
50
 Also, a son of „Kyeewuns‟ (Kyi Wun: officer of granaries) 
visited Buchanan frequently.
51
 Other than these, a Siamese painter,
52
 the Sawbwa of 
Bhamo,
53
 a Cachari man captured by the Manipuris then by the Burmese,
54
 and two 
traders from Arakan
55
 also contributed to his enquiry. 
 
While at Amarapura, Buchanan asked for peoples from different regions of Burma 
to be sent to him so that he could obtain geographic information about those remote 
parts of Burma and record their customs and languages. In this manner, he interviewed 
three „Kathee Shan‟, two Thanayntharee (people of Tenasserim), and three Arakanese. 
From these he collected samples of their vocabularies as he did whenever he met a 
people with a different language from Burmese or Indian. On the return journey he even 
visited two Karen villages „to see Karyan (Karen) manner of living.‟56 The categories 
that appear in this journal as a result are arranged in table 1. 
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Table 1. Ethnic Categories in Buchanan’s Journal of His Journey to Ava, 1795 
Categories
a
 Other Appellations Modern English Equivalent 
Myanmau Pumma,  Burman 
Yo  (Yaw) 
Kadu  Kadu 
Rakain Yakain Arakanese/Rakhine 
Roshaan Rooinga Bengalis in Arakan (Rohinga) 
Davoy  (People of) Tavoy 
Tanayntharee  (People of)Tenasserim 
Moan Talain Mon 
Myelap Shan 
Kathee Shan 
Taroup Shan 
Tai Yai 
Tai Long, Moitay Kabo 
 
Shan 
Yun Shan Jangomai (Chiangmai) 
Lowa Northern Lao, Shan Wa, Lowa Shan Wa 
Palaung  Palaung 
Kakiayn  Kachin 
Burma Karayn  Sgaw 
Karen (Kayin) 
Talain Karayn  Pao 
Kiayn Yeen Koloun  
Chin 
Kiayn Yain Ayngieen 
Kathee/Cussay  Manipuri or Meithei 
Akobat  Cachari 
Laynzayn Lantchang, Laiyans, Laos, Lanjams Lao 
Lo  Lo-lo (?) 
a
 These are the spellings Buchanan preferred throughout his journal. 
 
 
 
Buchanan spelt the Chin as „Kiayn‟. Other spellings such as „Kyan‟ or „Kayn‟ were 
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used at the beginning, but such terms were gradually standardised into „Kiayn‟ towards 
the later half of his journal. The first time he heard of them was when the party first 
approached Myede, on their journey up the Irrawaddy River: a Chin village was said to 
be located on the western bank of the Myede about half a league from the place.
57
 Eight 
days later, Panchoo ran into a Chin village while he was sent away „in search of poultry‟ 
and told Buchanan that the Chin „spoke a language totally different from either 
Burmans or Kareyns [Karens], but like the latter lived entirely among the woods and 
although they pay tribute, were never called on to fight‟.58 Later on, the Rangoon Myo-
tza confirmed the tributary relationship, and told Buchanan that „the Kiayn (Chin) were 
great makers in silk‟ and that some men‟s waistcloths mixed with gold were highly 
valued in Burma and brought as presents for the royal family.
59
  
 
Nothing much was heard of the Chin while he was at Amarapura. Only those 
merchants from Arakan gave him a piece of information on the Chin: that there was no 
inhabitant but „Kiayn‟ along the road from Arakan to Amarapura, and that they built 
their villages in the most inaccessible places.
60
 On the return journey, however, he met a 
group of Chin people brought by the Rangoon Myo-wun.
61
 Symes also recorded this 
occasion in his journal and inserted an engraving of a Chin couple.
62
 Buchanan used this 
chance to obtain more information regarding their customs, especially their religion. 
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Those brought on this occasion were from the villages dependent on Myede. They 
were collectively known as „Kiayn Yeen‟ or subjected Chin by the Burmese, in contrast 
to the „Kiayn Yain‟, the independent or „wild‟ Chin. They called themselves „Kăloūn‟ 
and the independent Chin or „Chin Yain‟ as „Taidoo‟; the Burmans, „Ngoo‟; and the 
„Yakain‟ (Burmese pronunciation of Rakhine; Arakanese), „Lakan‟. Of these, „Taidoo‟ 
seems to be the same as Thado but there is no definite evidence, while the term „Kăloūn‟ 
itself cannot be identified with any of the Kuki-Chin groups nowadays.  
 
Of the „subjected Chins‟, Symes noted that: 
they were originally inhabitants of Arracan mountains, whom the Birmans, 
since their conquest of that kingdom, have prevailed on, partly by force, and 
partly by mild treatment, to abandon their native hills, and settle on the plain. 
There are several small societies of these people established near the foot of 
the mountains farther north.
63
 
Therefore, it seems that these Chin people had been captured from the Arakan Yoma and 
resettled by the Burmese between the western bank of the Irrawaddy and the Arakan 
Yoma. Further evidence for this, according to both Symes and Buchanan, is that these 
Chin people carried the ashes of their deceased into the Arakan Yoma where they buried 
them: they were still emotionally attached to the mountains.  
 
Symes described the Chin as „harmless‟, and Buchanan‟s article regarding the 
language mentions their „simple honesty, industry and an inoffensive disposition‟,64 
which is the opposite of the rapine and plunder the name Kuki came to be associated 
with in Bengal and Assam. This difference must have originated from the different 
political positions the Kuki-Chin people occupied in relation to the plains-people. In 
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Bengal the Kuki were mostly independent of the Bengalis or other hill people, while the 
Chin people encountered by Buchanan and Symes had been disarmed and resettled by 
the Burmese. In fact, the Burmese also held that the independent Chins, who were 
numerous in the mountains further north, were a „fierce race‟. The same remark was 
made by the Rangoon Myo-wun regarding a nation he called „Ayngieen‟ who lived on 
the west bank of Chindwin river inhabiting scattered villages.
65
  
 
The term „Ayngieen‟ cannot be identified with any of the Chin groups of today, nor 
with any other ethnic group in Burma. The location of the people, however, corresponds 
with the Kubaw Valley, since the Rangoon Myo-wun said that through this country was 
the best road to Munnypura (Manipur). Buchanan suspected the term „Ayngieen‟ to be 
the same as Kiayn Yain or the wild Chin,
66
 as both of these were said by the Burmese to 
occupy the country on the western bank of Irrawaddy River between Ava and Manipur. 
It can only be conjectured that „Ayngieen‟ might be a reversed form of „Kiayn Yain‟ or 
„Ayain Kiayn‟ in which case the sound „k‟ would be softened to „g‟. 
 
The distinction of the Chin into two categories of „independent‟ and „subjected‟ 
was based on Burmese practices and reflected their differing political relationship from 
the Burmese point of view. It also carried the stereotypes attached to each category by 
the Burmese, such as „peaceful‟, „harmless‟, „industrious‟ for the subjected and „fierce‟, 
„wild‟, or „untamed‟ for the independent Chin. Similar influences are visible in other 
categories as well. For example, the Karen were divided into „Burmese‟ and „Talain‟ (or 
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Mon) Karens, which is the precedent for the division between Sgaw and Pao Karens,
67
 
and the Shan into three groups of Tayoup (Chinese), Kathee (Manipur) and Mrelap or 
royal Shans – meaning the territories in the Shan State not specifically under the 
jurisdiction of any Sawbwa.
68
 Buchanan knew that these were Burmese concepts and 
not necessarily what the people considered themselves to be. When he visited a Karen 
village, he found that, as he had suspected, they did not know the Burmese distinction 
between the Burmese and Mon Karens, except for those who had regular interaction 
with the Burmese and were therefore accustomed to the names Burmese gave them. Yet, 
as he was confined by the official schedule of the embassy and reliant on the Burmese 
interpreters, he could not avoid relying on Burmese views.  
 
To the categories he acquired from the Burmese, he added his own geographic 
interpretation. He had given up finding geographic details such as rivers, hills, routes, 
and cities for all the unknown parts of Burma, but he carried on his task by filling the 
geographic gap with the names of peoples. Besides, the geographic location of a group 
of people was often the only piece of information he could rely on when different 
informants mentioned similar yet different names. Thus, many of the categories that 
appear in the table 1 above were understood by their locations: „Independent Chins‟ 
were in the north and „Subjected Chins‟ were in the south; „Yun Shan‟ was the name of 
the people living near „Jangomai‟ (Chiangmai); the „Yo‟ were the people in the 
neighbourhood of Ye-veo (Ye-bya). It was also the only information available that can 
be used to compare the categories with his and his contemporary Europeans‟ knowledge. 
                                                 
67
 A. Judson, A Dictionary: Burmese English, 2nd ed. (Rangoon: American Baptist Mission Press, 
1883); John F. Cady. A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958) 
68
 Myanmar-English Dictionary (Yangon: Department of the Myanmar Language Commission, 
2001), s.v. „_______‟ (Mee-lat). 
  
 105 
Thus, judging by the similarity of sound and the similarity of location he concluded that 
the „Layn Sayn‟ of the Burmese are the same as the „Laiyans‟ of Modern Universal 
History and „Laos‟ of Laubère. 
 
The geographic nature of ethnic categories becomes clearer when we look at the 
map compiled in the Surveyor General‟s office in 1824 or a similar map published in 
London by L. Herbert (see Map 6 on the next page).
69
 These maps drew most of the 
information from Wood‟s charts and Buchanan‟s journal and placed the names that 
appear in table 1 (see page 110 above) at specific locations following Buchanan closely. 
There are „Kathee Shan‟, „Mrelap Shan‟ (Arakanese pronunciation of „Mee-lat Shan‟), 
„Independent‟ and „Subjected Kiayn‟ neatly written within the domain of the Kingdom 
of Ava or „Mranma Pyee‟ (Arakanese pronunciation of „Myanma country‟). In this 
manner, the Burmese taxonomy of the categories of people around them was 
geographically fixed in British knowledge. 
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Map 6, Part of Map of the Burmese Empire, by L. Herbert (1825) (BL Maps 58765(6)) 
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After this mission, five more diplomatic missions were sent, up to 1811: Hiram 
Cox in 1796, Symes again in 1802, and John Canning three times in 1803, 1809 and 
1811. None of these, however, brought any improvement to the tension along the 
border,
70
 nor any more information on the people of Burma was added. Regarding the 
Chin, Hiram Cox‟s journal merely mentioned that „the country to the westward of them 
[the Burmese] is inhabited by the people called Caens‟, who were independent of 
Burma.
71
 Vincentius Sangermano, on his return to Italy, published an account of Burma, 
which then was translated into English in the 1830s; but again, there was no more 
information on the Chin (spelt „Chien‟) to be found in his book other than the custom of 
tattooing women‟s faces.72 He added that this custom originated from the attempt to 
protect their women folk from raids by the Burmese by rendering them ugly – a much-
quoted idea, though the truth of it has been doubted.
73
 
 
 
2) The Survey of Southeast Bengal, 1798 
 
Three years after his mission to Ava, Buchanan, now stationed at Lakkhipur, 
received an order to proceed through the provinces of Chittagong and Tripura. In a 
journey that lasted three months from the 2
nd
 March 1798, Buchanan passed through the 
coastal plains of Chittagong to the area near the Naaf River, and then returned by a more 
inland route through the Chittagong Hills, reaching Barkal near the current Mizoram 
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state, and visiting Comilla in Tripura before returning to his residence at Patahat.
74
  
 
The main purpose of the journey was to find out if spices could be grown 
profitably in Southeastern Bengal: to stimulate the local economy to become more 
productive, and subsequently to make the Chittagong region more prosperous and 
safe.
75
 Thus, wherever he went, he recorded the quality of soil, geographical 
peculiarities and the state of agriculture in that place. Such interests were expanded into 
the economic life of the people such as the local products, methods of cultivation, trade 
taking place in the markets, and, as during his stay in Burma, different peoples. 
 
The methods he employed for this enquiry were the same as when he was in 
Burma: mainly interviews, taking verbal accounts of ethnic appellations and customs, 
collecting vocabularies and visiting villages if possible. The difference, however, was 
that this time he was travelling within the hills and was permitted a closer view of the 
people. 
 
While in the Chittagong Hills, his informants included several chiefs of the hill 
people: three Marma chiefs – Kaung-La-Pru76, Umpry Palong, and Aung-ghio-se – and 
a Chakma chief – Taub-boka Mang. 77  All of these rendered great assistance to 
Buchanan‟s enquiry, in contrast to the Bengalis in the plains who, Buchanan suspected, 
tried to conceal as much truth as possible from him.
78
 Kaung-la-pru even sent Buchanan 
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a number of people from different ethnic groups under his authority from whom 
Buchanan took samples of vocabulary and information on their customs. Thus 
Buchanan was able to interview a group of Kuki people sent by Kaung-la-pru and four 
individuals who had come to trade in a market within Kaung-la-pru‟s authority. As when 
he was in Burma, he preferred his own observations and endeavoured to visit different 
villages whenever possible, but other than two Mru villages, he was not able to visit any 
Kuki village, since the Chakmas and Marmas, who guided him in the hills, were afraid 
of the Kuki and refused to guide Buchanan deep into their country.
79
 
 
Regarding Tripura, his interest in the ethnic situation was rather casual compared 
to that in Chittagong. He spent less than ten days in Tripura and only talked to a couple 
of individuals regarding the people of Tripura. He had hoped to see more of the interior 
of Tripura himself, but the early start of the rains and a fever prevented him.
80
 On the 
other hand, by coincidence, Jai Singh, the Rajah of Manipur, was visiting Tripura with a 
large group of followers numbering seven hundred. He was on a pilgrimage to 
„Kishnagar‟(Krishnanagar) on the Ganges, and was staying with the Rajah of Tripura, 
who had married one of his daughters. Buchanan took this opportunity to converse with 
the ministers and priests of Jai Singh.
81
 Table 2 on the next page shows the resulting 
categories that appear in his journal. 
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Table 2. Ethnic Categories in Buchanan’s Journal of South-Eastern Bengal 
Categories
a
 Other Appellations 
Modern English 
Equivalent 
Chakma Saksa, Moishang Sak: by themselves 
 Chakma: Bengali Corruption 
Chakma (Sak) 
Marma Ma-a-ma, Mrama, Marma-gre: by themselves 
Joomea, Joomea Mug, or Mug : by Bengalis 
Kiaung-sa (Chaung-tha): also widely used 
Marma 
Tipperah Mrung, Mroong, Mooung: by Marma 
Myoun: by Burmese 
Mroong, Moroong: by Bengalis 
Tripuri 
Koongky Zou: by themselves 
 Cho/Kio: Burmese corruption 
Koongky: by Bengali 
 Kuki/Cuci: English corruption 
Lang-ka, Lang-ga: by Marma 
 Lingta: Bengali corruption 
Kuki 
Kuki-Chin 
Looshe Loosai/Lushe: corruption from a name of a chief 
Longshe 
Mizo 
Bon-zu Bon-zu: by Arakanese and Marma 
 Bonjoogi : Bengali corruption and accepted by 
the British officers. 
Bawm-zo 
Mru Moroo/Moroosa : by themselves. 
Moroong : Bengali corruption 
Mroo : by Marma 
Myoo: by Burmese 
Mru 
Poitoo (Buchanan regarded this as a name of a place) Paitu (?) 
Lang-mang  Lakhers
b
 
Shan-du or Shein-du Lakhers 
Kue-mye  Kumi 
a
 These are the spellings Buchanan preferred throughout the journal. 
b
 Van Schendel postulates ‘Lang-mang’ as the same as ‘Lakher’ but there is no definite 
evidence for this liaison; however, ‘Langga’, another term for Kuki, is the Bengali 
corruption of the Burmese ‘Langkhe’ which has the same origin as the ‘Lakher’. 
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At a glance, the broad outline of the categorisation shown above can be 
summarised into „Chakma‟, „Marma‟, „Tripuri‟ and „Kuki-Chin‟. In fact, when 
Buchanan first entered Chittagong, a Bengali person told him that the hills were 
inhabited by „three different races of people, called Joomeas, Tiperahs, and Chakmas‟, 
who frequently changed their place of residence „owing chiefly to the incursions of a 
very savage people called Koongkies‟.82 In this statement, four distinctive categories 
can be extracted, namely, „Joomeas‟, „Tiperahs‟, „Chakmas‟ and „Koongkies‟. Except 
for the addition of Tripuri, this is, in fact, the same as in John Macrae‟s article or the 
Bengali categorisation of the hill people.
83
 There is, however, an important difference 
between this categorisation and the one adopted by Macrae in the article mentioned 
earlier: whereas the Bengali informant to Buchanan used „Jumma‟ and „Chakma‟ as 
separate races, in Macrae‟s article „Jumma‟ was used to mean „Chakma‟ while „Mug‟ 
was adopted as another race that lived nearer to the plains. Buchanan‟s journal is an 
important work, since it reveals this kind of complicated and confused state of ethnic 
categories in the Chittagong Hills. 
 
The category Jumma, spelt „Joomea‟ by Buchanan exemplifies the complex 
situation very well. When Buchanan met Kaung-la-pru, the chief of the people called 
„Joomea‟ by the Bengali, he told Buchanan that the proper name for the Jumma was 
„Marma‟, spelt _______ in Arakanese. This, in fact, had the same origin as the term 
„Myanmar‟, the name Burmese call themselves. A subject of Kaung-la-pru told 
Buchanan that they also called themselves „Ma-ra-ma-gre‟ or „the Great Burmas‟ which, 
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Buchanan wrote, was the name given „by the inhabitants of Ava to the people of 
Arakan‟.84 In every respect they were descendants of the Arakanese. Their tradition told 
them of their immigration from Arakan, they spoke Arakanese, and had the same 
religion as Arakan – Buchanan recorded that they worshipped „Ma-ha Moony or the 
great image of Buddha in Arakan‟ – and had Buddhist monks called „Poun-gris‟ 
(_______, „Pon-gyi‟ in Burmese) some of whom were invited from Arakan to teach the 
language to the children.
85
  
 
The same link to Arakanese culture was also true of the Marma societies under 
other chiefs, such as Umpry Palong
86
 and Aung-Ghio-se.
87
 They all regarded themselves 
as one nation, but the Bengalis used a variety of different categories for these people. 
Umpry Palong‟s people were called „Jummea Mugs‟ by the Bengalis. Mug, as Buchanan 
found out, was the term Bengalis in Chittagong used to designate „all the tribes or 
nations east of Bengal who do not have caste‟. In this sense, it included the Buddhist 
Arakanese and Burmese, and carried an implication of contempt. This term was 
normally used for the refugees from Arakan after the Burmese invasion, as they were 
the ones that the Bengalis most frequently came across at the period. „Joomea Mug‟ 
therefore, can be said to have been a term used to designate the Arakanese descendants 
in the hills, distinguished from those in the plains by the prefix „Joomea‟ – a description 
on their mode of cultivation called „jhoom‟ in Bengali. 
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Umpry Palong, on the other hand, regarded the proper name for his people as 
„Kiaung-sa‟(or more properly Chaung-tha), or the sons of the river. This term seems to 
have been more widely used among the Marma people around Ramu than the term 
„Marma‟ itself and while Buchanan was travelling these areas he adopted „Kiaung-sa‟ to 
mean all the Arakanese descendants in the hills. Nevertheless, as an ethnic category, this 
term is as ambiguous as „Jumma‟. Both Chaung-tha and its counterpart Toung-tha are of 
Burmese origin: Chaung _______ in Burmese means stream, and Toung _____ 
mountain, so these terms classify the hill people into two according to their relative 
heights or remoteness from the plains. Such usage seems to have developed in Arakan 
and followed the immigrants into Chittagong where Lewin adopted it as a standard 
division of the inhabitants of the hills later in the 1860s.
88
 Yet only those Marma of 
Umpry Palong used „Chaung-tha‟ to describe themselves, while those of Kaung-la-pru 
knew this term but preferred Marma. When Buchanan made enquiries on this point to 
the people of Kaung-la-pru, they told Buchanan that those under Umpry Palong were of 
the „same nation‟, but they described themselves as both Chaungtha and Toungtha.89  
 
Therefore, the terms „Jumma‟, „Mug‟, „Chaung-tha‟, and „Toungtha‟ are all very 
unsatisfactory as ethnic categories: they are not terms that distinguish one people from 
another but merely highlight certain characteristics that are not embedded in the people 
thus called. Jumma is a term for a mode of cultivation and theoretically anyone who 
practises jhoom cultivation could be regarded as such. Chaungtha and Toungtha are 
terms developed in Arakan that distinguished people according to their location. Mug 
highlights the quality of having no caste, and was normally confined to the Arakanese in 
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the case of Chittagong, but the term could be enlarged to anyone east of Chittagong. It is 
true that the people knew these names but none of these originated from the identity of 
the people thus named.  
 
The term „Mug‟ needs a further mention as it shows how one name had different 
meanings to different people. As Buchanan found out, a section of so-called Mug who 
had adopted Hindu customs were called Rajbunshi (or royal descent) by the Bengalis in 
Chittagong, but further from Chittagong the Bengalis in Calcutta used the term Mug to 
designate people in the eastern hills who had adopted Hindu customs, dreaded as 
experts in black magic. Also, as the wives of British officers employed many of these as 
cooks, the term was further corrupted to carry the connotation of a race of cooks.
90
 
 
„Chakmas‟ were another group that had originally come from Arakan. Though they 
normally spoke Bengali and adopted Hindu customs, their religious textbooks were in 
Arakanese and the title of chiefs such as Po-Min and Kha-Min were all from the 
Burmese, meaning prince. They called themselves „Saksa‟ which was corrupted into 
„Chakma‟ in Bengali. This word literally means „son of Sak‟, and they regarded 
themselves as the same people as, the „Thaek‟ in Arakan. The „Chakma‟ in the 
Chittagong Hills, however, seem to have developed a separate identity from the „Thaek‟ 
in Arakan, as they adopted another term „Sakmee‟ for the latter.91 
 
„Tiperah‟ were obviously the same as the Tripuri. Those Tripuris in the Chittagong 
Hills who lived outside the jurisdiction of the Tripura Rajah were called „Mrung‟ in the 
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Chittagong Hills. Buchanan regarded the affinity between the Mrung and the Tripuri as 
somewhat similar to that between the Burmese and Arakanese, as they had the same 
culture and spoke dialects of the same language.
92
 Marmas called them „Mrung‟ or 
„Wathé Mroo‟ and Burmese called them „Myoun‟ („Mroun‟ or „Mrung‟ in Arakanese) in 
distinction from the „Myoo‟ or „Mru‟. The Bengalis, however, indiscriminately used 
„Moroong‟ for both the Mrung and the Mru. This confounded Buchanan initially, but 
soon he was able to confirm them as different people by the way they bound their hair 
in knots: the Mrung or Tipperah bound their hair in a knot at the nape while the Mru had 
a knot on the forehead.
93
  
 
These were the people living nearer to the plains. Apart from these, the Bengali 
called all the others from further inland by a blanket term, „Koongkies‟, which, 
according to Buchanan, had been corrupted into English as „Kookie‟ or „Cuci‟. 
Buchanan had only two occasions to meet them: the first was when Kaung-la-pru sent 
six men and two women from one of his tributaries, and the second was at the market of 
Kaung-la-pru, where Buchanan saw one man and three women. On the second occasion, 
he could not get any information from them, as there was no-one who spoke Bengali or 
Marma among these Kukis. Thus, he could only make some observations on the 
ornaments they were wearing. The first group, on the other hand, was accompanied by 
the headman of the village, who could speak some Bengali, and Buchanan could 
interview them regarding their culture, and collect samples of their words.  
 
Of the names of the people he wrote: 
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They name their own tribe Zou. By the Ma-ra-mas they are named Lang-
ga, which by the Bengalese is corrupted into Lingta. By the Bengalese they 
are commonly called Koongky, which we have corrupted into Kooky, or as it 
is written in the Asiatic Researches, Cuci.
94
 
This is the only mention of „Zou‟ (Zo) in his journal. He seems to have regarded „Zou‟ 
as somewhat different from „Koongky‟ in the extent of its use and therefore not as a 
compatible term. Buchanan himself preferred to call them „Koongky‟, except in the 
table of vocabulary he collected from this particular group, preserving the Bengali 
appellation unless other terms – such as Langga – were used by the informers.  
 
„Langga‟, also spelt „Laynga‟, „Lanka‟, „Linkta‟, „Lingta‟ and so on, was another 
blanket term Buchanan often used as coterminous with „Koongky‟. 95  According to 
Buchanan it was the Marma people who used this term for the same people whom the 
Bengalis called „Koongky‟96 and it was while he was with the Marma that Buchanan 
recorded the Kuki being called „Langga or Koongky‟. The term „Koongky‟ was 
obviously well known among the Marmas as well, perhaps due to their interaction with 
the Bengalis. On the other hand, the Bengalis corrupted the Marma term „Langga‟ into 
„Lingta‟, which is the same term as „Lunctas‟ that Macrae used in his article.97 A similar 
form is found in a list of „rude tribes of the hills‟ given to Buchanan by a Burmese 
merchant as „Layn-ga‟ _______ („Lin-ke‟ in Burmese), confirming the Arakanese origin 
of the term.
98
 This fits in with the explanation of the origin of this term given by Macrae, 
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when he mentioned the term „Lunctas‟ in a legend of Marma.99 Nevertheless, Macrae‟s 
note that the name implied „naked‟ does not match this Marma origin, because it is in 
Bengali that „Langga‟ means naked.  
 
Van Schendel recognises this term, especially the Burmese word Lin-ke(______), 
as the corruption of „Lakhers‟.100 If this is true, which is likely, it shows that the usage 
of Langga to mean Kuki people in general, originated from a section of the people who 
were called „Lin-ke‟ by the Arakanese, which then was softened into „Langga‟ and 
corrupted into „Lingta‟ or „Luncta‟ by the Bengalis, who also added their own 
interpretation that this term came from their word „naked‟: an example of metonymy.  
 
According to Buchanan, Lushai, spelt „Looshe‟ or „Loosai‟, was another term that 
went through a similar corruption. Buchanan noted that the Koongkies were in various 
places also called „Loo-sai, Loo-she and Lang-ga or Linkta.‟101 From this, it appears 
that Buchanan understood these terms as interchangeable, but when he was in Tripura, a 
dewan or minister of the Rajah told him of ten „different kinds of Kukis‟ subjected to 
the Tripura Rajah among whom „Looshee‟ was one.102  In this sense Lushai was a 
subgroup of the Kuki. In fact, Buchanan postulated that „Longshue‟, the name of a 
powerful Kuki chief near Fenny, gave birth to the term „Loosai,‟103 thus adding another 
explanation regarding the origin of the term Lushai.
104
 He also pointed out that it was 
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the Chakmas who commonly employed the term „Loosai‟ for the same group called the 
„Koong-kies‟. At this point, it is tempting to conclude that Lushai originally came from 
the name of one chief to designate the people under him – a common practice in the 
hills in this frontier – and then this usage was expanded by the Chakmas who applied 
the term to other Kukis as well: in a similar way as the term „Langga‟ came to be 
applicable to a broader range of the Kuki. Nevertheless, the information from Buchanan 
is not sufficient to support such a conjecture, at best, it only shows that different people 
used the term „Lushai‟, as well as „Koongky‟ and „Langga‟ with different extensions. 
 
Apart from the terms „Koongky‟, „Langga‟, and „Loosai‟, there were other 
categories that appear in Buchanan‟s journal which, even though Buchanan regarded 
them as separate categories, are nowadays recognised as cognate groups of the Kuki-
Chin people. Mru was one of them. The name they called themselves were „Moroo‟ or 
„Moroosa‟ and the Marma and the Arakanese called them „Moroo‟ or „Mroo‟ which was 
the same as the Burmese „Myoo‟. Buchanan had first heard of Mru as a people living 
under Kaung-la-pru but speaking a different language. Later he had opportunity to 
interview two different groups of them and to visit one of their villages, which was on 
friendly terms with the Marma chief Aung-ghio-se.
105
 
 
Another Kuki-Chin group that Buchanan regarded as a separate entity was the 
Bawm-zo. „Bon-zu‟ was the Marma and Arakanese term for the same people, and 
Buchanan used this form in his diary. Buchanan heard of them from Marmas and 
Chakmas as powerful people who were, unlike the Kukis, armed with muskets. Many of 
the Kuki and Loosai were said to be subjects or tributaries of Bon-zu chiefs. They did 
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not have much communication with the Bengalis in Chittagong nor with the Chakma or 
Marma but were known to acquire salt from Arakan.
106
  
 
Other than these, there were categories of the Kuki-Chin people mentioned only 
very briefly in the journal. Chakmas who guided him told Buchanan of the „Lang Mang‟ 
who were „constantly at war with the Koongkies‟ and who „slept on trees like 
baboons‟107: there was a persistent tendency to apply the stigma of half-brutes to the 
people further away in the hills. A Burmese merchant also named some of the hill tribes 
of the Chittagong Hills towards the head of the Mayu River among which were „Kue-
mye‟(_____, Kwemi), „Kio‟(____, „Cho‟: possibly a misspelling of „Chin‟ _____), and 
„Shandu‟(_____, Shendu).108 Regarding these, Buchanan merely recorded the fact of his 
hearing these names and the approximate locations.  
 
In Tripura, Buchanan noticed four categories of people: Tripuri, Riang, Kuki, and 
Alynagur. Of these, little more than the names were recorded. There were disagreements 
regarding the Riang: some told him that they spoke a language totally different from the 
Tripuri, while others told him that they spoke dialects of the same language as Tripuri 
and Alynagur. Alynagur was rather the name of a place than of a people. The only 
account of Kukis concerned the location of some of their villages as related by a 
Bengali woodcutter.
109
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His accounts of the Kuki in Manipur are more interesting than those concerning 
Tripura. Because of some hostilities with Cachar, the Manipur Rajah could not use the 
normal route he used to visit Tripura, which was through Khaspur – the capital of 
Cachar. Instead he had cut a fresh route circumventing Cachar through the southern hills 
and via Bhanga, a border town in Sylhet. The Kuki around this road were all said to 
have been subject to one powerful chief who lived three days‟ journey south of this new 
road at a place called „Poitoo‟ and that chief was said to be able to raise eight thousand 
armed men.
110
 As van Schendel observed, this name „Poitoo‟ seems not to be the name 
of a place but of a Kuki group, which became notorious as raiders in the southern 
frontier of Sylhet and Cachar from the 1820s.
111
  
 
 
3) Buchanan’s Proto-Ethnology of the Kuki-Chin Frontier 
 
Buchanan‟s journal of the survey of south-eastern Bengal contains even richer and 
more detailed accounts of the ethnic categories compared to his Manuscript Burma 
Journal, but in both of these journals, Buchanan merely collected the facts: what he 
understood of these confusing usages of ethnic categories is nowhere to be seen. In the 
case of his travel in Burma, however, he later published an article in Asiatic 
Researches,
112
 which reveals a fraction of his understanding. Here he used the language, 
or more precisely, the words he had collected, to make up the six categories which 
appear in table 3.  
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Table 3. Language Groups of Burma According to Buchanan 
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In this table, Buchanan used language as a guiding principle to regroup and arrange 
the categories he had collected in Burma. Burma proper, Arakanese, Yo and the people 
of Tenasserim are grouped together under „Burma‟, while Siamese proper(Thai), Kathee 
and Myelap Shans are put under „Siamese‟ and „Burma Karens‟ and „Talain Karens‟ 
under Karen. Not all these groupings, however, were based on the analysis of their 
languages. The only examples where he concluded one category to be a sub-category of 
another through linguistic evidence are Tenasserim and Arakan, which from the 
evidence of vocabularies he regarded as dialects of Burmese. In other cases, he had 
learned of mutual affinities from the people he met during his journey and formed a 
categorisation based on the knowledge.  
 
The reason he published this was explained in his own words:  
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Language, of all adventitious circumstances, is the surest guide in tracing the 
migrations and connections of nations. . .
113
 
When he mentioned „the migration and connections of nations‟ here, it was on a grander 
scale than that of the ethnic categories of Burma, and was in a wider academic context 
than that of the study of one kingdom: it was about the movement of all the nations of 
the earth studied by means of comparative philology.  
 
In the early nineteenth century, various concepts and methods of formerly 
undifferentiated philological tradition began to blossom into the comparative philology 
that traced the dispersion of all different races of the earth from the biblical explanation 
of the dispersion of the sons of Noah. In due course, such interest was to give birth to a 
discipline called „ethnology‟ in mid-Victorian Britain. Religion was another topic 
related to this dispersion of mankind that was hotly debated at the time among the 
scholars: whether polytheism was a result of degeneration from monotheism after 
Noah‟s flood or the result of the progress of human civilisation.114  
 
Buchanan was certainly aware of these developments. Moreover, his interest in the 
people of the places he visited and the particular aspects of these people that he 
endeavoured to study seem to have been guided by current developments in the science 
of mankind among Europeans. In fact, whenever he met a new set of people, his 
questions were invariably about their religious practices and language. He was aware of 
misunderstandings that could arise from the difference in languages, and therefore, 
made broad enquiries about the gods and spirits that were worshipped, about mortuary 
customs, and about the concept of the after-life, rather than asking about „religion‟ in 
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general. Regarding language, he adopted an especially systematic approach, and he 
collected the same set of „vocables‟ whenever he had chance.115 
 
Despite this interest, as Vicziany revealed, his real academic ambition at this time, 
that which drove him to such zealous research even against the wishes of his superior 
administrators, concerned plants not people.
116
 Buchanan was also aware that his 
research was far from being complete. In spite of this, he published the result of his 
travels in Burma as a contribution to the pan-European academic discourse, in the hope 
that someone after him might benefit from what he had done: 
It is a beginning, which I hope hereafter to make more compleat(sic.), and 
where I fail, others without doubt will be more successful.
117
 
 
The study of language, however, did not enable Buchanan to perceive the 
relationships between different groups beyond what was told to him by the local people. 
In his article on the languages of Burma, he confessed that he was confused by the 
existence of such a number of different languages among people with similar physical 
and cultural traits.
118
 The confusion was obviously greater when he came into the 
Chittagong Hills. Here, all he could make out of the words he had collected was that 
there was some similarity between the Burmese and the „Zou‟ language, while he found 
Marma the same as the Arakanese dialect of the Burmese.
119
 Though Buchanan was the 
first British person to meet the Kuki-Chin people from both sides of the frontier, his 
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study of words did not enable him to relate the „Koongky‟ of the Chittagong Hills to the 
„Kiayn‟ of Burma. 
 
He also could not avoid using exonyms such as „Kiayn‟ and „Kuki‟ for the Kuki-
Chin people. Van Schendel praised Buchanan as the first to introduce „emic‟ 
perspectives in the Chittagong Hills.
120
 Indeed, from his journey in Burma he evidently 
preferred to call people by the name they call themselves. This is especially true of the 
Marma with whom he had close interaction. Nevertheless, whether in Burma or in 
Chittagong his knowledge on the Kuki-Chin people came largely from his guides, 
translators and other non-Kuki-Chins with whom he associated. From these, he adopted 
the usage of Kuki (spelt „Koongky‟ in Bengali fashion) and Kiayn as the standard 
blanket terms to cover all „other‟ hill peoples of western Burma and eastern Chittagong. 
It was partly due to the limited extent of his interaction with the Kuki-Chin people that 
he could not conclude whether the terms used by the Kuki-Chin for themselves, such as 
„Zou‟ or „Kăloūn‟, were coextensive with „Koongky‟ or „Kiayn‟ and opted for the latter 
that were more widely used and covered all those that he had not met. 
 
Regardless of this shortcoming, his journals, especially the part relating to the 
Chittagong Hills, are still valuable sources as they show the confused and complex 
situation of ethnic categories better than any other accounts published afterwards. In this 
aspect, Buchanan‟s journals contrast with Lewin‟s work, which attempted to render the 
situation more comprehensible to its readers by suggesting fictitious groups clearly 
distinguished from each other, and neatly classifiable under supra-categories of 
„Chaungtha‟ and „Toungtha‟ that were not genuinely „ethnic‟ in origin.  
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The complex situation of the ethnic categories revealed in Buchanan‟s journal 
reflected the similarly complex political situation of the Hills. In the Chittagong Hills, a 
political entity usually consisted of people from different ethnic categories. For example, 
the country of Kaung-la-pru consisted of Marma villages under different roajas (from 
Burmese Yua-tza ______ or village headmen), as well as Kuki, Mru, and Mrung 
villages subjected or tributary to him, and slaves originally captured as prisoners of 
war.
121
 This state of affairs was also true of other chiefs‟ villages. A Bawm-zo chief 
called Taikoup by the Chakmas was said to rule over a mixed population of Lushai (or 
Kuki) and Bawm-zo from whom he received a tribute of rice and cotton from the head 
of every family. He was also said to have many Lang-ga settlers and slaves, and some 
slaves tattooed like Burmese.
122
 These were what van Schendel calls „Multi-ethnic 
arrangements‟, for example: 
Villages inhabited by swidden cultivators belonging to different language 
groups; villages that were „ethnically stratified,‟ being inhabited by an ethnic 
group together with its debt peons from different groups; and villages in 
which the leaders had servants from several other groups. Moreover, chiefs 
often collected tribute from households belonging to an amalgam of ethnic 
groups.
123
 
 
The distinction between the hill people and the Bengalis of the plains also became 
blurred from a closer viewpoint. Chakma and Marma not only lived in the nearer hills 
and visited the markets in the plains but in many cases were living side by side with the 
Bengalis: some of the subjects of Kaung-la-pru actually occupied lands belonging to the 
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zemindars and paid rent to them,
124
 and Taubboka Min of the Chakma held a large 
estate around Rangunia but a part of this fertile land, according to Buchanan, had been 
unjustly seized by the Company‟s native officer about fourteen years previous to his 
visit, during the rule of Taubboka Min‟s father.125 
 
The multi-ethnic arrangements he found in the Chittagong Hills seem to have been 
related to the complicated and confused usages of ethnic categories. Different people in 
different contexts used different sets of categories. For example, the Burmese merchant 
he met in Chittagong knew the term „Layn-ga‟ and „Chin‟ but not „Kuki‟, but in 
Chittagong Hills the term „Chin‟ was not used but Kuki, „Langga‟, and Lushai by 
different people with different extensions. In Burma, through his almost exclusive 
interaction with the dominant population in the central part of the country, he acquired a 
knowledge of the taxonomy of the ethnic categories as understood by the people within 
that specific context, which made it easier for him to come up with a simplified system 
of categorisation, as seen in his article on the languages spoken in Burma. In this sense, 
the confusion he faced in the Chittagong Hills was due to the variety of the people he 
could interview: unlike Burma, here he met different people with different ideas on the 
categories of people around them. 
 
This complicated ethno-political situation revealed in his journal was seldom 
noticed by other administrators, nor did it interest the British administration: it was 
enough for the administrators to name the „Chakma‟ and a group of „Mugs‟ called 
„Bohmong‟ who were tributaries. Thus, as in the case of Macrae, the categorisation 
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popularly employed by the Bengalis became standard British categorisation for the 
people in the Chittagong Hills. In this simplified form, the British administrators 
recognised two powers in the hills closer to the plains – Chakma and Bohmong – and 
one race of marauders against whom these friendly chiefs worked as shields: the Kuki. 
In the meantime, Buchanan‟s works were forgotten, even among the British 
administrators, until recently, and therefore made no impact on the British colonial 
practices or ethnographic knowledge. 
 
In relation to colonial practice and knowledge, Buchanan‟s journeys show two 
ways in which the consolidation of the colonial administration encouraged the 
collection of information on the territories around British administration: one was the 
political need to know its possibly hostile neighbours, and another was economic 
calculations to know possible resources which could be exploited. Nevertheless, the 
articles that appeared in Asiatic Researches can at best be described as a result of 
personal interest rather than of any administrative interests of British colonialism. Only 
in the broadest sense were these related to the consolidation of British rule in India: the 
growing interaction between the administrators and the local people in the proximity of 
the Kuki-Chin land increased the chance for the British to acquire second-hand 
knowledge on the Kuki-Chin through those local people who had closer relationships 
with the Kuki-Chin. 
 
This is a different case from Buller‟s report on Tripura, which was an example in 
which administrative contexts dominated the contents of the report and the circulation 
of the information. In the case of Rawlins and Macrae, however, both their interest and 
the publication of their information were independent of their administrative duties. In 
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short, an administrator as an individual is under the influence of various circumstances 
in which colonial administration is but one, and the weight of colonial administration on 
an individual administrator also varied.  
 
Lastly, there were notable differences in Buchanan‟s attitudes towards 
administration and scholarly activities that set him apart from the generation of scholars 
prior to him. One was his identification with the governmental duties to protect the 
people with the same principles of sympathy and justice that the British parliament had 
imposed on the Company at the time of the reforms. Thus, when Buchanan heard that 
the Lushai were one of the tributaries to the Tripura Rajah, he commented that it would 
be just to put a stop to their depredations on the Chakma, who were tributary to the 
Company, by using the influence of the Rajah of Tripura.
126
 In another instance, 
commenting on the miserable conditions of the Arakanese refugees along the 
Chittagong-Arakan border and the unsettled state of that part of Chittagong, he urged 
the government to extend firmer control over the province, which in his opinion could 
not succeed „without previously humbling the Burmas‟.127 Here we can observe the 
merging interests of an expansionist and a benevolent despot. 
 
The kind of sympathy shown by Buchanan was also different in nature from that of 
Hastings‟s generation. Hastings‟s generation came to India for trade, and their attitude 
to the administration was first to learn the native ways, which would be the least 
resisted by the Indian population, and therefore the most effectual mode of governance. 
On the other hand, the reforms of Cornwallis broke away from the traditionalist view, 
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and opted for justice and efficiency along English lines. Thus, the moral sympathy of 
the administration with the people began to base itself on the belief that the answers to 
the political – and growingly, social as well – problems in India should be found in 
English ideas. Thus British Indian Government as a whole began to adopt a collective 
sense of the superiority of British ways to Indian ways. 
 
Such a change in attitude, however, was not generally apparent among British 
administrators in India as yet. As Stokes commented, though Cornwallis‟s reforms had a 
definite tendency towards „Anglicisation‟, his measures were still consistent with the 
old mercantilist conception of the British position in India, and they were not aimed at 
assimilation of the Indian people and culture to that of Britain.
128
 Apart from the 
question of principles behind the administration, the consolidation of the British 
administration in this frontier area itself came slowly.  
 
Then, in the 1820s, one event suddenly focused British attention on this frontier, 
causing a flood of changes. In a sense, it was an inevitable result of the expansion and 
consolidation of the British administration in Eastern Bengal, towards which another 
power, the Kingdom of Burma, was expanding from the east. The events that 
necessitated diplomatic missions to the „Court of Ava‟ were a symptom of the growing 
tension between these two neighbours, which in 1824 erupted into a military showdown, 
the First Anglo-Burmese War. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE FIRST ANGLO-BURMESE WAR AND THE CHANGING FRONTIER: 
1824-1833 
 
 
1. The First Anglo-Burmese War 
 
a) The Outbreak of the War 
 
Border troubles in Chittagong with Burma continued after the last diplomatic 
mission to the Court of Ava by John Canning in 1811. Chin Pyan, a son of a former 
myo-thugyi of Mrohaung, partly succeeded in taking Arakan in 1811. He then hid 
himself in the Chittagong Hills but continued to invade Arakan until his death in 1814. 
In the meantime new troubles were brewing in the north. In 1812 the Burmese invaded 
Manipur led by Marjit Singh, a Manipur prince who had been brought up in Ava. Then 
in 1816 they also invaded Assam led by a Burha Gohain – one of the three highest 
officers of the state
1
 – named Badan Chandra who had requested Burmese support for 
his own ambition.
2
 British authors of the time tended to depict this as outright 
expansionism of the Burmese and have particularly emphasised the brutal and inhuman 
way with which the Burmese treated the Assamese during their campaign.
3
 Yet from the 
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Burmese point of view, their invasions of Arakan, Manipur and Assam were necessary 
in order to restore law and order, remove „bad rulers‟, and help the local people to get 
„good rulers‟. 4  In fact, all of the above-mentioned invasions originated from local 
pretenders requesting Burmese support and continued due to the desire of the Burmese 
to keep these countries under their influence in stable tributary relationships.  
 
The British first felt the Burmese advance through the refugees pouring into the 
frontier districts of Chittagong, Sylhet, and Rangpur. Among these were several 
claimants for various thrones, requesting military assistance against the Burmese. Chin 
Pyan was one such case. Chaurjit Singh, a prince of Manipur, solicited British support 
against the Burmese in 1812, but took refuge in the Jaintia Hills. Marjit Singh, who had 
dethroned Chaurjit with the help of the Burmese, then invaded Cachar, with the result 
that Gobind Chandra, the Rajah of Cachar, sought British support in 1817. Then in 1819 
Marit Singh himself fled into Cachar fleeing from the Burmese who invaded Manipur to 
punish Marjit Singh‟s insolence. In Cachar, Marjit Singh reconciled with Chaurjit Singh 
and together they turned out Gobind Chandra. The Rajah of Cachar again fled into the 
British territory and appealed for assistance. Soon after this, Chaurjit Singh also fled 
into Sylhet after a quarrel with Gambhir Singh, another of the Manipuri princes. 
 
Added to this number were the Assamese nobles and princes. Before turning to the 
Burmese, Badan Chandra had requested British support in 1816. Purandar Singh, a 
prince dethroned by the Burmese, fled into the British territory in 1819, pleading for 
help. Then Chandrakanta, the one who the Burmese had placed on the throne, fled near 
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to – and occasionally entered – Rangpur, but continued his military campaign against 
the Burmese from 1821. During this turbulent period, the Burmese constantly urged the 
British Indian Government to capture and hand over these defectors, together with their 
followers. 
 
Despite all these pleas, the Government of British India adamantly stood by the 
policy of non-intervention on this frontier. It was, however, a different story with the 
frontier officers who actually had to deal with the refugees while receiving rumours of 
the advancing Burmese troops. Not surprisingly, some of the frontier officers took the 
situation in their own hands and provided support to the princes and nobles in exile 
against the Burmese. Captain White, who was in Chittagong during Chin Pyan‟s 
campaigns against the Burmese, suggested that T. C. Robertson, the Magistrate of 
Chittagong, as well as John Macrae, a civil surgeon and the author of the article on the 
Kuki in Asiatic Researches, had implicitly supported Chin Pyan against the Burmese in 
Arakan.
5
 This was done without the sanction of the central authorities, but on the other 
frontier, David Scott, the Magistrate of Rangpur, supported the Assamese princes 
against the Burmese with permission from the government.
6
 
 
Then from around the 1820s the Burmese began to assume a more aggressive 
attitude towards British India. On the Arakan frontier a real confrontation began over an 
island at the mouth of the Naaf River called Shapuri, or Sheenmaboo in Burmese.
7
 On 
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the Assam frontier, the Burmese Government sent a large force led by their most 
renowned general, Maha Bandula, in 1822 and defeated Chandrakanta, who fled to 
Assam Choky to seek British protection.
8
 
 
At this stage, both Scott and Robertson argued strongly for a war, which they saw 
as the only solution for the border problem.
9
 The authorities at Calcutta, however, did 
not believe that the Burmese would actually invade British territories.
10
 Nevertheless, 
the existence of a less than friendly power at the doorstep of British India itself was a 
threat that had to be addressed. When the crisis surrounding Shapuri Island intensified, 
George Swinton, the Secretary to the Government and a close friend of David Scott, 
saw in this dispute an occasion for settling the security question along the whole eastern 
frontier: any rupture with Burma over the Island of Shapuri was to be used as an excuse 
to march Company troops into Assam. By the end of the year 1823 the Commander-in-
Chief was already considering the most effective mode of engagement.
11
 
 
The final decision was made in relation to the events in Cachar. The Rajah of 
Cachar, Gobind Chandra, realising it was hopeless to obtain British assistance against 
the Manipuri princes, turned to the Burmese for support. Thus, in November 1823, the 
Burmese gathered all their troops at Gauhati and in December of that year, 4,000 
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Burmese and Assamese marched through the Barail Range and stockaded in the village 
of Bikrampore in Cachar, 45 miles to the east of Sylhet. Another column came from 
Manipur, driving out Gambhir Singh on its way, and yet another was marching through 
the Jaintia Hills, over which they claimed suzerainty inherited from Assam.
12
 
 
Scott finally received the government‟s sanction to move troops into Cachar. 
Cachar was hastily declared to be under British protection and an assault was made on 
the 17
th
 January 1824 and the Burmese were driven back to Manipur by the end of 
February. This was the first armed clash between the Burmese and the British. After this 
skirmish, the Burmese commander wrote to Scott that their order was to reinstate 
Gobind Chandra on the throne and to pursue the three Manipuri princes, even into 
British territory. Scott warned the Burmese not to make any further advance and 
declared the Jaintia Hills under British protection. Once again, Scott wrote emphatically 
on the danger of the Burmese in Assam, urging the Government to take action and war 
was declared officially on the 24
th
 February.
13
 
 
Thus began the First Anglo-Burmese War. In the official declaration of war, the 
Governor-General justified the war by putting all the blame on the Burmese who 
compelled the British government to a war „by the hostile conduct and language of its 
officers, and the actual advance of its forces to several and widely distant points of our 
frontier‟. The British Government, he continued, had to take up arms „not less in self-
defence, than for the assertion of its rights, and the vindication of its insulted dignity 
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and honour‟.14 He therefore knew that there had been no actual invasion by the Burmese, 
but felt that the war was necessary nonetheless to uphold British honour and to deter the 
possibilities of future aggression. At this period, the question of „honour‟ was 
understood to have a serious repercussion on the British position. The point is most 
clearly made by John Malcolm, who wrote in 1826 that: 
we have, whenever our authority is in question, no retreat . . . our name 
and ascendancy must be supported, and victory must, on any terms, be 
obtained; for we cannot [as aliens in India] long exist if our strength be even 
doubted. 
15
 
 
Yet the war cannot be fully understood from the British or Burmese side of the 
story without reference to local circumstances. Particular features of the political 
network in the frontier played a pivotal role in bringing these two powers into collision. 
The engagement of the Burmese on the frontier, their continued struggle to maintain 
supremacy, and the process by which the British officers at the frontier and later the 
government itself were drawn into the war, were all due to this particular characteristic 
of the frontier. In other words, the mechanism of the frontier had sucked the two powers 
into a war. 
 
The „multi-ethnic arrangement‟ discussed in the last chapter also contributed. Not 
only the polities in the Chittagong Hills but virtually all the polities on this frontier were 
composed of different elements of population from neighbouring polities. Prolonged 
instability in the region also promoted continuous emigration of people looking for safer 
places outside their traditional domain. Thus, Chin Pyan, Manipuri princes and 
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Assamese princes could all raise an army chiefly among their compatriots in British 
territory, and the numbers could easily swell with the participation of others who joined 
the venture expecting loot and other future benefits.
16
 
 
There is not much evidence to show the Kuki-Chin people‟s implication in this war, 
but there are two instances which show Kuki-Chin involvement. In 1817, when Marjit 
Singh was making his first invasion of Cachar, a Mr. F. Carey
17
 warned the Magistrate 
of Sylhet that there were Burmese troops behind the Manipuri and „all the Nagas and 
Kokee tribes have already joined them‟.18 It is likely that either the Burmese or the 
Manipuri invoked the assistance of the Kukis during their campaigns either through 
their tributary relationship or through the lure of plunder. In another instance, Chin 
Pyan‟s army was said to have included a sirdar named „Tongrabo‟ who was a Chin from 
the Arakan Hills. When the war broke out, Tongrabo accompanied British army into 
Arakan and established himself among the „haunts of his fore-fathers‟ on the banks of 
the Talak River, where he was said to have been much respected by his own tribe and 
followers.
19
 
 
 
b) Administrative Changes to the Frontier Area 
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The war lasted two years. By the time it came to an official end with the Treaty of 
Yandabu in February 1826, the British had lost over three thousand soldiers excluding 
sepoys. Of these only a hundred and fifty were killed in battle, and the rest by disease. 
The total number of casualties was estimated at fifteen thousand. The financial cost was 
also high, since the Company was left with a deficit of five million pounds and a total 
cost estimated at fourteen million pounds.
20
 
 
If the particular political features of the frontier brought about the First Anglo-
Burmese War, it was also to produce the most notable change to the frontier during the 
rule of the Company. The Treaty of Yandabu granted the Company not only an 
indemnity of 10 million rupees (or 1 million pounds), permission to exchange residence 
of accredited ministers, but also suzerainty over Manipur and Assam, and cession of 
Arakan and Tenasserim.
21
 
 
Strategic calculations were the most important reason for the annexation of Arakan. 
At the commencement of the war, the Governor-General was of the opinion that the 
retention of ports and principal islands would benefit British war efforts by overawing 
Ava with the might of the British – not the whole of Arakan but only several ports.22 On 
the other hand, John Canning, the chief advisor during the war, thought that the 
annexation of the whole of Arakan was the best way of solving the problem in 
Chittagong, since the Arakan Yoma provided the best and cheapest line of defence.
23
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During the course of the war, the latter view won general agreement. General Robertson, 
while negotiating with Ava for the treaty of Yandabu, maintained that „we must have the 
mountains as a barrier between us and you to prevent the possibility of the recurrence of 
war.‟24  
 
The British policy for Assam had been, from the commencement of the war, to 
expel the Burmese and re-establish those states, which had been overrun by the 
Burmese.
25
 This principle was apparent in the Treaty of Yandabu, which stipulated that 
the King of Burma renounced all claims upon, and would abstain from all future 
interference with, the principality of Assam and its dependencies, including Cachar and 
Jaintia.
26
 The proclamation to the Assamese people also emphasised that the British 
were not led into their country by the thirst of conquest but to „exclude our foe from 
Assam and re-establish in that country a government adapted to your wants and 
calculated to promote the happiness of the people of all classes‟.27  
 
Yet such an ideal government was hard to find and during the occupation of 
Gauhati, where the British troops stayed during the rainy season of 1824, David Scott 
reported that it was premature and impolitic to install a native prince „when the people 
lost all confidence in their chief‟. Thus in practice the British administration of Assam 
from Goal Para to Gauhati started during the war-period. This part was conveniently 
called „Lower‟ or „West‟ Assam in contrast to the „Upper‟ or „East‟ Assam still under 
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Burmese control at this point. This division was retained even after Assam was cleared 
of Burmese in January 1825, when the temporary administration began, with David 
Scott in charge of Lower(or Western) Assam, and Colonel Richardson in charge of 
Upper(or Eastern) Assam.
28
 
 
In February 1828, Scott made his first proposal regarding the administration of 
Assam, in which he opted for the annexation of western or Lower Assam and the 
restoration of the Assamese king in the eastern or upper Assam. His proposals were 
based on his observation that, as the Lower Assam had been under the Mughal emperors 
before, the revenue system was similar to that of Bengal and less resistance could be 
expected to a foreign rule. The government accepted this proposal and in March 1828 
regular troops were withdrawn and the administration of Assam began.
29
 
 
The restoration of the Assamese monarchy in Upper Assam had to wait another 
five years, as the British Indian Government could not decide whom to place on the 
throne – Chandrakanta or Purandar Singh. In the end, the Governor General signed a 
treaty with Purandar Singh in 1833. He was favoured over Chandrakanta largely due to 
the general distrust entertained by the British officers of the latter: he had once 
surrendered himself to the Burmese.
30
 The reign of Purandar Singh, however, did not 
last long and in 1838, upon his failure to pay tribute, the Company assumed direct 
administration of this tract and Purandar Singh was pensioned off.
31
. 
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Cacahr had been proclaimed to be under British protection just before the official 
declaration of war, and a treaty was signed between Gobind Chandra and the 
Government on the 6
th
 March 1824. Under the terms of the treaty, Rajah Gobind 
Chandra was restored to the throne with an annual tribute of ten thousand rupees.
32
 
 
After the final expulsion of Burmese troops from Cachar in June 1824, the British 
troops remained defensive, unable to penetrate the jungle into Manipur,
33
 but a year 
later, Gambhir Singh, the younger of the Manipuri princes, marched into Manipur with 
five hundred men and expelled the Burmese. From this time on, the government armed 
and paid for the soldiers of Gambhir Singh. After a short retreat back to Sylhet, 
Gambhir Singh again entered Manipur in December 1825 and cleared the remaining 
Burmese from stockades in Tammu.
34
 This made Gambhir Singh a favoured figure for 
the British among all the candidates to the Manipuri Throne, and his name was 
especially mentioned in the Treaty of Yandabu as the sovereign of Manipur.
35
  
 
Gambhir Singh enjoyed special treatment from the British Government that the 
other independent Rajahs did not receive. He was exempted from any tribute, but the 
British Indian government „paid, accoutred and supplied‟ Gambhir Singh‟s now 2,000 
strong army and styled it the Manipur Levy with Captain F. T. Grant as the 
commander.
36
 The British calculation was that Manipur would act as a „strong bulwark‟ 
                                                 
32
 „Treaty with Gobnid Chandra, Rajah of Cachar‟, 1824 (Kumar, Trends, 47-8 Annexure 4). 
33
 Gait. History, 332-40. 
34
 Ibid., 340. 
35
 Second Article, „Treaty of Yandabu‟, 1826 (Wilson, Documents, no.170, 209-10). 
36
 India Political Department, no.14, 3 December 1834, para. 84.(OIOC E/4/742); Mackenzie, 
  
 141 
against the Burmese. In the words of Scott, the reestablishment of Manipur afforded „a 
well founded prospect of defence to our frontier in that direction, by the interposition of 
a race of people known to entertain a rooted antipathy to the only enemy against whose 
aggression it was necessary to guard‟.37  
 
Thus strengthened, Gambhir Singh began to extend his own influence over the 
neighbouring territory. In January 1826, Gambhir Singh sent his troops to occupy the 
Kubo valley.
38
 The Burmese protested to the British Indian Government, but Captain 
Grant firmly backed Gambhir Singh‟s move. Only in 1834, was it transferred back to 
Burma with compensation for Gambhir Singh.
39
 Gambhir Singh also encroached upon 
Gobind Chandra‟s territory. In 1827 he subjugated Naga clans in a tract of country that 
had belonged to Cachar, and began moving Manipuri settlers into parts of Cachar he 
claimed his own. This created refugees into Cachar, fleeing from „the dread of the 
prospect of being placed under Gambhir Singh‟.40 
 
This was not the only trouble for Cachar. Gobind Chandra got caught up in mutual 
hostilities with Tularam, the heir of Kohi Dass, who had rebelled against Gobind 
Chandra and established himself in the northern Hills of Cachar back in 1813. After the 
assassination of Kohi Dass, Tularam had carried on the rebellion. At last the British 
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Government intervened and in 1829, Scott induced Gobind Chandra to recognise 
Tularam‟s authority in North Cachar in return for a treaty of peace.41 
 
A year after this, in 1830, Gobind Chandra was murdered by a Manipuri gang. It 
was never confirmed that they were acting under Gambhir Singh‟s orders, despite strong 
suspicion in that direction. A more pressing problem concerned the future disposal of 
the country, as Gobind Chandra had died without heir. Lieutenant Fisher, who had been 
on survey duty in Sylhet, was sent by the British to Cachar to manage the country 
pending further settlement. Then in August 1832, Cachar was declared to be British 
territory, with Lieutenant Fisher as the first Superintendent.
42
 
 
By this time, the British authorities‟ appreciation of the importance of Manipur and 
their faith in Gambhir Singh had decreased. In 1833, the new Governor-General 
William Bentinck viewed the advantages of the connection with Manipur as „very 
problematical,‟ as the country showed no sign of development in its revenue, 
administration, military independence, or „civilisation‟.43 Besides, the Directors thought 
that the conduct of Gambhir Singh towards the hill people was „by no means 
favourable‟ and the manner in which he used the Manipur Levy to increase his 
dominions „harsh, arbitrary and far from scrupulous.‟44 A subsequent review was made 
and in 1835 British superintendence over the Manipur Levy was discontinued and 
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Major Grant, then promoted from Captain, was withdrawn. Instead a Political Agent 
was installed: 
. . . for the preservation of a friendly intercourse, and as a medium of 
communications with the Manipur Government, and, as occasions might 
require, with the Burmese authorities on that frontier, and more especially to 
prevent border feuds and disturbances which might lead to hostilities between 
the Manipuris and the Burmese.
45
 
The first officer appointed was Lieutenant Gordon, who had before been stationed in 
Manipur as an assistant to Major Grant. 
 
While strategic considerations formed the chief reason for the annexation of 
Arakan, the later annexations of Assam and Cachar were motivated more by the 
prospects of material gain. The Directors of the Company were particularly attracted by 
the material value of a territory. When Purandar Singh was placed on the throne of 
Upper Assam, the Court of Directors reprimanded the Governor-General strongly: 
You had been positively enjoined in no case to conclude a permanent 
settlement, in any part of our Territory without the previous sanction of the 
home authorities. In the present case you have not only fixed the revenue, but 
made over the administration of an extensive District with a population of 
200,000 souls and resources adequate to the support of many times that 
number.
46
 
 
During the ten years of consideration of the future of Assam, the Directors had 
opened their eyes to the wealth of the country.
47
 The place Jenkins praised the most was 
Cachar. About both the hills and plains of Cachar he wrote that „there can scarcely be in 
India and probably not in the British Empire a tract more capable of producing varied 
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products.‟48 Thus, replying to the question of the annexation of the plains of Cachar, the 
Directors reminded the Governor-General of the possibility that the country could 
„become under good management a highly valuable possession‟ as: 
 . . . all your officers who are best acquainted with the country concur in 
representing its soil as extremely fertile, and suited to the culture of cotton, 
sugar and various other valuable productions. . . The upper part of the country, 
towards the hills as well as the hills themselves are covered with immense 
forests of valuable timber, which is brought to market at small expense by 
being floated down the various streams which intersect even the hilly part of 
the country. . . 
49
 
 
In contrast to Cachar, Manipur was known to be located „in the heart of a difficult 
and mountainous country, with no mineral treasures, or facilities of intercourse with the 
more civilised and wealthy states, and with a population greatly disproportioned to the 
cultivable area of its surface‟, while Gambhir Singh was represented as „the poorest of 
all the native princes under British influence‟.50  
 
The Governor-General, on the other hand, was more inclined towards the strategic 
or political value of a territory. Regarding Northern Cachar, he wrote that it was „of 
value to us only because it is interposed between Assam and Sylhet and the Cassyah 
Hills and Munneepore.‟ 51  These assessments seem to have had a lasting effect, as 
Manipur was to remain semi-independent under its own ruler. Northern Cachar also 
maintained a precarious independence until 1854, but in that year it was annexed 
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because of the inability of its rulers to keep the neighbouring hill tribes under control.
52
 
 
Another important administrative structure introduced to the Frontier after the First 
Anglo-Burmese war was the Agent to the Governor-General in the North East Frontier 
of Bengal. It was created in 1823 to „exercise a general control and superintendence 
over the political relations and intercourse with the petty states in that quarter, including 
Sikkhim, Bootan, Tibet, Cooch Behar, Bijnee, Assam, Cachar, Manipur and Jaintia, and 
other independent states‟.53 David Scott was the first Agent and, during the war, he was 
in charge of contacting chiefs of this frontier in order to induce them to accept British 
suzerainty and shake off the Burmese yoke.
54
 His subsequent efforts were directed 
towards the administration of the newly acquired territories, and mediating between the 
central authorities, other frontier officers and the chiefs of the hill people. After the 
annexation of Lower Assam, the management of Assam was added to his charge, on top 
of his duties as the magistrate of Rangpur and the Agent in the North East Frontier. The 
administrative burden proved too much for one man, and in 1831 Scott died in 
Cherrapunji due to ill health and fatigue. Robertson, the former Magistrate of 
Chittagong, succeeded Scott and suggested the separation of the office of the Agent in 
the North-East Frontier from the magistracy of Rangpur. This was done in 1834 and 
Francis Jenkins succeeded to the office as the third Agent.
55
  
 
With these annexations, the British approached nearer to the Kuki-Chin, but the 
                                                 
52
 Mackenzie, History, 103, 145; Barpujari, Assam, 157-63. 
53
 Bhuyan, Anglo-Assamese, 456-8. 
54
 Barpujari, Problem of the Hill Tribes: North-East Frontier, vol.1 (Gauhati: Lawyer‟s Book Stall, 
1970; reprint, Shillong: NEHU, 1998), 27 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 
55
 Barpujari, Assam, 120; idem, Problems, vol.1, 81. 
  
 146 
change was not confined to physical distance alone: the war also changed British 
attitudes regarding the frontier from a lack of interest to constant vigilance against 
threats that could come from or through the hills. During the war itself, British troops 
had encountered Burmese troops swelled in number by the hill people: for example, half 
of the Burmese force that invaded Assam in 1821 was known to have been the Singpho 
(or Kachin) levy.
56
 Besides, frictions with the hill people were one of the major threats 
to the peace and security of the frontier.
57
 Thus, the hill peoples were no longer outside 
direct administrative concern, but became central to the administration of the newly 
acquired territories after the First Anglo-Burmese war. 
 
 
 
2. Surveys and the British Knowledge of the Kuki-Chin 
 
a) The Surveys of the Eastern Frontier of Bengal 
 
The First Anglo-Burmese war had very effectively highlighted British ignorance of 
the geography of Burma and the Eastern Frontier of Bengal. As Pemberton commented, 
British knowledge regarding Burma „had not advanced one step beyond the point it had 
attained when the clear, laborious, and accurate Buchanan withdrew from the field of 
investigation‟.58 Thus, at the commencement of the war, Pemberton continued, „our 
ignorance of the whole frontier became manifest, and it was found that the records of 
Government furnished no information that could in the slightest degree direct or 
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facilitate the advance of those armies.‟59 The only reliable map available for the main 
force along the Irrawaddy River were the charts Thomas Wood had compiled during 
Symes‟s First Mission in 1794. No information regarding a land route was available, 
and as the initial plan to move the troops through the river proved impracticable, the 
British troops had to move slowly, sending pioneers in advance to ascertain the 
positions for the ensuing day‟s encampment.60 Similarly in Assam, the only map of the 
Brahmputra available for the troops was that compiled by Thomas Wood, who had 
accompanied Captain Welsh‟s mission to Assam to support Rajah Kamaleswar against 
bandits between 1792 and 1794.
61
 As a result the British had to a pay bitter price for this 
ignorance „in an expenditure of life and treasure without parallel in the annals of Indian 
warfare.‟62 
 
Not only were the British ill-informed about these foreign territories but they did 
not even have correct information regarding the limits of their own territories. The Naaf 
River, which was supposed to be the boundary between Chittagong and Arakan, had 
been surveyed in 1814 by John Cheape despite „a good deal of difficulty and fatigue‟, 
but towards the east he had made no attempt to penetrate the wild hills. The course of 
the Koladyne River, which was supposed to be the eastern boundary of Chittagong, was 
given as described by Cheape without pretension to its accuracy, and the Blue Mountain, 
conjectured to be within the British territory, was only observed from forty miles‟ 
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distance.
63
 The boundary of Chittagong with Hill Tripura was also assumed to be the 
Fenny River, though no treaty existed and it was subject to continuous disputes between 
the Rajah and British officers.
64
  
 
The southern boundary of Sylhet was the only boundary on this frontier that had 
been settled before the war. Lieutenant Fisher, who was employed in the revenue survey 
of Sylhet from 1820, demarcated the boundary in the presence of representatives of the 
Rajah.
65
 The northern boundary of Sylhet was rendered definite only after the war in 
1826. Further north, the boundaries with the Garrow Hills had been settled by Scott 
while he was bringing the Garrows under submission, but the British never had 
officially laid down its boundary with Assam other than holding the western bank of the 
Brahmputra as their territory. 
 
Naturally, the war stimulated a collective zeal on the part of the British 
administrators in India to know this formerly unknown part of the world east of Bengal. 
In fact, for the Surveyor General, Major J. Blacker, the war itself was an opportunity to 
study this ill-known region, and he suggested the deputation of a number of surveyors 
„to acquire geographical and physical knowledge of a tract of country which may be 
termed terra incognita.‟ 66  Therefore, at the commencement of the war, revenue 
surveyors who had been employed elsewhere were transferred to this frontier, to take 
military duties as well as carrying out survey missions whenever possible.
67
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Regarding the Assam valley, particular attention was paid to the question of the 
source of the Brahmputra.
68
 James Bedford, who was given charge of the survey of the 
Assam valley from December 1824, was directed to consider this as his main object. 
Lieutenants Burlton, Jones and Neufville on the Quarter Master General‟s staff and 
Mathew and Bedingfied, who were under the Political Agent, also performed survey 
missions.
69
  
 
To Sylhet, Cachar and Manipur, Lieutenants Birnie Browne, Robert Pemberton, 
and sub-assistant Macpherson were posted as surveyors. When Gambhir Singh‟s troops 
moved into Manipur, Pemberton and Browne took the opportunity to survey the vicinity 
of a Kuki village named „Thangum‟, which had been under dispute between the Rajahs 
of Tripura and Cachar. From here, Pemberton continued into Manipur following 
Gambhir Singh, while Browne and McPherson were transferred to Burma. After 
reaching Manipur, Pemberton returned to Calcutta on leave but returned to Manipur 
before Gambhir Singh‟s campaign into the Kabaw valley early in 1826, surveying the 
routes he travelled.
70
 
 
In Arakan the surveyors, as well as the regular troops, had harder times. The first 
surveyor attached to the column at the early stage of the campaign in May 1825 was 
Major Salch. He died of fever while reconnoitring the Koladyne River. The remaining 
surveyors were also constantly engaged in reconnoitring missions until the final 
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expulsion of the Burmese across the Yoma. They then found that most of the important 
instruments and documents, which had been under Major Salch, were so neglected that 
they had become unserviceable. When a survey across the Arakan Yoma was ordered, 
the surveyor complained:  
For this interesting duty I have scarcely a pocket compass, nothing 
wherewith to determine the height of the mountains, or even a sextant. The 
absence of a perambulator will not be of any moment, as the use of it must be 
totally impracticable over such steep and rocky ground.
71
  
 
When it was determined to hold the whole of Arakan, the importance of locating 
routes through the mountains to Burma increased, as this would make it possible to 
defend against possible invasion by the Burmese and to send troops into the Kingdom 
of Ava. Captains Ross and Trant led the first group that successfully crossed the 
mountains through the Aeng Pass. Accompanied by Thanduk Wun, a former Myowun of 
Sandoway, the 18
th
 Madras Infantry, 50 pioneers, 36 elephants, and 100 pack bullocks,
72
 
left Yandabu on the 6
th
 March, went through Pakeng Yeh (Pakhan Ngé), Cholain Mew 
(Tsalen myo) and reached Aeng on the 26
th
 and proceeded to Amherst harbour which 
they reached on the 28
th 
March 1826.
73
 Another group was led by Lieutenant Browne, 
who traversed the Arakan Yoma through the Tongho Pass. He left Prome on 18
th
 March, 
went through Padaung, which he left on 23
rd
, and reached Toungoop in the Sandoway 
district on 1
st
 April 1826. This group was less successful than that of Ross and Trant, as 
the Burmese coolies deserted the mission in the middle of the mountains. Browne 
reported that this pass was unsuitable for the march of an army, and would only answer 
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the purpose of dak-communication.
74
 
 
In the Irrawaddy valley, the surveyors could not do much work during pitched 
battles and only a few sketches of the Irrawaddy River and routes to important towns 
were made by Lieutenant Trant and Major Jackson of the Quarter-Master General‟s 
department. At the beginning of 1825 more surveyors, Lieutenants Browne and 
Macpherson, were transferred from Cachar to the Irrawaddy valley, and another 
experienced surveyor, Peter Grant, was attached specifically for this purpose. In March 
1826, John Crawfurd was appointed as the Civil Commissioner of Pegu, with 
headquarters at Rangoon, pending a final settlement with the court of Ava. While in this 
post, he proceeded to Martaban at the end of March to take possession of the province 
of Tenasserim. This occasion was also used for a survey of the coast. The rivers in 
Tenasserim were surveyed
75
 as well as inland routes towards China, Siam, and Ava, 
which were surveyed by Captain McLeod and Dr. Richardson from 1829 to the end of 
the 1830s.
76
 In September 1826, Crawfurd was deputed to the court of Ava to conclude 
a commercial treaty. DeMontmorency accompanied this mission and surveyed the 
towns and fortification of Ava.
77
  
 
In 1828, DeMontmorency was again sent by the Government to survey the 
Chindwin River from its confluence with the Irrawaddy. He travelled by boat up the 
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river and, in three weeks, reached Kendat, a town at the border of Manipur, where he 
met Lieutenant Pemberton who by then had surveyed routes in Manipur, Assam, and the 
Khasi Hills, and was engaged in a commission laying down the boundary between 
Manipur and Burma.
78
 Pemberton then proceeded to Ava and travelled to Arakan 
despite the unfavourable weather from July to September, retracing Captain Trant‟s 
route and making barometric observations to record the altitude.
79
  
 
Upon his return to Calcutta, Pemberton, together with Captain Francis Jenkins, was 
appointed for a singularly important survey mission during the immediate post war 
period. From 1831 to 1833, they were ordered to survey Arakan, Cachar, Manipur, 
Assam, and the Khasi Hills. This survey originated from the need to formulate 
defensive arrangements for the Arakan frontier, and to find out the best mode of military 
operations in case of another war with Burma. For this, the Governor-General needed 
more comprehensive information and thus decided to send experienced officers on a 
special survey mission to this frontier. Soon this plan was enlarged to include all of the 
newly acquired territories.
80
 
 
Their first destination was Arakan. After a month of preparation at Calcutta, they 
arrived at Kyouk Phyu on the 26
th
 of February 1831. From there they surveyed the Aeng 
Pass up to the top of Mount Naragain and then inspected the military cantonments along 
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the coast, marching up to Chittagong which they reached on the 18
th
 of May. They 
submitted their report on the 16
th
 September 1831 while they were in Calcutta preparing 
for the next mission.
81
  
 
After the rains of 1831, Captain Jenkins and Lieutenant Pemberton started for 
Manipur.
82
 They left Calcutta on the 13
th
 October, surveying routes from Sylhet through 
Cachar, then into Manipur which they reached on the 19
th
 December. Here they were 
delayed due to the Nagas, through whose territory they had to pass, who were reported 
to be hostile. On the 7
th
 January 1832, they left Manipur with more escorts – six 
hundred of the Manipur Levy with Lieutenat Gordon and a Rajah‟s nephew – furnished 
by Gambhir Singh, and the party literally fought their way through into Assam and 
reached Gauhati on the 18
th
 February. They then turned southwards through the Khasi 
Hills back to Sylhet and reported their return on the 14
th
 April 1832.
83
   
 
In the meantime, more routes into Burma from these newly occupied areas were 
surveyed in preparation for another military campaign into Burma. In 1831, Richardson 
surveyed the land route from Ava to Kendat,
84
 while Captain Grant of the Manipur Levy 
performed a tour of inspection along the Manipur frontier including a detailed survey of 
the course of the Ningthee River, which connected to those parts surveyed by 
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Richardson.
85
 The sketch maps of these two surveys were printed in the Journal of the 
Asiatic Society of Bengal. Another route into Burma was thought to exist from Assam 
through the Hukawng Valley but the Burmese Government had been opposing the 
survey of this route, which lead through the Amber Mine. An opportunity came when a 
group of Kachin people tributary to Burma attacked another Kachin chief under British 
protection. Henry Burney, the resident at Ava, despatched Captain S. F. Hannay not only 
to sort out this relatively insignificant feud, but to investigate the communications 
between Assam and Ava through the Hukawng valley. This journey also passed through 
Bhamo, which was much valued as a gateway to China.
86
 
 
The information thus collected did not just stay within administrative circles. The 
Calcutta Gazette published many articles resulting from the surveys,
87
 as did the 
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
88
 Some of those who participated in the survey 
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mission also published their own accounts in single volumes. Notable among these were 
Two Years in Ava, published by Thomas Trant, which includes the narrative of his march 
through the Aeng Pass, and the Report on the Eastern Frontier by Robert Pemberton, 
based on his extensive experience and knowledge as well as that of the others, which 
was published by order of the Government of India.
89
 William Griffith also produced 
several volumes, notable among which were the Report on the Tea plant of Upper 
Assam(1840), and the Journal of travels in Assam, Bootan Affghanistan and the 
Neighbouring Countries(1847) which deals with his journeys in the Naga hills and from 
Upper Assam through the Hukong valley to Ava in 1837.
90
  
 
These surveys were different from those mentioned in earlier chapters in terms of 
the way information was collected. Formerly, it had been mostly based on casual and 
personal curiosities. But the surveys during and after the First Anglo-Burmese War were 
coordinated by the central authorities, with destinations purposefully chosen to cover as 
much of the different areas as possible, and, prior to each survey mission, orders were 
despatched with specific information the surveyors had to look for.
91
 Measurements 
were preferred and the surveyors were mostly trained engineers who were accustomed 
to the use of equipment provided by the government.
92
 The information thus gathered 
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was sent to the Surveyor General‟s office, where it was compiled, published, and 
ultimately, used for compiling maps of the region.
93
  
 
The most important information for the central authorities regarded routes: 
possible routes of invasion from Burma by the Burmese and suitable routes of invasion 
into Burma by British troops. In the case of Jenkins and Pemberton, their orders were to 
find out the best mode of defence of the frontier, including the locations for stationing 
troops, and the appropriate size of, and ways of supplying them. However, a surveyor‟s 
report was seldom confined to measurements of routes but also included large amounts 
of information regarding the resources of the country, population, political situation, 
language, and customs of the people.
94
 In fact, when the report of Jenkins and 
Pemberton reached London it was the socio-cultural information that interested the 
Directors of the Company the most.
95
 From an earlier period, the central authorities, 
who had little knowledge or contact with India, looked upon survey missions as a vital 
source of information regarding the general situation of India. As early as 1788, James 
Rennell, the first Surveyor General, ordered surveyors to send in their journals and field 
books, noting „the appearance and produce of the Countries, names of village and 
whatever else may seem remarkable‟ through which they passed. This request was 
partly made to ensure that the surveyors were using government money for beneficial 
ends.
96
 Nonetheless, the effect of this was obvious in supplying the Government with 
much detailed description of the territories under its rule. 
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The surveys in Assam, Arakan and Burma after the war were no exception to this 
trend. There were visible individual differences regarding the information imparted 
beyond the immediate purpose of the survey, but in countries so little known as Assam 
and Burma, the information provided by these surveys proved to be of the utmost 
interest.
97
 Some of the information thus collected related to the people residing in the 
hills, and in this manner more knowledge was made available about the Kuki-Chin 
people. 
 
 
 
b) British Knowledge on the Kuki-Chin 
 
1) Records of the Chin in Arakan 
 
Captain Ross and Lieutenant Trant were the first British officers to encounter the 
Chin people in their own villages. During their march through the Aeng Pass, they first 
passed a Chin village near „Shoegoun‟, a place that marked the beginning of the hills. 
From this village they continued for two days in the hills to reach „Napeh‟ (Ngape). 
Between Shoegoun and Ngape they noted mixed settlements of the Burmese and the 
Chins but after that there were only a few hamlets inhabited by the Chin „who had 
placed themselves under the Burman Government‟. Here, Trant had the opportunity to 
observe the customs of the Chin he met, and record them in detail.
98
 As mentioned 
earlier, Pemberton later traced the same route during the rainy season of 1830, but he 
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was occupied with distance and barometric readings, so that except for a note on the 
tattooed face of the Chin women, he did not leave any observation of the people.
99
 
 
Jenkins and Pemberton re-surveyed the Aeng Pass in 1831 and more notes on the 
Chin can be found in their report.
100
 This report also includes the opinions of the 
officers stationed in Arakan regarding the Chin people living toward the source of the 
Koladyne River. Other than this, in December 1827 the Junior Commissioner of Arakan, 
Mr. Paton, made an excursion to the town of Talak and to the source of the Talak River. 
He was then accompanied by a Chin chief named Tongrabo, a former sirdar of Chin 
Pyan, and attempted to contact other Chin chiefs living towards the source of Talak; 
however, they were tributary to a Burmese village to the east, and refused to meet a 
British officer, fearing that such acts might offend the Burmese authorities.
101
  
 
Lieutenant Trant‟s journal, especially the parts relating to a description of the Chin 
people, appeared in four different places,
102
 with four different spellings for the word 
„Chin‟. The book he published in London in 1827 used „Kieaans‟; his article in Asiatic 
Researches in 1828 used „Khyén‟; his article in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of 
Bengal used „Kicaams‟, which, according to the editors, was „the spelling used in his 
manuscripts‟; and the Calcutta Gazette in 1826 even used „Kareans‟. As „Kieaans‟ is the 
term used in his book, it is likely that Trant adopted this form in his own manuscript. 
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The sound of this term corresponds with „Kiayn‟ that Buchanan had used earlier. The 
editors of the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal obviously misread this as 
„Kicaams‟, which is an understandable mistake arising from manuscripts. In fact, the 
same article also printed „passive‟ as the name of their supreme being, which cannot be 
other than another misreading of „passine‟, which can be none other than „pathian‟ 
meaning God, that appears in Trant‟s book.103 The editors of Asiatic Researches seem to 
have freely used their own judgement and opted for Khyén, a more common spelling 
among the British administrators in Arakan, while the editors of the Calcutta Gazette 
seem to have abused their similar freedom and replaced this term with one they were 
familiar with: namely, the Karens.  
 
„Khyén‟, adopted by the editors of Asiatic Researches illuminates a certain 
progress in the British categorisation of the Chin people. The variety of ways of spelling 
the „Chin‟ that had existed before – Kiayn (Buchanan, 1798), Kayn (Symes, 1795), 
Caen (Cox, 1821) and Kieaans (Trant, 1827) – were being standardised into „Khyen‟. 
This form started to have wider currency among the administrators during the years 
immediately after the annexation of Arakan. An article in the Calcutta Gazette in 
February 1828 that contained a description of the Chin people by the Junior 
Commissioner of Arakan, Mr. Paton, used „Khyang‟.104 Captain Jenkins and Lieutenant 
Pemberton, reporting their survey of Arakan in 1831, used „Kyens‟ 105 ; Captain 
Dickinson, who was then the superintendent of Arakan used „Khyeng‟ 106 ; while 
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Pemberton used „Khyen‟ in the book and map that he compiled (see Map 7 below).107 
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Map 7. Part of Map of the Eastern Frontier of British India with the Adjacent Countries, by R. B. 
Pemberton (1838) (BL. Maps 52450(28)) 
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None of these, however, made any effort to find out the names the people used for 
themselves in the way that Buchanan did, even though Jenkins and Pemberton knew the 
existence of „various denominations of tribes that came under the general term of the 
Kyens,‟ no other category was mentioned than that of „Kyen‟.108 The only division of 
the Chin people, common to all of those who mention the Chin in this period, was that 
analogous to the Burmese division of „subjected‟ and „independent‟ Chin. Trant 
described the Chin people around the Aeng Pass as an „inoffensive and quiet‟ people 
„devoted to agriculture‟, and the same was said by Foley of the „Kaengs‟ of Ramree.109 
This description, however, was in contrast to those who lived further in the „remote and 
unfrequented recesses of the mountain wilds,‟ who were described as „perfectly wild 
and independent‟ and „addicted to plunder and rapine.‟ 110  The officers stationed in 
Arakan during Jenkins and Pemberton‟s survey held similar views. Captain Dickinson, 
the Superintendent of Arakan, was of the opinion that, though there was no reason for 
supposing those Chin who inhabited the mountains between Arakan and Ava to be other 
than well affected towards the British Government, the people towards the source of 
Koladyne were „utterly indifferent‟ to the British Indian government and any attempt to 
interfere there would be opposed.
111
 Captain M. G. White, the Senior Assistant 
Superintendent of Arakan, also described the tribes near Aeng, or „civilised Kheing‟, as 
„industrious and orderly‟, but the inhabitants of the other mountainous circles, or the 
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northern hills towards the source of the Koladyne, as „men of notorious bad 
character‟.112  
 
It is not clear whether the evidence for this division came from the British officers‟ 
own observations or from what the Burmese or Arakanese told them. Most likely it 
would have been a bit of both: as the British came to occupy the same position the 
Burmese or Arakanese had in relation to the Chin people, it is natural that the same 
categorical division that mattered to the Burmese before them became the most relevant 
division of the Chin people for the British officers. Not only the division itself, but the 
stereotypes were also the same as those delineated by Symes and Buchanan before: the 
„subjected Chin‟ were industrious, inoffensive, and orderly, while the „independent 
Chin‟ were uncivilised, wild, and savage marauders.  
 
There was a particular attitude toward other people, however, that was peculiar to 
the British officers at this time. This can be best demonstrated in the following quote 
from Trant on the Chin people in general:  
To judge, however, by their simple code of laws, they are not by any 
means deficient in the knowledge of right and wrong, and are quite aware of 
the footing on which men stand with each other. It is therefore highly 
probable, that with lenity and kindness, they might be induced to mix with 
their more civilised neighbours, and become useful members of society.
113
 
 
Here, Trant judges the Chin people by the standard of their collective achievement 
in moral development. The code of law is used as a gauge for this development and he 
concludes that they can be brought to a higher state of civilisation, which would 
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ultimately make them more useful members of society. What underlies this comment is 
a view of „civilisation‟ in terms of the different degrees of progress of different groups 
of people, and a form of utilitarianism that views full realisation of the potential utility 
of individuals or groups to „society‟ as the proper goal in life.  
 
Trant himself does not specify what he meant by „more useful members of society,‟ 
but Jenkins and Pemberton had a more specific view on this. It was the utility of the 
people in the service of the colonial state. Jenkins and Pemberton first mention „Kyens‟ 
(other than a passing reference to their villages) in relation to the coolies needed to 
convey arms and supplies to the troops in the event of a campaign into Burma through 
the Aeng Pass. In Arakan, the carriage cattle, elephants or carts were reported to be too 
few and unsuitable for the army.
114
 Thus, it was critical to obtain a secure source of 
manpower. At this point, Jenkins and Pemberton turned their eyes to the Chin. They saw 
a great number of these „practised porters‟ in the hills around Aeng and northward, who 
could be assembled at Aeng with little delay. Also, as the females were „capable and in 
the habit of performing most of the duties which generally fall to the lot of the males,‟ 
this would cause little inconvenience to their everyday work.
115
 
 
On the other hand, John Crawfurd was most explicit on the theme of „civilisation‟. 
After returning from the embassy to the Court of Ava from September 1826 to February 
1827, Crawfurd left a journal following the tradition of his predecessors, Michael 
Symes and Hiram Cox. In contrast to Symes, who had been full of awe towards Burma 
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and its people, however, Crawfurd focuses on how „uncivilised‟ the people of Burma 
were. To him, the evidence that the Burmese were „barely civilised‟ and „semi-
barbarous‟ was overwhelming: tattooing and piercing the earlobes; inferior quality of 
clothes compared „even to that of Cochin Chinese‟; only moderate progress in useful 
arts, a large part of which was carried out by foreigners; and extremely limited 
knowledge in the higher branches of knowledge. The system of government was 
characterised by „its rudeness, vices, and imperfections‟ beyond all question.116 His final 
verdict was that they were greatly inferior to the Hindoos in civilisation, and still more 
so to the Chinese. Nearest in the level of civilisation, Crawfurd judged, were the 
inhabitants of Java.
117
  
 
Nevertheless, within Burma, the Burmese were at the top of the league table of 
civilised nations, followed by Mons, Shans, and Manipuris. Then came the wilder tribes 
of Karens, and Kyens who were „little less civilised‟ than the Burmese, to be followed 
by Palaon, Pyu, Lenzen, Lawá, D‟hanu, D‟hanao, and Zalaung, who, according to him, 
lived in „savage states‟ in the mountains118 – a daring conclusion for one who never had 
any direct contact with any of these. The only reason that the Chins were not put at the 
lower level of this hierarchy was perhaps the fact that many of them, at least those who 
were under the consideration of Crawfurd, lived near the Burmese villages and had 
more or less settled villages while the quality of silk clothes produced by the Kyens 
surpassed that of their „more civilised masters‟.119 
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In this view, the people were divided into groups with different levels of 
civilisation. Such factors as material culture, political institutions, laws, religion and 
languages were taken into consideration in judging the stage of development of a group. 
Europeans were obviously the forerunners followed by Chinese and Indians. Not all the 
officers held such a whole view on world „civilisations‟ as Crawfurd, but the same 
principle that people can be judged and compared in terms of degree of civilisation can 
be found in most of the other works. Those who had written about the Kukis in Sylhet, 
Cachar and Manipur were no exceptions. 
 
 
2) The Kuki in Sylhet, Cachar and Manipur 
 
Thomas Fisher was the first to record the Kuki people from his own observations, 
though mixed with what he had heard from the Manipuris who were then in possession 
of Cachar.
120
 After the war, it was Pemberton who first recorded observations of the 
Kuki when he followed Gambhir Singh into Manipur in 1825. On that occasion he 
surveyed the road from Banskandi in Cachar into Manipur, and also visited a Kuki 
village of Thangum (or Thlangum) to ascertain whether this village fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Rajah of Tripura, who had been anxious to put this village under his 
influence. The result was published in the Calcutta Gazette.
121
 Later in 1831, he came 
back to this frontier with Jenkins and, as in Arakan, more information on the Kuki 
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people can be found in their reports and the book he published afterwards.
122
 
 
„Kuki‟ as an ethnic label did not suffer from the existence of as many varieties of 
spelling as Chin in Arakan did. This perhaps was due to the fact that British officers 
understood Bengali better than Burmese. On the other hand, the usage was more 
confused than „Khyen‟. Fisher introduced the Kuki (spelt Kooky) as follows:  
The extensive range of mountains which, after dividing Cachar from 
Maunnipoor, passes through the independent territories on the sea coast to the 
east of Chittagong is occupied in different parts by various tribes of savages 
which in the parts between Cachar and Munnipoor are called Nagas, and in 
places near Tipperah and Sylhet, are styled Kookies.
123
 
 
In this introduction, Fisher recognises the existence of a variety of unspecified 
groupings, which were locally classified into two categories of Naga and Kuki by others. 
The categories of Naga and Kuki were the main division of the hill people of Manipur 
and Cachar in the other works as well. Upon the difference between the Nagas and the 
Kukis, Pemberton observed that the Kukis, who were „scattered among the ranges south 
of Barak‟, were of „smaller stature (than Nagas), darker complexions, and more 
unfavourable countenances‟.124 This, which he later attributed to the „Malay descent‟ of 
the Kukis,
125
 was contrasted to „the northern Nagas‟ who generally bore some degree of 
resemblance to the Chinese. Yet, for both Fisher and Pemberton, this division was 
basically a geographic one: the Nagas lived in the northern hills, while the Kukis 
occupied the southern.  
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The division between Kuki and Naga was only distinctive in categorical terms: 
there was great confusion in the actual application of the division to real groups or 
individuals. To take one example, Jenkins and Pemberton at times used expressions 
such as „southern or Kookie Nagas‟126 showing that the category Kuki was somehow 
regarded as a sub-category of Nagas and therefore giving the impression that the term 
Naga was used to designate the hill people in general, while the term Kuki was confined 
to those in the south. Besides, the Anals and Koms, which Pemberton classified under 
the category of Naga, were regarded as Kukis in the later Gazetteers, or in more recent 
publications.
127
 The „Khongjai‟ was a term for the new Kukis in Manipur, and 
Pemberton regarded this as a somewhat similar term to Kuki but the Political Agent of 
Manipur reported them as Nagas.
128
 It seems that these two terms divided the hill people 
into two categories and therefore, used in contrast to each other, but there were 
confusions in the actual application of this categorical division onto individuals or 
groups. 
 
Similar confusion is found in the other cognate categories of the Kuki. Pemberton 
occasionally referred to „Koochungs‟, or „Kuchoongs‟ and „Khongjuee‟ or „Khongjai‟ 
people in Manipur.
129
 What „Kuchoong‟ exactly referred to is unknown, but according 
to Dun, „Khongjai‟ was a name generally given to the „New Kukis‟ by the Manipuris in 
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contrast to the „Old Kukis‟ 130  and this term appears in the context of Manipur 
throughout the British colonial period. Pemberton, however, does not seem to have had 
any accurate knowledge of these two categories or their relationships with the category 
Kuki, but from the usages such as „Khonjuee or Kookee villages‟, it appears that he 
understood them as more or less coterminous with the Kuki. All these show confusion 
among the British officers regarding the ethnic categories of the hill people and at the 
same time suggest the existence of multiple and often conflicting categorisation within 
Cachar and Manipur similar to that found by Buchanan in the Chittagong Hills thirty 
years before: the terms were distinctive, or even contrasting, but the applications were 
not as clearly differentiated. 
 
Nevertheless, the Poitoo in the southern hills of Cachar and Sylhet were more 
readily identified than other sub-groups of the Kuki. There are disagreements regarding 
the identity of the „Poitoo‟. While they were undoubtedly a major Kuki group south of 
Sylhet and Cachar as Fisher recognised, references to the Poitoo disappear in the British 
records before the annexation of the Lushai Hills. Some identified this group with 
„Paite‟ currently in Manipur,131 but John Edgar, the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, 
who made a special tour among the Lushai chiefs in 1869, recognised these as two 
different categories, one called „Poitoo‟ and another, „Pytes‟. Edgar describes the latter 
as being in the easternmost hills near the watershed of the Irrawaddy and recognises 
them as a cognate group of the „Soktes‟. or Pytes‟.132 The description of the Pyte here, 
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their location, and their relation to the Soktes, all fit the current Paite. The remaining 
question then is: what had become of the Poitoo? One likely assumption is that the 
Poitoo as a polity had been weakened and dispersed among the Lushais and other sub-
groups of the Kuki in Cachar and Sylhet as a result of a series of attacks from the 
British as well as the Lushais.
133
  
 
In the meantime, the „Poitoo‟ were undeniably the most important Kuki group 
south of Cachar and Sylhet at the time of Fisher. He reported them as having a close 
relationship with Sylhet, bringing the forest products down for trade to a market at a 
small town called Chargola. Several names of the chiefs are mentioned: „Landoo‟, 
„Lollhoo‟, and „Bontay-loll‟ who were brothers and „Rochacheboo‟ who was a cousin of 
the other three. To the south of the „Pytoo‟ he mentions „others governed by three chiefs, 
„Shukboul‟, „Bannietany‟, and „Loll-tyem‟. Most of these names were later identified 
again as the names of Poitoo and Lushai chiefs in other reports,
134
 which further testifies 
to the existence of the Poitoo. There seems to have been much greater intercourse 
between the Poitoo and the people of Sylhet, which resulted in both the more detailed 
knowledge of the Poitoo and the clearer sense of the identity of Poitoo held by the 
dwellers in the plains.  
 
Different stereotypes did exist regarding the Kuki people living near the plains and 
those living further inland, but such a division did not culminate in a categorical 
division as the „subjected‟ and the „independent Chin‟ in the case of Arakan. While in 
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Cachar, Jenkins noted in his private journal that the Kukis around Cachar were those 
who had been chased out of their original homes by „a stronger tribe from the south – a 
race clothed in armour of hide and well armed with their common weapons but having 
besides a few musquets‟.135 A similar note can be found in Pemberton‟s book regarding 
the „Changsels‟ who were said to have moved to the first peak south of Cachar in recent 
years.
136
  
 
Jenkins noted that there were many Kuki villages in the low hills around Cachar, 
which were not settled in fixed positions. Beside those displaced by other Kukis, there 
were more Kukis being driven into Cachar by Gambhir Singh‟s occupation of the Jiri 
Tracts. The influx of a scattered and mobile population posed an administrative problem 
for Cachar. For the pacific development of administration – maintenance of roads, 
imposition of government rules and taxes, protection of the people and travellers – and 
also for the increase in cultivation, it was far more preferable to have these people 
settled in fixed villages. Thus Jenkins, as well as Fisher, recommended locating them 
along the line or road that links the southern plains of Cachar to the Central hills in 
order to construct and maintain the road.
137
  
 
These „refugee‟ Kukis were regarded as industrious people who could serve a 
useful purpose for the government, and in this they were contrasted to the Kukis outside 
the jurisdiction of Sylhet, Cachar or Manipur. These latter were noted for their „thirst for 
                                                 
135
 Private Journal kept by Captain Jenkins on his Last Tour through Cachar, 1 December 1831 
(OIOC F/4/1446 56957). 
136
 Pemberton, Report, 195. 
137
 Letter from Captain Jenkins to W. H. Macnaghten, Secretary to Government in Political 
Department, 1 June 1833, para.9 (Barpujari, Francis Jenkins, 145-60) 152. 
  
 172 
blood‟ and „avidity after plunder‟, and who depopulated the hills which were inhabited 
by less warlike tribes.
138
 In Sylhet, Jenkins and Pemberton also observed that the 
unsettled or misgoverned state of the Kuki tribes on the border of the plains made „the 
most fertile and valuable tracts‟ of southern Sylhet „desolate and unprofitable jungles‟ 
due to „the dread the Bengalees entertained of their plundering and murderous 
incursions‟. 139  Besides, the villages along the routes linking Cachar and Manipur, 
especially that of Kala Naga routes, were under constant threat from the raids of the 
Kuki, endangering the maintenance of these routes as well as the wood cutters and 
merchants who used them.
140
 
 
On the threat posed by the Kuki raids, Pemberton thought that since the Kukis east 
of the Chikoo Nullah had tendered submission to the Manipur Rajah, and since this 
river serves as a sufficiently clear boundary between Manipur and Tripura, each Rajah 
should be made answerable for the people within his own jurisdiction. Nonetheless, he 
admitted that there was a vast tract of country inhabited by „independent tribes as yet 
totally unknown to either of the parties‟, which made it unreasonable to transfer them 
either to Manipur or Tripura before their subjugation. On this matter, Pemberton was of 
the opinion that „[it] had better be left to the gradual operation of time and the general 
improvement of the still unoccupied but fertile plain below these‟.141  
 
On the other hand, Jenkins‟s opinion was more optimistic. Commenting on those 
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two Kuki persons he met in Sylhet, he wrote in his private journal that „presents and 
good treatment would certainly win these simple savages to our purpose‟ and when they 
were rendered docile, the value of their services, he thought, „might prove beyond 
comprehension‟. 142  In another separate report of his own, he wrote regarding the 
possibilities of controlling the Kukis in this tract, either directly, or through the medium 
of the Tripura Rajah: 
I should conceive it would be by no means a difficult matter to manage them; 
the tribes settled in Cachar have shown themselves a valuable addition to its 
population as agriculturists and there seems to be no reason to doubt that they 
could be turned to good account as an armed police for their habits are 
decidedly warlike and it is with some difficulty that they have lately been 
restrained from attacking another tribe of Kukies beyond our border against 
which they have some old cause of enmity.
143
 
 
In inducing the Kuki to settle along the border, Jenkins saw the solution of the two 
direst problems in Cachar: development and security. In his private journal, recalling his 
encounter with the two Kukis on the 1
st
 December 1831, Jenkins wrote that they would 
be „welcome settlers and agriculturalists‟, who could bring the fertile but deserted lands 
of Cachar under cultivation. Furthermore, by teaching these settlers the use of firearms, 
which „would give such a decided superiority over any of their neighbours,‟ the security 
of the frontier or even „advancing it at pleasure‟ would be ensured.144  
 
Jenkins‟s plan was not only confined to the betterment of the British administration 
or the development of the territory to its full potential. Several days after his first 
encounter with the two Kuki men, he found some Kukis among the coolies employed 
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for him. He observed that they were „by no means inferior looking people in muscular 
strength or intelligence but miserably enslaved to the Manipuris‟. Then he commented 
that: 
. . . [they can be used for] far more important purpose . . . of bringing under 
control and thence to civilisation many of their kindred tribes. A 
consummation much devoutly to be prayed for if ever we expect to have 
peace on our borders and to turn to protect the inexhaustible wealth of this 
now much profitless frontier.
145
 
What is found here is a grander object than development and security: that of bringing 
„civilisation‟ to the others in the hills through the medium of the settled Kuki people. 
This opinion was heartily welcomed by the Directors in London who praised Jenkins‟s 
suggestion to conciliate the Kuki as „an excellent spirit‟ which should be met with due 
attention by the Governor-General.
146
 
 
It was a very similar note to Trant‟s earlier comment on the Chin people, that „with 
lenity and kindness‟ they could be „brought to civilisation and become useful members 
of society.‟147 In a similar spirit, Jenkins and Pemberton, recommended augmenting the 
Sylhet Light Infantry with a form of Kuki Levy so as to prevail on „the wilder and more 
refractory tribes‟ to take permanent service in the military. This, they argued, would be 
„a step to extending our influence and control over them, to acquire a knowledge of 
them and their country and to induce the tribes to come into our settled countries for the 
purpose of traffic‟. 148  Here, the particular understanding of „civilisation‟, and the 
utilitarian approach to the people and land, were mixed to produce an early form of 
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British paternalism or their interest in the development of their subjects‟ living 
conditions – for the benefit of the government as well as the country and the people. 
 
This change was not confined to a few surveyors on this frontier, but the attitude of 
the British in general was going through a change around the same period independent 
of the events on the frontier. Thompson and Garret regard the arrival of the Governor-
General Lord Bentinck in 1828 as a milestone for a new era in which the British India 
administration as a whole would turn towards Anglicism and paternalism, with more 
administrators believing in British superiority over the Indians.
149
 This change, 
according to them, was best demonstrated in the debates between „Anglicists‟ and 
„Orientalists‟ over education in British India that took place in the Committee of Public 
Instruction from 1823. Here, the „Orientalists‟ were those older generation conservatives, 
living the dream of Hastings and Jones, who genuinely appreciated Indian culture and 
preferred the traditional values, institutions, and culture of India to be preserved, 
whereas the „Anglicists‟ argued for the enlightenment of the natives of India with the 
„progressive elements‟ of European civilisation. In the end it was the Anglicists‟ view 
that Bentinck adopted: if the government contributed money it should be invested in 
some form of „useful‟ training.150 
 
Spear summarised this change as the combined effect of several factors: the 
utilitarianism which believed that societies could be reformed by proper laws, the 
radicals who failed to introduce such reform in Britain but had strong influence over the 
India House through personal connections, and their unexpected allies among the 
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religious evangelicals.
151
 Thus there was a convergence of interest in influencing the 
Government of India to become more involved in reshaping the daily lives of the people 
of India: the evangelicals had a keen interest in spreading the Gospel among the Indian 
subjects, while the radicals viewed India as a „sociological guinea pig‟, to borrow 
Spear‟s expression, through which they could demonstrate the virtues of new ideas 
which they could not pass through the British parliament.
152
  
 
This created a new dominating ethos among the British regarding India at the dawn 
of Victorian Britain. Thus, by the 1830s, the administrators in India were a radically 
different breed from the early merchants of the Company, and also different from 
unimaginative and unmotivated cogs of a bureaucratic machine. Of course, there were 
individual differences, but a new generation had already arrived in India with a 
passionate belief in improving the rule as well as the ruled. Therefore, together with the 
security reasons that heightened British alertness towards the hills, the changing 
attitudes of the British administrators who tried to induce this „warlike‟ people into 
civilisation began to change the neglected state of the hill people on the frontier. 
 
The surveys represent the changing attitude revealed in the study of India, with 
troops of surveyors trained in the method of measurements rendering the landscape into 
abstract value that can be reconstructed into uniform knowledge. Thus, a natural result 
of the surveys on the Kuki-Chin category was standardisation. This was most obvious in 
the spellings of the word „Khyen‟, but standardisation also took place regarding the 
British understanding of the Kuki-Chin categories in a broader sense. In the introduction 
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to his book, published in 1835, Pemberton wrote that there were „few circumstances 
more calculated to arrest attention in considering this chain of mountains, than the 
number and variety of the tribes by which it is inhabited‟, and he continued:  
Of these, the principal are the Murams, who occupy the tract of country 
between Assam and Muneepoor; the Kupooees, known in Bengal by the term 
Nagas, who reside on the several ranges of hills between the latter country 
and Cachar, and the Khongjuees, who under the more generally known names 
of Koochungs, and Kuci, stretch from the southern borders of the Muneepoor 
valley to the northern limit of the province of Arracan: these are succeeded by 
the Khyens, who occupy that portion of the tract between Arracan and Ava, 
and the Karens, who reside on the inferior heights overlooking the low lands 
of Bassein.
153
 
 
Regarding the Kuki-Chin categories, this paragraph presents two distinctive groups 
of people, one named „Koochungs‟ and „Kuci‟ and another named „Khyen‟, occupying 
different portions of the hills. Moreover, they are seen as two different units within a 
whole range of similarly isolated categories, all of which can be located in separate 
locations. What is neglected here is that, as Buchanan found in the Chittagong Hills, 
different people in different contexts use any of these terms with different meanings. In 
other words, the extension of a category depended on the particular context in which it 
was used. Therefore, a group of individuals could be called by different names 
according to the circumstances.  
 
Some correspondence regarding the disputes between Burma and Manipur 
demonstrate this point clearly: in January 1831, the British Resident at Ava, Major 
Burney, sent a letter to Captain Grant, the commander of the Manipur Levy, to apprise 
him of an alleged incursion of Manipuri into the Burmese territory of Ningthee. In this 
letter, as well as in the original complaint from the Burmese governor of Nighthee, he 
                                                 
153
 Pemberton, Report, 15. 
  
 178 
claimed that thirty Chin villages (spelt „Khyn‟ or „Khyen‟) were destroyed by the 
Burmese.
154
 Captain Grant, on the other hand, supported the Manipuri actions as 
legitimate, and replied that the mention by the Burmese of thirty „Khyn or Naga‟ 
villages destroyed was sheer exaggeration, as only one „Naga‟ village had been 
destroyed by the Manipuri due to their aggression.
155
 What the Burmese called „Khyen‟, 
were here known by Captain Grant as „Naga‟, in the context of Manipur, where there 
was a confusion between the categories of „Naga‟ and „Kuki‟156 
 
This confusion is natural, as the category „Khyen‟ was one that had meaning in the 
context of Burma and Arakan, and „Kuci‟ was a main division against the Nagas in the 
context of Manipur and Cachar. In the local usages these two terms were not used in the 
same context. Yet in the process of the compilation of geographic information following 
the survey, categories developed from different contexts were juxtaposed on a larger 
context of geographic knowledge of the whole Eastern Frontier of Bengal. Thus, the 
categories Kuki and Chin began to be regarded as two different units in a new geo-
administrative context. 
 
                                                 
154
 Letter from Major Henry Burney, Resident at Ava, to Captain Grant, Commander of Manipur 
Levy, 5 January 1831 (OIOC F/4/1447 56960). 
155
 Letter from Captain Grant, Commander of Manipur Levy, to George Swinton, the Secretary to the 
Government, 27 January 1831 (OIOC F/4/1447 56960). 
156
 Letter from Captain Grant, Commander of Manipur Levy, to George Swinton, the Secretary to the 
Government, 12 October 1831, paras. 21-2 (OIOC F/4/1446 56956). 
  
 179 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Beginning of the Frontier Administration: the 1830s 
 
 
1. Arrangements for the Newly Acquired Territories 
 
a) British Frontier Policy 
 
After the First Anglo-Burmese War, the British administration formed a continuous 
frontier with the Kuki-Chin people except for the eastern parts where the Kingdom of 
Burma, though weakened by the British, maintained its sovereignty. Administrative 
duties over these areas were divided between the Agent in the North East Frontier, and 
the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. The latter came into being in 1834 when the office 
of Governor-General was separated from the administration of Bengal to concentrate on 
the supervision of all three presidencies and general matters relating to India. Of the 
districts within the Kuki-Chin frontier thus formed, the native state of Hill Tripura, 
however, was almost totally ignored by the British administration except for intermittent 
legal issues raised by the Rajah regarding his jurisdiction
454
 and, as Hunter wrote, no 
one knew about the internal state of the country during the 1820s and 1850s but „only 
rumours came that the Kukis raided [Tripura] Raja‟s territory and the Raja‟s people 
raided Kuki territory.‟455 Similarly, the British officers did not notice the situation in the 
Chittagong Hills until the late 1840s, and British contacts with the Kuki-Chin people, 
for the rest of the period of the Company, were divided between two frontiers: the 
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northern frontier, or the hills south of Sylhet, Cachar and Manipur; and the southern 
frontier, or the hills to the north of Arakan and east of Chittagong. 
 
In both the northern and southern Kuki-Chin frontier areas, initial British policy 
after the annexation was that of retrenchments, focusing on the consolidation of British 
rule in the plains. After such an expensive war as the First Anglo-Burmese War, the 
authorities in London naturally preferred not to increase their financial burden any 
further.
456
 Under this circumstance, the central authorities tried to restrain any reckless 
decisions by the frontier officers to engage with the hill people, which often led to 
expensive and protracted warfare with them.
457
 This led to a defensive, non-
interventionist policy in the frontier districts. 
 
There were also some reasons of a moral nature as well. Many of the actions taken 
by the British officers in dealing with the hill people were often too harsh or inhumane 
in the eyes of the central authorities.
458
 Summary punishment or burning whole villages 
was particularly abhorred. In another instance, the directors wrote to the Governor-
General that:  
Indiscriminate destruction (even if only of property) which affects the 
innocent as well as the guilty, is contrary to the principles of civilized warfare 
as well as to the dictates of humanity and of an enlightened polity.
459
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The only case in which a summary punishment was justified, according to the directors, 
was when „the tribe has made itself collectively a party to the injury by refusing to make 
reparation or give up the offenders or by refusing to enter into an engagement to forbear 
from plundering or by violating such engagements when made; where every experiment 
has been tried in vain to conciliate them, and where they cannot be reached by any other 
mode of punishment.‟460  
 
On the other hand, the officers on the frontier tended to advocate more assertive 
measures. Francis Jenkins was one of the advocates of such measures. Contrary to what 
the directors thought of summary punishments, Jenkins believed that destroying villages 
and therefore convincing the hill people of British power was the only way to rid the 
frontier of the troubles caused by their incursions into the plains.
461
 In relation to the 
Nagas, he even wrote that: „the most humane and efficacious punishment we can inflict 
upon the hill tribes is the burning of their villages and the destruction of their hoarded 
corn‟.462 
 
Thomas Fisher, the first Superintendent of Cachar, also shared a similar view. In 
the winter of 1832, while Jenkins was on the special survey mission with Pemberton in 
Cachar, Fisher sent word to Jenkins of an incursion of the Poitoo Kuki into the south-
western part of Cachar, where they had murdered three inhabitants and taken their heads. 
Fisher wrote that a show of force was necessary to convince the Kukis that the British 
had the ability to reach their villages. This, he said, was the only way to render this 
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turbulent frontier peaceful and let the cultivators return to the fertile tract, which had 
long been deserted due to fear of the Kukis.
463
 For this purpose he recommended 
sending a detachment of seventy to eighty men to chastise all of the Poitoo villages. 
Furthermore, Fisher suggested a thorough survey of the country of the Kukis, to collect 
geographic information „southwards through the independent hill territory of Tripura 
Rajah to Agurtolah (Agartala) or Odeypoor (Udapur)‟.464 It was necessary to know the 
situation in the hills south of Cachar to deal with the Kuki raids more effectively and to 
render this frontier peaceful. 
 
Jenkins joined Fisher in urging the government to „exercise control over the Kuki 
tribes either directly or through the medium of the Tripura Rajah‟465 and T. C. Robertson, 
the Agent to the North Eastern Frontier at that time, also concurred with their views.
466
 
Yet the government could not sanction such a risky expedition. The reasons given were, 
first, that it could possibly lead „to our being engaged in protracted warfare‟ with Kukis, 
and second, that there was no clear evidence of the „murderous inroads‟ which had 
merely been alleged. The Secretary to the Government took this opportunity to 
emphasise that before taking any military action against hill tribes „the guilty party must 
be found to mediate or to commit aggressions which cannot be guarded against or 
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repelled by ordinary precaution‟467 Mere allegation that the fertile tracts were deserted 
by cultivators for the dread of the Kuki inroads was not sufficient to send troops against 
them: there had to be definite offenders clearly identified as guilty and their location 
must be within easy reach of the troops. Such information was precisely what Fisher 
wanted to acquire by sending expeditions to the whole of Tripura: without this 
knowledge an expedition was too risky and without an expedition there was no other 
easy way of obtaining such information. 
 
Writing in the 1870s, Woodthorpe described the Company‟s policy regarding the 
„frontier tribes‟ of the early days of annexation as the policy of conciliation, civilisation 
and raising barriers,
468
 but he also conceded that „a policy of conciliation would be 
ineffectual, without impressing on the tribes a conviction of our power to punish them if 
necessary.‟469. In reality, there was a visible discrepancy of opinion among different 
ranks of officers: the central authorities preferred conciliatory policies, while the 
frontier officers wanted more assertive solutions. Actual action was decided case-by-
case, led by individual circumstances. Overall, as Barpujari noted, British India was 
penetrating into the hills slowly but steadily through the activities of the local 
authorities.
470
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b) Defensive Measures in the Northern Kuki-Chin Frontier 
 
One of the means adopted by the British frontier officers to suppress the incursion 
of the hill people was to give annual payments to the hill chiefs in return for not 
invading border villages. This practice, termed „blackmail‟, had existed in different 
parts of Assam and Sylhet before the British occupation, and when the British annexed 
these territories they continued the tradition.
471
 The directors welcomed this and, 
commenting on a case of the Dufflas, they praised the practice of „blackmail‟ as „the 
most effectual and least troublesome mode of keeping the Dufflas, Booteahs & c. in 
order.‟472 The Directors further hoped that those who received the blackmail would 
undertake the control of others around them and become responsible for their quiet 
conduct.
473
  
 
Among the Kuki-Chin people, a Poitoo chief named Buntye (or Bontai) received 
blackmail from the British authorities at Sylhet. This was also a continuation of the 
arrangement between Buntye and zemindars of the plain during the Mughal period.
474
 
Undoubtedly, it was the Poitoo Kukis who had the upper hand in this relationship. In 
September 1826, upon the failure of the Sylhet authorities to deliver blackmail, Buntye 
massacred a group of Sylhet woodcutters at a hill between the Rivers Dhaleswari and 
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the Singla. The Collector of Sylhet sent three messengers to Buntye‟s village, located on 
the River Lungai three days journey south of Sylhet, to investigate the case. They were 
also directed to seek the possibilities of opening communications with other Poitoo 
chiefs named „Laroo‟ and „Linden‟ living further upstream. The names of these three 
chiefs – Buntye, Laroo, and Linden – were identical to the three chiefs named by Fisher 
in his earlier article: Bontay-loll, Lollhoo, and Landoo. Buntye, however, did not allow 
the messengers to pass upstream. Instead, he kept two of the messengers as hostages 
while sending the last back to collect the blackmail after showing him the severed heads 
of the woodcutters. The Government had no other choice but to sanction the payment to 
save the other two messengers. Enquiry was made regarding the possibility of reaching 
Buntye‟s village with troops and the Tripura Rajah was called upon for assistance, but 
nothing came out of this. Instead, the British temporarily closed the markets to all Kukis 
in retaliation.
475
 
 
Apart from „blackmail‟, the British officers also gave occasional presents to the hill 
chiefs. This custom seems to have taken place not only with the chiefs out of British 
influence but also with those who normally paid tax. One such case was recorded 
between the principal Assistant in Nowgong and a group of the Kuki people in 1853.
476
 
Unfortunately, only the register of the document exists now, but it is probable that the 
group of Kukis mentioned in this article was one of those that lived in the Northern 
Cachar Hills, which were made over to Nowgong in 1839.
477
 Both Jenkins and 
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Pemberton mentioned the existence of Kuki settlements in the hills north of Cachar,
478
 
and when Lieutenant Bigge surveyed this tract, he reported the Kuki population as the 
most important contributor to the revenue of all the residents of the hills.
479
 Thus, the 
present mentioned in 1853 seems to have been one that was in the nature of an 
occasional renewal of faith rather than an annual payment. 
 
Whether it was an annual practice or an occasional present, such presents were 
made to keep the hill people in a friendly relationship with the British administration. 
The Government‟s interpretation, according to Woodthorpe, was that the „blackmail‟ 
was a compensation for the loss the people of the village incurred by giving up their 
occasional plunder.
480
 Yet there is no denying that such a custom continued as a result of 
Britain‟s inability to force their influence on the hill chiefs; therefore, it is highly likely 
that the hill chiefs assumed that they had some kind of superiority over the British. 
Indeed, later in the 1860s a group of the Lushai people whose chief had been given 
presents by a British officer were reported to have told the subjects of Manipur in a 
sneering manner that: „Your Raja [meaning Manipur Rajah] has become very great 
lately, and has joined the Feringhee Sahibs [the British]. Look, the Sahibs have paid us 
tribute‟.481 „Tribute‟ was what they regarded it to be. 
 
How long the British authorities of Sylhet continued to pay blackmail to Buntye is 
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obscure, but it can be safely said that it did not last longer than the first expedition 
against the Poitoo in 1844 and is likely to have been discontinued during the mid-1830s 
when another measure was adopted for the security of the frontier. After the annexation 
of Cachar by the British, the Poitoo initially remained friendly to the British and showed 
an interest in opening a bazaar within Cachar. This induced Lieutenant Fisher to regard 
it sufficient to place a small post of sepoys in the Kuki bazaar at Kossinugar for the 
defence of the south-western frontier of Cachar.
482
 On the other hand, defensive 
measures were urgently needed for the south-eastern part of Cachar where there was no 
relationship or communication with the Kukis who raided the plains. Four months after 
his assumption of the management of Cachar, in December 1830, Lieutenant Fisher 
reported the establishment of a party of sepoys, consisting of a havildar (sergeant), one 
naik(corporal) and 16 sepoys, to protect the south-eastern part of Cachar from the 
incursions of the Kukis. But he was doubtful about the effectiveness of this post of 
sepoys beyond its immediate neighbourhood, since the attacks of the Kukis were 
commonly made suddenly in the night for the acquisition of heads rather than 
plunder.
483
 
 
On this account, he suggested maintaining a party of chowkidars (watchmen) 
among the inhabitants of adjacent villages. His suggestion was to set aside a portion of 
land within every village as rent-free for the maintenance of chowkidar parties and 
furnish them with matchlocks or other inferior firearms. The firearms, Fisher calculated, 
would deter Kuki attacks as „the Kukis had a great dread of fire arms and had never 
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been known to attack a village thus armed.‟484 This, he argued, was a far more effective 
and economical mode of defence than the alternative, the establishment of a chain of 
posts of sepoys.
485
  
 
Upon receiving Fisher‟s suggestion, David Scott, the Agent to the North Eastern 
Frontier, asked Fisher to clarify the quantity of land to be given and the amount of 
revenue to be relinquished as the advance.
486
 To this, Fisher replied that his proposal 
was not a relinquishment of revenue immediately derivable but the offer of inducements 
to the settlers to clear a portion of wasteland on condition that they defend the 
pergunnah thus occupied. The quantity of such land, he suggested would be one hal to 
each chowkidar and ten chowkidars for every hundred hals of cultivation.
487
  
 
This was not the only instance of paying a cash advance to encourage people to 
settle in the waste land of Cachar. For example, in 1831 five hundred rupees were 
advanced to the Kukis of Gograpar in central Cachar and in 1833 Fisher reported with 
satisfaction that the amount had been nearly repaid.
488
 Jenkins recommended further 
settlements of two thousand Kukis and Nagas, as suggested by Fisher, to be located and 
settled near the road. The advance, he thought, would easily be recovered by employing 
them as porters for traffic, or for the protection of passengers and for the building and 
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repair of the roads between Cachar and Dhurumpore.
489
 There were other Kuki villages 
on the southern hills of Sylhet and Cachar established by the British authorities. The 
circumstances leading to such establishments, or the number and exact location of such 
villages cannot be found in the documents, but the existence of such villages was clearly 
mentioned when they were attacked by „independent‟ Kukis. 490  Pemberton also 
mentions a small colony of Kukis established on the Telyn hills towards the southwest 
of Cachar as the first settlement to cultivate this area.
491
 
 
Fisher‟s scheme, however, was different from these in that it was principally for 
the purpose of defence, and the participants were given not only advances but also 
firearms. Government approval for Fisher‟s scheme arrived in February 1831.492 Yet in 
the following year, Fisher submitted a modified plan. He wrote that the original plan of 
defence by chowkidars could not be „speedily effected‟ and consequently a number of 
small posts of sepoys were still called for. Fisher does not specify the reason for this, 
but from the context, it is probable that he could not find enough people willing to settle 
in the tracts threatened by the Kukis. Therefore, instead of Cachari or Bengali 
chowkidars, he suggested establishing Manipuri villages on the troublesome frontier on 
condition that they build defences against the Kukis. For this, he asked the 
Government‟s sanction for an advance of two thousand rupees to a Manipur prince 
named Purbitta Singh to facilitate their settlement under the same condition sanctioned 
in the letter by Scott mentioned above, i.e. provision of muskets and rent-free lands on 
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the condition of the defence of their own settlements against the Kukis.
 493
 
 
Though Manipur came under the British influence, the internal struggle among the 
contenders to the throne continued
494
 and Purbitta Singh, one of the princes, had crossed 
the border into Cachar with his followers, applying for settlement. Fisher took this 
opportunity to solve the defence problem on the Kuki frontier by establishing Manipuri 
settlements along the southern frontier. Facing a lack of resources and manpower, the 
British administration sought to deal with defence by the indirect means of establishing 
a line of villages of people deemed more warlike than the Cacharis, as a human shield. 
The authorities in Calcutta were not sure about the expediency of supplying muskets. 
Nonetheless, the plan was sanctioned in November 1832, as Fisher proposed.
495
  
 
Two years later, in January 1834, Fisher reported the Manipuri settlements as a 
success: there had been no Kuki outrages along the line of villages of Purbitta Sing, the 
advance made to him had already been paid in part, and the villages appeared to be 
improving. Besides, several other Manipuri chiefs also offered to „take advances for the 
establishment of villages under similar terms with that of Purbitta Sing‟. To this Fisher 
added that: 
A great extension of cultivation and consequent increase of revenue might be 
expected from it not merely from the lands which would be cleared by the 
Manipuris but from much larger tracts which will be protected by them and 
which in their present state of insecurity our unwarlike Ryots are afraid to 
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occupy.
496
 
The authorities in Calcutta and London sanctioned further advances for establishment of 
more Manipuri villages on the remaining positions on the frontier, as Fisher 
recommended, without question.
497
  
 
Pemberton also noted these Manipuri settlements as a „most complete success.‟ 
While he regarded the Bengalis as noted for „natural timidity and physical inferiority‟, 
which made them unable to contend with the fierce border tribes, the Manipuris were 
regarded as a hardy race that could provide protection not only of their own villages but 
also those of the Bengalis behind them, with just a few muskets. Besides, their intimate 
knowledge of the Kuki, and their experience and „anticipation‟ in dealing with the Kuki, 
were mentioned as contributing factors for this scheme.
498
 
 
It is doubtful that the Kuki raids were repulsed by the mere possession of fire-arms 
in the hands of the Manipuri settlers. While mentioning the lack of Kuki raids on the 
frontier defended by the Manipuri settlements, Fisher contrasted it with the other parts 
of Cachar defended by posts of sepoys. He reported that in December1833 a group of 
Kukis openly attacked a post of the Company‟s sepoys, and were repulsed „after a few 
rounds of musketry and arrows had been exchanged.‟499 In one place, the Kukis were 
reported to be bold enough to make an open attack on a post of sepoys while in another 
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place they were reported to have been overawed by the mere possession of firearms by 
the Manipuris. It seems that Fisher was driven by his anxiety to prove the success of his 
own scheme. Nevertheless, it is still very probable that these Manipuri settlements 
located in between the hills and the plains worked as a buffer zone, and proved helpful 
in repopulating the area, which was the main goal of the scheme, if not by deterring the 
Kuki attacks, then by absorbing the attacks. As Woodthorpe commented, it was a policy 
of raising barriers.
500
 
 
The Manipuris, on the other hand, were not quiet settlers protecting their own 
vicinities. Captain Lister, reporting some 10 years later, provided a different view of the 
Manipuri settlers. According to Lister, Tribowanjit was one of the Manipuri princes who 
was settled to the south of Sylhet and Cachar between 1834 and 1835. He received 
considerable land at Jafferbund, south of Hailakandy, with two thousand rupees and 
twelve muskets to start a settlement and bring the Poitoo Kukis under control. He was 
also allowed to levy tolls from timber, bamboo and other forest products coming down 
the Dhaleswari River, as well as exacting protection money from the woodcutters.
501
 
 
Thus strengthened, Tribowanjit raided Kuki villages and joined with another 
brother in Cachar to attack Manipur in 1841, where both of them were killed. After his 
death, the village was taken over by another Manipuri prince and the custom of 
receiving tolls and protection money continued.
502
 These aggressive activities of the 
Manipuri princes aggravated the Kuki people towards the Manipuris and possibly to the 
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British administration that supported them. In fact it was only a matter of time until 
„mere possession of firearms‟ would become insufficient to hold against Kuki raids, and 
such an event was actually recorded in April 1844 when the Poitoo Kukis attacked one 
of the Manipuri settlements in Sylhet. 
 
 
c) Arrangements of Southern Kuki-Chin Frontier 
 
In Arakan, the British administration took longer to settle down in the plains than 
in Cachar. This is no surprise, considering the difference in size: Cachar was only a 
district of less than 4,000 square miles including the northern hills,
503
 while Arakan was 
a division with three districts (Akyab, Kyouk-hpyoo, and Sandoway) and more than 
13,000 square miles in total area, excluding the Northern Arakan Hills, which were 
incorporated in the 1860s.
504
 Before the British, the Burmese had divided Arakan into 
four divisions of Akyab, Ramree, Aeng, and Sandoway. Upon annexation, the British 
divided Aeng between Akyab and Sandoway maintaining three districts. Then in 1833 
Aeng was re-constituted as a district, following a suggestion of Jenkins and Pemberton, 
but in 1852 Ramree and Aeng were merged as Kyouk-hpyoo.
505
 
 
An Assistant Commissioner was appointed to each district, which was divided into 
circles and villages administered by the native authorities. Arthur Phayre, who was a 
senior Assistant Commissioner of Arakan, wrote in 1841 that there were overall 160 
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circles and 960 villages in Arakan during his time. Of these circles, 148 were called the 
„Kyun‟ or islands, being situated in the low lands, and 12 were called „Kyoung‟ or 
streams, being in the hill districts.
506
 „Kyun‟(______) in Burmese also means alluvial 
lands, and therefore the circles of „Kyun‟ were those in plains, in contrast to the 
„Kyoung‟(______) in the hills. The heads of circles were called „Kyun-okes‟ or „Kyoung-
okes‟ according to the situation of the circle. These officers, or thugies, were in charge 
of delivering the revenues of the circles. The villages were under the charge of Rawa-
goung (________ Yuwa Gain: village headmen), elected by the people themselves, who 
dealt with the collection of revenue as well as preservation of order. In later years, all 
the official duties of Rawa-goung were transferred to Thugyis, and Rawa-goung became 
a nominal position.
507
 
 
The actual implementation of the administrative system was not smooth in Arakan. 
At the annexation, the posts of native officers in the civil administration, the police, the 
courts and the military were given to Bengalis from Chittagong. This practice naturally 
caused disaffection among the Arakanese as well as necessitating a large number of 
interpreters, making the administration inefficient. As an example, in a report to the 
Court of Directors, the Superintendent of Arakan described the normal procedures in the 
court, in which evidence was taken in Arakanese, or the language of the people, then 
interpreted into Hindi and recorded in both, while the orders of the European officers 
were recorded in Persian. It was in 1836, ten years after the annexation, that Arakanese 
was chosen as the official language, and the people of Arakan began to take offices in 
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the administration.
508
 
 
The zemindary style of revenue assessment introduced by the British in 1826 also 
proved to be a failure. As the British had no knowledge of the revenue assessment 
before the annexation, the government received tenders as to the amount of revenue 
which should be paid by the person holding the appointment of Kyun-oke or Thugyi in 
each circle. In other words, the government auctioned the position of the head of circles 
according to the amounts of revenue the candidates promised to pay, regardless of the 
actual level of production. The Superintendent of Arakan wrote to the Government in 
1828 that many doubtful characters made their way into these lucrative positions, and in 
principle, assessment was made on such rough grounds as the number of ploughs and 
bullock ploughs.
509
 Phayre wrote of the administration in Arakan before 1836 that it was 
„difficult to account for such an impolitic and unjust system of taxation . . . ever having 
been proposed or adopted‟.510 The following passage by the Assistant Commissioner of 
Ramree reviewing the early revenue collection in his district shows the real situation: 
The revenue was a capitation tax only, and the demand was freaky in its 
nature and irregular as to amount and time of demand. No man knew what tax 
he had to pay per year; how many instalments he had to pay it in; and when 
each instalment would be due. When the tax-gatherer arrived, he made his 
demand apparently as the fit took him, and received not only money in 
liquidation of his demand, but cloths of all sorts, ivory, rice or paddy, bees‟ 
wax, hair off the head of the people, dahs, hatchets, or any other saleable 
articles; all those who could not pay did for a time desert their circle or village 
and hide in the jungle to evade the tax, or to put off the day of reckoning in 
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order to gain time.
511
 
 
To cripple the British administration further, the unhealthy climate of Arakan, 
which had already made the province notorious during the war with Burma, continued 
to create casualties among the Indian sepoys and European officers stationed in Arakan. 
For instance, the post at Aeng, which was created in 1833 after the advice in the report 
of Jenkins and Pemberton, killed the first two British officers posted there within a few 
months of their arrival, and the third officer also died in 1837 from what then became 
notorious as the „Aeng Fever‟. The fourth officer, Lieutenant A. C. Rainey, moved the 
headquarters to Kyouk-hpyu in March 1837 on his own responsibility. The Government 
sanctioned this arrangement in the following year and in 1852 the Districts of Aeng and 
Ramree were amalgamated into Kyouk-hpyu.
512
  
 
On top of all this, to borrow the words of the Governor-General in 1831, the people 
of Arakan were not disposed to sit down quietly under „grievances real or imaginary‟.513 
Especially near the Burmese frontier, the country was reported to be in „an agitated 
state‟514 and the vicinity of Aeng to be „infested with banditti‟.515 In 1829, reports came 
that army deserters had joined the insurgency of one named Saoo, a thugyi of Allegyoo 
(Alegyun). To suppress this insurgency, the Government sent two expeditions in 1829 
and 1830, resulting in three European deaths and many more sepoy casualties from 
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disease. In the end, Saoo fled into Burma, and the court of Ava was pressed to 
apprehend him and hand him over to British authorities in Arakan and this was duly 
carried out.
516
 
 
This was not merely a case of bandits taking the opportunity of the initial 
confusion, but of resistance to British rule, aimed at replacing the British administration 
in Arakan with an Arakanese dynasty.
517
 In 1827 a man named Shwe-pang, descendant 
of a former king of Arakan before the Burmese annexation, returned and began to attract 
the loyalty of the rawa-goungs. The British government persuaded him to accept a post 
of Kyun-oke, but in 1836, Shwe-pang, with another man named Kyeet-tsan-we, raised 
arms to seize the government of the country. This revolt was joined, Phayre wrote, by „a 
band of escaped convicts, and other desperate characters‟, and „some of the ignorant hill 
tribe, the Khyengs‟.518  
 
This is one of the rare references regarding the Chin people in Arakan during the 
1830s. Despite its brevity it sufficiently demonstrates that the Chin people joined the 
Arakanese in their struggle against the British. It also shows that British control had not 
been consolidated over the Chin villages around Aeng. In fact, the whole of the kyoungs 
were under very limited control. From the kyoungs, the kyoung-okes or „head of a river 
district‟ collected 2 or 3 rupees per house from the hill men. The kind of control to 
which the people of kyoung circles were subjected, Phayre continued, stopped at paying 
two rupees per year per household. The assessment for this was made on the basis of the 
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number of cultivators and the chiefs were answerable for the preservation of order in 
their clans, which meant that the chief had to make sure that the men under him did not 
commit murderous inroads into the plains. Phayre also recorded that some of the chiefs 
outside these circles also paid a fixed sum yearly as a token of their fealty but were 
entirely beyond the control.
519
 Beyond these were large clans who lived further in the 
interior, did not pay anything, and therefore were not under British influence.
520
  
 
Here, a division of the hill people can be observed: those living in the administered 
area under Kyoung-oke and those entirely out of British control. Interestingly, the word 
kyoung is the same word as in the category „Kyoung-tha‟ in contrast to „Toung-tha‟ 
previously seen in regard to the Chittagong Hill Tracts. This suggests that the division 
of Kyoung-tha and Toung-tha, when it originated in Arakan, had a close relationship 
with the administrative incorporation of the kyoung circles into the administration of the 
plains, which, in turn, was analogous to the division between the wild and subjected 
Chins.
521
 
 
The overall situation on the Arakan frontier can be described as a gradual decrease 
of the Company‟s control towards the interior of the hills to the north. There were first 
the semi-integrated villages of kyoungs, then the tribute paying villages, and finally the 
uncontrolled people beyond these. A part of the lack of control was due to the unsettled 
situation in the plains, but within the system described by Phayre there was no particular 
zeal shown by the British to control the people in any other way than preventing them 
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from committing inroads into the administered areas. In fact, the reason that the kyoung 
circles came under British rule was not because the British had subjugated them but 
because the British had inherited the arrangements of their predecessors. On the other 
hand, less control also meant less responsibility on the part of the British Indian 
Government to protect the people of these frontier villages. From the later records, it 
can be seen that these frontier villages were constantly at war among themselves or with 
the people further away,
522
 but no mention of defence could be found in the 
administrative reports, not even news of such events. In other words, the existence of 
these semi-integrated friendly groups at the fringe actually worked as a buffer zone that 
absorbed most of the attacks from outsiders, but went unnoticed by the British officers 
in the plains. 
 
Chittagong was in a similar situation to Arakan in this respect. Due to the pre-
existing arrangements with the hill chiefs, the British administrators did not concern 
themselves much with the affairs of the hills further inland. In fact, during the 1830s the 
Chakma and Marma polities were going through a period of chaos: internal feuds 
weakened the central authorities and this was naturally followed by numerous raids by 
the Kuki-Chin people, partly in alliance with the warring factions of the former ruling 
classes. Nevertheless, no investigation was made regarding the situation of the 
Chittagong Hills in the 1830s,
523
 and it was only in the 1840s that the problem began to 
be discussed in relation to that of the Arakan Hills. 
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2. The Boundaries of the Frontier  
 
There was a notable difference in the British management of the Kuki-Chin 
frontier between the northern and the southern frontier. In the northern frontier areas, 
the problems of Kuki people were recognised and the administrators adopted various 
measures to deal with them, but such problems were not even noticed by the British 
officers in the southern frontier areas. This difference was again due to the existence of 
semi-integrated villages in the southern frontier that the British had inherited from their 
predecessors, but it was also closely related to the different conditions of the boundaries 
in the respective frontiers. The British boundary on the Kuki-Chin frontier was better 
laid down in the northern frontier (i.e.the southern boundaries of Sylhet, Cachar, 
Manipur) than in the southern frontier (i.e. north of Arakan and east of Chittagong).  
 
The demarcation and maintenance of boundaries could be most successful when 
the division could be fixed to clearly recognisable geographic features such as well-
identified rivers, streams and mountain ridges. In the north the hill ridges, rivers and 
streams met the plains at right angles. This posed a problem in finding an easily 
recognisable line of natural boundary. Fisher laid down the southern boundary of Sylhet 
in 1822 by linking certain obvious streams and ridges through plains and forests. Here, 
the obscure part was when the line of demarcation crossed the plains in between streams 
and ridges; but, over all, the line of demarcation was sufficiently clear for administrative 
purposes.
524
 Other than this, the southern boundary of Cachar and Manipur was only 
imagined. The only point that had actually been surveyed by Pemberton was the 
confluence of the Chikoo Nullah with the Barak, which marked the triple boundary of 
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Cachar, Manipur and Tripura. From this point until the line of demarcation met the 
Manipur River (or Kathé Chaung in Burmese), the boundary was an imagined line, 
„most ill-defined and irregular‟.525 
 
Despite this, the southern boundary of Sylhet, Cachar and Manipur was still by far 
better defined than the northern boundary of Arakan or the eastern boundary of 
Chittagong. The terrain in the northern hills of Arakan was more complicated than the 
southern hills of Sylhet and Cachar: a series of mountain ranges swept down to the 
plains from the north-north-west to the south-south-east, which gradually increased in 
height eastwards towards the great Yoma Range, and towards the north to the current 
Chin State. Besides, unlike the nullahs in Cachar and Sylhet that alternated with the 
mountains in an orderly manner, here sizeable rivers such as Koladyne and the Talak 
pierced the mountains leaving long trails of cultivable valley wedged between high hills. 
 
In the map compiled by Pemberton, the northern boundary of Arakan starts in the 
west from the Naaf River, and then follows the Mayu River in a north-easterly direction 
up to about 21° north latitude where it crosses a mountain range to join the Koladyne. 
Then it follows the Koladyne up to its source at about the 22°40‟ north latitude, which 
marks the northern limit of Arakan. Thence, it follows the eastern boundary of 
Chittagong and continues along the mountain ridge that includes the Blue Mountain in a 
northerly direction to join the eastern boundary of Hill Tripura (see Map 2 on page xiv 
and Map 7 on page 162 above). This boundary line, however, could only have been a 
work of the imagination. Pemberton himself never surveyed the River Koladyne and no 
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other survey followed, despite Pemberton‟s strong urge for its necessity. 526  The 
mountains north of Arakan and east of Chittagong had never been contacted by the 
British except from a distance or through rumour. In fact, the area where the northern 
boundary of Arakan meets the eastern boundary of Chittagong was the most erroneously 
drawn part of Pemberton‟s map. Pemberton simply took the conjectured courses of 
rivers and the mountains as the boundary and linked these to define the boundary of 
Arakan and Chittagong. 
 
The actual administrative limits fell far short of this conceptual boundary. Writing 
in 1841, Phayre stated that British authority extended „up the Kola-dan River. . . to the 
mouth of a stream called the Oo-tha-lang‟, which he located at about 21°40 north 
latitude, near the town of Koladyne. Beyond this, he said, was „untrodden by civilised 
man.‟527 This is a full one-degree of latitude south of Pemberton‟s estimate. Observing 
this difference in 1869, the Commissioner of Arakan called Phayre‟s boundary „the real 
or practical boundary‟ and Pemberton‟s as „the nominal or political boundary‟.528  
 
The same division also existed on the eastern frontier of Chittagong: the 
Company‟s influence stopped at the territories of the Chakma and the Phru, while the 
eastern boundary of these polities had never even been made an issue for the 
administrators of Chittagong. It was only in the 1860s, when the Hill Tracts of 
Chittagong constituted a separate administration from the rest, that at least the boundary 
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between these hill chiefs and Chittagong proper was settled.
529
  
 
Later, this division between „practical‟ boundary and „political‟ boundary was 
formalised with the promulgation of the „Inner Line‟ Regulation: the Regulation for the 
Peace and Government of Certain Districts on the Eastern Frontier of Bengal’ (Statute 
32 and 33, Vic, Cap.3).
530
 In its origin, the „Inner Line‟ was defined to prevent British 
subjects from moving into the hills and thereby leading to complications with the hill 
people. Therefore, through this regulation, the passage beyond this line was strictly 
forbidden except by the authorisation of the government. Soon this came to represent 
the limit of British jurisdiction. The counterpart of the „Inner Line‟, or the „Outer Line‟, 
had never been defined or even named thus, but to the enquiry of an officer regarding 
the nature of „Inner Line‟ and „Outer Line‟ in 1884, the Secretary of State replied:  
The „Inner‟ Line, which varies in every district to which the Regulation I 
of 1873 has been applied, is the line up to which it has been decided that our 
officers shall exercise some kind of jurisdiction. Between that and an outer 
line (the actual term “Outer Line” cannot be traced in any of the papers after a 
careful search) lies a tract
a
 over which we claim some sort of sovereignty, but 
exercise no jurisdiction, and work by personal influence only. Outside that 
again lies independent territory, over which we claim no right, and with which 
we do not interfere in any way.
531
 
 
(
a
 Of which the external boundary is purposely left undefined [footnote in the 
original text]) 
 
Therefore, the concept of an Inner Line represents a stage in the development of 
the boundary of British India, when the different capacities of the state – administrative, 
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political or sovereign control – had different recognised geographic limits. The Inner 
Line was not yet the ideal boundary of a modern state, which, ideally, fixes the limits of 
all the capacities of a state on one line defined by geographic features; beyond which is 
another equally complete state. But it was still a more rationalised form of boundary 
than what had existed during the period of the Company: namely, the vague diminuendo 
of the British Indian government in the vicinity of its boundaries.  
 
The reality of the limits of British India during the period of the Company 
depended on the difficult local situations and boundaries in different parts of frontier 
areas in different conditions. For an example, the southern boundary between Sylhet and 
Hill Tripura was better defined than any other parts in the Kuki-Chin frontier area, due 
to the disputes with the Rajah of Tripura. The Tripura Rajah had been claiming the 
whole of the hills south of Sylhet and Cachar as under his influence, and British officers 
had accepted this even though they doubted the actual control the Rajah had over the 
various Kuki chiefs in these hills.
532 
This claim erupted at times into conflicts with 
Cachar and Manipur, and, when the British came into this region, they needed to make a 
clear division of sovereignty to prevent future conflicts. Thus, Fisher demarcated the 
southern boundary of Sylhet in the presence of a representative of the Rajah of Hill 
Tripura.
533
 
 
The demarcation of the southern boundary of Sylhet was also a measure for the 
defence of Sylhet against Kuki raids. The claims of Tripura Rajah was one reason that 
started the boundary survey but it was also ordered so that the government could „fix 
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upon the Rajah the responsibility of keeping order in his own markets, and preventing 
the passage of marauders to the defenceless plains‟.534 In dividing the respective limits 
of jurisdiction, the British officers expected a sharp division of rights – such as revenue 
collections – as well as responsibilities of controlling the people within the respective 
boundaries. Thus the Tripura Rajah was, in principle, held responsible for the matters 
within his boundary and he was asked to exercise control over the people or at least 
assist British efforts to put them under control as can be seen in the case of the raids by 
the Poitoo into Sylhet in 1826 and Cachar 1832. 
 
In reality, however, the boundary of the North East Frontier had been the least 
successful in this very respect. The network of political relationships between the native 
Rajahs and the hill people constantly defied so rigid a definition of a boundary: 
whenever there was a conflict, whether within or between polities, the Rajahs of Tripura, 
Manipur, Cachar and North Cachar mobilised the hill people for warfare, or even 
resettled those friendly to them in order to gain political superiority over their 
adversaries.
535
 Besides, the movement of people, either by their mode of cultivation or 
by inter-tribal warfare, ruined the efforts by the British officers to sustain the division of 
sovereign control over the population through boundaries.  
 
In one instance, men from three villages of Khongjai Kuki, presumed to be the 
subjects of the Manipur Rajah, had been employed in the maintenance of the Manipur 
road in 1841; but when the time for the payment came, two of the villages were found 
to be within Cachar. The problem was whether the government should pay these 
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villagers as inhabitants of Cachar or pay the Manipur Rajah for the service, the work 
being part of his subjects‟ annual quota of public works.536 Upon closer inspection, it 
was found that the two villages within Cachar recognised the supremacy of the other 
village in Manipur, whose chief was responsible for arranging the annual quota of 
labour to be rendered to the Manipur Rajah. Therefore the decision was made that as 
long as this village stayed within Manipur, all three villages were to be regarded as 
tributary to Manipur. A treaty to this end was signed between Manipur and British 
India.
537
 
 
Despite these failings in reality, the British Indian administration had an undeniable 
preference for a rigidly defined boundary between districts and between different 
polities. The increasingly rationalised revenue collection, especially that part linked 
with the direct measurement of land and productivity, was one reason. Besides, the 
sense that the administration has to provide protection to the taxpayers within its 
territory contributed to the refined sense of division of „our people‟ and „our territory‟ 
from the rest.  
 
It is also the case that the division of subjects from outsiders was bound to be a 
geographic one, since the British were alien to the people they had come to rule. Unlike 
the other native rulers who had embedded loyalties deriving from a cultural, religious, 
or ethnic core, the British did not have a natural limit of their influence embedded in the 
people, and their rule could only be limited in geographic terms. In the initial years of 
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annexation, the British administration exercised sovereignty within the limits it had 
inherited from its predecessors. They assumed that the records of Mughal, Assam or 
Arakan would provide them with the administrative limits within which the British 
administration would work as the inheritor of that particular sovereignty. Lack of 
precise records was one problem. The Burmese war had already disrupted whatever was 
available, and on many occasions the actual customs were in conflict with what had 
been recorded. Besides, the Arakanese records on the northern limits of Arakan, as 
found by Captain Dickinson, the Superintendent of Arakan, were so vaguely termed, 
with all distance measured by the time taken to travel, that they could not provide any 
guideline to the British administrators.
538
 Thus, if the British administration in Arakan 
was to have a boundary, it had to be one newly drawn by British through survey, 
pacification of those inside the boundary and political negotiation with the people 
outside the boundary. All these could not be achieved at the start of their administration 
in Arakan. Therefore, against their principle, the actual limits of administration were left 
vague on the boundaries, with the general practice of gradually diminishing influence. 
 
Naturally, while the British officers remained defensive, no more information on 
the hill people was added to the reports of the previous surveys. On the other hand, the 
information from the surveys was not enough for the management of the frontier neither 
for the expedition into the hills, nor for the demarcation of boundary. The change to this 
situation, however, came not from another survey, but from the increasing consolidation 
of the administration in the plains and resulting increase in relationships with the local 
people, which began to make impact in the 1840s. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
EXPEDITIONS INTO THE HILLS: the 1840s 
 
 
1. Expeditions into the Hills 
 
a) Northern Frontier 
 
1) Blackwood’s expedition in 1844 
 
On the night of the 16
th
 April 1844, some two hundred Kukis attacked a Manipuri 
colony called Kochabari in southern Sylhet and took twenty heads as well as six 
captives.
1
 Fearing the recurrence of such raids, the cultivators deserted neighbouring 
government estates, and troops and police had to go down in numbers to restore 
confidence.
2
 The information given to the Sylhet authority by the survivors of the attack 
and Europeans employed at Tripura Rajah‟s court pointed to a Poitoo chief named 
Lalchokla as the main culprit. 
 
Lalchokla (also spelt „Lal-Suktla‟) was a son of Laroo who had been mentioned by 
Fisher as one of three chiefs of Poitoo.
3
 Laroo had died in 1843 and his son, Lalchokla, 
committed the raid to acquire heads to adorn his father‟s tomb as Kuki custom dictated. 
                                                 
1
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Besides, Lalchokla stated during his trial that it was also a revenge for the maltreatment 
of his father by two Manipuri princes, Ramsing and Tribowanjit
4
 – the Manipuri princes 
who had been settled on the Sylhet frontier by the British officers to defend against the 
Kukis. 
 
There is, however, another explanation for this raid. John Edgar, who was a deputy 
commissioner of Cachar during the years leading to the outbreak of the First Lushai 
Campaign in 1871-2, gave a more complex background to this incident, based on what 
he had learnt from the Lushais. The Poitoo Kukis, according to him, had long been 
under pressure from the Lushai, and sometime in the late 1830s, Laroo (spelt Lasoo by 
Edgar) had been driven out of his territory by a Lushai Chief named Mongper (a chief 
of the Sailo clan of the Lushai). Laroo then pleaded with Tribowanjit and Ram Sing for 
support and these Manipuris princes had surprised and destroyed Mongper‟s village, 
taking Mongper a captive. Mongper was later released upon the promise not to raid 
either Poitoo or Manipuri villages. After the death of Laroo in 1843, Laroo‟s son, 
Lalchokla was somehow reconciled with Mongper, and immediately after committed 
the raid on Kochabari. So, Edgar concluded that the raid was done at the suggestion of 
Mongper, if not with his assistance.
5
 
 
It is quite possible that both of these versions were true: the Manipuri princes could 
have molested Laroo after assisting him against Mongper. Thus, at the background of 
this seemingly straightforward head-hunting raid was a struggle for the political survival 
of the Poitoo chiefs in a complicated political environment composed of the British 
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administration, Manipuri settlers and the Lushai chiefs encroaching from the south.  
 
Tripura Rajah was not a bystander in this intricate network of hill politics. When 
the government asked the Rajah of Tripura to apprehend the culprit, Tripura Rajah 
refused, arguing that he had no authority over the particular tribe in question. The 
British officers suspected that the Tripura Rajah was protecting this Poitoo chief. In fact, 
it was found out later that Lalchokla had applied to the Tripura Rajah for protection 
against the British.
6
 Chatterjee argues that Lalchokla was a friendly and powerful vassal 
of Tripura Rajah.
7
 It was a common practice for the Kuki chiefs around Tripura to be 
aligned with either the Rajah or his adversary to the Tripuri throne. As a Kuki chief 
might easily change sides according to the circumstances and his own calculation of 
benefit and loss, it was important for the Tripura Rajah to protect those aligned with him. 
As seen above, Laroo‟s alignment with the Manipuris was overturned by his successor 
Lalchokla who allied himself to the Lushais, and Gnurshailon the son of Lalchokla was 
said to have aligned with an opponent of the Rajah in the 1860s on marrying the 
daughter of the Lushai chief Sukpilal.
8
 
 
This time, the British Indian Government was determined to punish Lalchokla for 
the raid and began preparing an expedition. When this news reached the Tripura Rajah, 
he suddenly became cooperative and sent in four Kuki prisoners and „twenty seven 
witnesses‟, but all of these denied any knowledge of the raid. Next, he sent in a Kuki 
chief named Botai, a cousin of Laroo. This is not the Buntey or Bontai of the Sylhet 
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massacre in 1826 who was a brother of Laroo (see Fig.3 on the next page). Conflicting 
information exists regarding Botai‟s involvement in the raid: Mackenzie regarded him 
as one who cooperated with Laroo, while Chatterjee regarded him as the real perpetrator. 
In addition, Chatterjee argued that he was the father of Lalmi Sing, another Poitoo chief, 
who offered to lead British troops to Lalchokla‟s village in return for his father‟s 
release.
9
 Yet according to Mackenzie, Lalmi Sing was the son of Buntye, who had 
received blackmail from the zemindars of Sylhet.
 10
 This shows the lack of precise 
information regarding the situation in the hills. 
 
Lalmi Sing‟s support proved to be vital in the success of the expedition against 
Lalchokla, as it was he who guided the British troops, who left Sylhet on the 1
st
 of 
December and surrounded Lalchokla‟s village, cutting off supplies. On the 4th, 
Lalchokla surrendered himself to save his people and his village after negotiation 
through Lalmi Sing. He was then brought to Sylhet, tried for his crime, and transported 
for life. Two of his sons, Gnurshailon and Dakunipur, were also tried and were 
imprisoned in Sylhet for a short while. Botai was released soon after the trial, according 
to Chatterjee, in return for his son‟s cooperation. 
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Fig. 3. The Poitoo Chiefs 
a
. According to Chatterjee 
b
. According to Mackenzie and Edgar 
 
 
 
As Chatterjee points out, this was an extraordinary trial as Lalchokla was not a 
British subject but under the Tripura Rajah‟s jurisdiction: technically, he should have 
been tried in Tripura.
11
 Moreover, Lalchokla was known to have surrendered on the 
promise that his life would be spared and he would not be kept in captivity. Edgar 
argues that this promise was not made by Captain Blackwood but by Lalmi Sing of his 
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own accord.
12
 Whatever the case, this was obviously treachery in the eyes of the Kukis. 
Edgar, as well as Woodthorpe, singled this out as the reason why negotiations had later 
been so difficult with Lushai chiefs during the British war with them in the early 
1870s.
13
  
 
After this incident, the Poitoo were weakened and divided themselves among the 
Lushais, Cachar and Tripura. Yet, the spirit of vengeance sown in the hearts of the sons 
of Lalchokla did not die without making its impact on the British territories. 
Gnurshailion, also known as Mischoilon or Mischoilal who became a wanderer and 
outcast, was said to have sworn vengeance against the British at this moment and spent 
the rest of his life raiding and encouraging Lushai chiefs to raid British territories.
14
 His 
half-brother, Dakunipur, on the other hand, attacked Lalmi Sing‟s village in 1847, which 
was reported to have resulted in up to 150 deaths.
15
  
 
 
2) Continuing Raids in 1840s and the Advent of the Lushai 
 
Blackwood‟s expedition did not succeed in bringing peace to the frontier. On the 
contrary, throughout the later half of the 1840s, the number of reports of Kuki raids 
along the southern frontier of Sylhet, Cachar and Manipur increased. In June 1844, 
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while the investigation regarding Lalchokla‟s raid was in progress, a band of Kukis 
headed by a Thado chief from Manipur attacked a Kuki village within Cachar and took 
eight heads.
16
 In this case, one of the raiders had been apprehended, which made it 
easier to identify the chief involved. The reason for this incursion was to acquire heads 
for the burial of their chief. Besides, the attacked villagers were known to have 
emigrated from the attackers‟ village, making it probable that political enmity had 
motivated this raid as well.
17
 The Session judge of Sylhet, Mr. Stainforth insisted that it 
was absolutely necessary to depute a party of the Sylhet Light Infantry to convince „the 
savages that attacking Ryots of the Company‟s territory was sure to be followed by a 
retribution which it was better not to provoke‟.18 The Government, however, was of the 
opinion that such a punitive expedition would be „unworthy of a great Government and 
would probably fail in its object, besides exposing the troops employed in carrying it 
out to the ill effects of a climate more insidious than the attacks of the enemy‟.19 Instead, 
the Manipur Rajah was asked to arrest and give up the chief and other Kukis involved in 
the attack and take appropriate measures to prevent further similar incidents.
20
  
 
Nothing further can be found about the aftermath of this request but it was unlikely 
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that Manipur Rajah could have done anything, as the position of Manipur Rajah was 
again seriously threatened in the same year. Gambhir Singh died in 1834 leaving an 
infant son, Chandra Kirtee Singh, and Nar Singh, a senaputty, ruled Manipur as a regent. 
In 1844, Chandra Kirtee Singh and his mother attempted to take the throne by 
murdering Nar Singh. When the attempt failed, they both fled into Cachar and Nar 
Singh declared himself the Rajah of Manipur, regarding this act as an abdication. The 
British Indian Government formally recognised him as Rajah in the September as a 
result of the recommendation of the Political Agent, Lieutenant McCulloch. This, 
however, instigated more attacks on Manipur by Manipuri princes in Cachar and Burma 
into Manipur, and the Government had to warn those in Cachar that they would be 
removed to Bengal if they attacked Manipur.
21
  
 
Manipur was in constant conflict with the Kukis from the southern hills as well.
22
 
As the Rajah of Manipur had made over the supervision of all the Kuki refugees to the 
Political Agent, they were under the authority of the British Indian government.
23
 In 
1846 a group of Kukis attacked a village called Koompee and many of its inhabitants 
fled to Cachar.
24
 This attack caused a serious concern. In the vicinity of this village were 
several Kuki villages subservient to Manipur. When the defence of Koompee failed, the 
Kukis of the surrounding villages were also on the point of fleeing, and if they had 
deserted their position, there would have been no one left between the hostile „southern 
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Kukis‟ and the „Koupooees‟(or Kabuis).25  The Kabuis were important because they 
were in charge of the maintenance of the road between Manipur and Cachar.
26
  
 
As a solution, Lieutenant McCulloch suggested establishing more villages of „well-
affected Kukis‟ on this frontier to shield the Kabuis against the „southern savages‟. 
McCulloch also calculated that, due to the general similarity of Kuki languages, the 
villages thus established would be able to gather intelligence of an attack before the 
actual occurrence and enable the authorities to prevent future attacks or minimise the 
damage. Besides, this plan was calculated to prevent any population drain into Cachar 
and bring the friendly Kukis under closer control.
27
 The Government approved the 
„tenor‟ of McCulloch‟s suggestion.28  
 
This was in essence the same arrangement as that in the southern borders of Sylhet 
and Cachar, discussed in the previous chapter. Yet the hope of the Government that the 
Kuki people would be able to ward off attacks from the other Kukis from further south 
was not well founded. On 9
th
 June 1847, a Kuki village holding land from the 
Government in Sylhet was attacked and thirty villagers massacred by the „Hill Kukis‟. 
Then in a series of conflicts, upward of 150 deaths was reported. A team of native 
officers was sent by the officiating Magistrate of Sylhet to investigate the case. This 
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time, the Tripura Rajah protested that the Government should not interfere with the 
matter as the village was within his territory. He claimed that a relative of Lalchokla had 
procured this territory from him, but after his trial it had been given to Lalmi Sing: the 
massacre was actually a result of a war between Lalmi Sing and Dakunipur, a son of 
Lalchokla.
29
  
 
Such was the state of the boundary at this time. Subsequently much time was 
wasted in determining whether the village belonged to the Company or Tripura Rajah. 
In the meantime, another report arrived in January 1848 that a company of Sylhet Light 
Infantry which had been stationed near the site of the massacre had been surrounded by 
an unprecedented (and possibly exaggerated) number of 3,000 to 4,000 Kukis who 
retreated after skirmishes that resulted one death and one casualty among the sepoys.
30
  
 
At this, the Government lost confidence in the Magistrate of Sylhet, Mr. B. W. 
Cooper, who was reported to lack the „zeal or ability‟ to deal with the situation. He was 
sent to the less important position of Second Joint Magistrate at Mymensing. In his 
place, Colonel Lister, the Political Agent in the Khasi Hills, was deputed to Sylhet to 
deal with the situation. A professional surveyor was also sent to determine the boundary 
precisely. This survey showed that the location was well within the boundary laid down 
by Fisher.
31
 
 
By this time, however, there was a sudden explosion of reports of Kuki raids into 
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the southern parts of Sylhet, Cachar and Manipur. In Sylhet, woodcutters were 
massacred, and two villages destroyed, in 1849. In Cachar, several villages of Thado 
Kukis were attacked, resulting in 29 deaths and 42 captives including a son of one of the 
chiefs.
32
 About the same time, five hundred Kukis attacked a thana (police post) of Kala 
Naga in Manipur.
33
 
 
More Kuki people were also moving into the districts of Cachar and Sylhet from 
the southern hills. Between the years 1846 and 1847 an especially large immigration of 
the Kukis was reported in North Cachar, which was then under Nowgong. The Kukis 
were all encouraged to settle in North Cachar with the hope that prosperity and 
population would be restored there.
34
 In addition, the Thado, Thlangum, and virtually all 
Kuki groups in the southern frontier of Sylhet, Cachar and Manipur were restlessly 
moving into the British districts, each driven by another group. The situation is well 
described in the words of Colonel Lister written in 1853.
 
According to him, first, some 
Nagas in southern Cachar were driven north by „Tangunes‟ (Thlangum) who were in 
turn driven north by „Chansen‟ (Changsen) and „Tadoés‟ (Thado); around 1846, Thados 
came to settle within eight or ten miles south of Silchar driven up by „Luchyes, a very 
powerful tribe‟.35 
 
After this series of raids and movements of Kuki people, there followed rumours of 
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a stronger people, and it was in relation to the enquiries made about them that the name 
„Lushai‟ became familiar among the British authorities. The Kukis who moved to the 
North Cachar Hills professed their reason for the movement as „the oppression of 
Manipur and the attacks of Lushais‟.36 Lister even stated that the British had first heard 
of the „Luchyes‟ from the movements of the Kuki people.37 In April 1847, the political 
agent of Manipur, Captain McCulloch sent a letter asking for information regarding the 
„Loosai tribe of Kookies‟ within Hill Tripura to the magistrate of Tripura H. Fergusson. 
It was made because of complaints made by Manipur Rajah that the „Loosais‟ were 
protected from the Manipur troops by being within the boundary of Hill Tripura. As 
usual, the Rajah of Tripura replied that he knew nothing about them, though he had 
heard of them living „many days journey away‟.38  
 
 
3) Lister’s Expedition in 1850 
 
Enquiries followed after the series of attacks in 1849. Again Tripura Rajah was 
asked to apprehend the guilty party, and Colonel Lister was instructed not to be deterred 
by any territorial claims of the Rajah but if the village was de facto under the British, 
proceed to ascertain the guilty parties and punish them if possible. Intelligence from 
Cachar alleged that the Lushais were the culprits and more specifically, Lalingvoom and 
his two sons, Barmoolal and Lalpor. Some of the information gathered through these 
enquiries proved to be contradictory. Friendly Kukis were also employed by the Sylhet 
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Magistrate to follow the trails of the offenders, and they brought back the name of the 
raiders as the „Khojawal‟ or „Kachak‟ tribe, who formed a part of a larger Lushai clan 
ruled by three chiefs of Lalingbhoom, Khojawal, and Sookpilal.
39
  
 
This information later proved to be wrong. Lalingvoom was indeed the father of 
Mura(or Mulla) and Mura was found out to be the chief who raided a Thado village in 
Cachar. Yet, Lalpor (or Lalpoong) was not a son of Lalingvoom but a nephew. Sukpilal 
was a son of Mongper and another nephew of Lalingvoom. The name Khojawal cannot 
be found among the names of known Lushai chiefs. Besides, „Kachak‟, according to 
Edgar, was only a Kuki term employed to designate „other Kukis‟ from further inland.40 
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Fig. 4. The Sailo Chiefs 
SOURCE: Letter from Edgar to Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, 13 March 1871, J. 
Kennedy, ‘Genealogical Table of Ruling Lushai Chiefs’ (NAI External A March 1889)Elly, 
Military Report, Nunthara, Mizoram. 
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Despite this uncertainty regarding the actual identity of the offender, an expedition 
was ordered when the Kuki scouts offered to guide the expedition to the village of the 
offenders: once again, the most important factor for the expedition was the cooperation 
of the friendly Kukis. The British troops left Silchar on the 4
th
 January 1850 and after a 
ten days‟ march of over a hundred miles into the hills, reached the village of a chief 
called „Mullah‟(Mura) which they took easily. Lister was surprised by the size of the 
village with 800 to 1,000 houses and concluded that the Lushais were not migratory, as 
almost all other Kukis were. He attributed the success of his attack to the suddenness of 
it and to the lack of fighting men in the village, who had gone away, with the chief 
himself, on another raid.  
 
While in the village, he observed the even larger village of another chief, 
„Barmooeelin‟, through his telescope. He estimated that there could be „not less than 
three thousand‟ houses and the scouts reported that this village was full of fighting men 
including „three hundred Burmese armed with muskets‟. Unlike the Kukis familiar to 
British officers, the Lushais had firearms among them. This confirmed Lister‟s belief 
that the Lushai were „a cross between the Kookees and the Burmese‟, and quoted a 
universally held belief that the Burmese troops who had come to Cachar in 1824 had 
never gone back but had settled in the jungle among the Lushais. The substantial 
manner in which the Lushais built their houses was for him another piece of evidence 
supporting this. 
 
He stayed the night in the village but early next morning he hurriedly returned to 
Cachar after burning the village with its stores of grain and cotton. The Lushais in the 
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neighbourhood had already started building stockades to cut his route back. Lister 
reported that the Lushais were experts in using dah and could quickly construct 
stockades in the most shrewdly calculated position, making best use of the terrain.  
 
In the end, apart from inflicting summary punishment on the village itself, this 
expedition failed to apprehend the chief or the raiders. As a justification of his actions, 
he found an abkaree (the licence to distil or sell spirituous liquor) with the name of a 
man belonging to a village attacked in Sylhet in the previous year: this proved that the 
village Lister had destroyed was that of the offender. Another „gratifying circumstance‟ 
was that 429 captives of the village, mostly Thado Kukis, made their escape from the 
villages dependent on Mura. From this he hoped that the expedition would have 
crippled Mura sufficiently to keep him from another raid for sometime; but he himself 
confessed that the expedition „would have had little real effect on this tribe at large, 
further than shewing that it was possible for us to penetrate their jungle‟.41  
 
Back in Silchar, Lister wrote to the Government that expeditions of such small 
scale, destroying several villages, would not have any effect other than to entice the 
Lushais further, but at the same time, „unless something decisive is done the whole of 
Cachar south of the Barak and probably south of Sylhet will become a desert‟.42 The 
best option, in his view, was to employ troops on permanent duty on the frontier while 
building roads from Cachar with depots along the road. He recommended keeping three 
thousand in all: five hundred to a thousand to keep the road from Cachar open and to 
protect depots, and the rest for carrying on operations in the country. Yet he doubted 
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whether the Government would commit such resources to this frontier, and as a 
temporary measure, he recommended establishing a Kuki Levy, armed with muskets, 
trained and commanded by a European officer, to be placed in stockades at the spots 
where Lushais made frequent inroads.
43
 He also suggested arming the frontier villages 
with condemned muskets to defend themselves against the Lushais.
44
 Of these, the 
Government sanctioned the establishment of a Kuki Levy but no other action was 
taken.
45
  
 
 
b) Southern Frontier 
 
1) Abolition of Slavery and Changes in Arakan 
 
As seen in the last chapter, during the early years of the British administration, the 
Government‟s control over the northern hills of Arakan had only been nominal. Under 
these circumstances, raids between different villages of the Chin people took place 
unchecked by the authorities even within British territory. Phayre recorded one such 
raid in April 1837 by a Kumi chief on the Koladyne River committed against a „Khyen‟ 
village on the Lemro River, both of whom were within British jurisdiction.
46
 He also 
added that it was the last incident in which a tribe within the British border had attacked 
another, implying that from this year British control over the frontier improved.  
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By 1837 the administration in Arakan seems finally to have reached a state of 
stability, as there were no more reports of local rebellions, and a modified revenue 
administration had been introduced to the satisfaction of the Directors in London.
47
 In 
relation to the villages in the hills as well, the Government began printing receipts for 
the taxes from the hill people at around the same time, bringing further control and 
regulation in their management of the frontier.
48
  
 
A more significant change, however, was introduced by the abolition of slavery in 
India. In early 19
th
 century Britain, evangelical revivalism among the middle class had 
joined with the liberal and reformist factions in British politics and had together formed 
a movement against slavery. Spearheaded by the Clapham Sect, which included Zachary 
Macaulay and William Wilberforce, the movement found supporters from all over 
Britain and put pressure on Parliament with a new method of political activity, the 
politics of pressure groups, using such methods as hustings, mass petitions, and 
newspaper campaigns.
49
 In 1807 they succeeded in passing the „Abolition of Slave 
Trade Act‟ but the public was not satisfied with this, and movements for the abolition of 
slavery continued. At the same time, public demands for the reform of Parliament grew 
stronger. In 1832, the Government caved in to this pressure, and when the reformed 
Parliament first sat in 1833 the „Abolition of Slavery Act‟ was passed.50  
 
The triumph of the anti-Slavery legislation in Britain had immediate repercussions 
                                                 
47
 India Revenue Department, no.13, 11 October 1837, para. 41 (OIOC E/4/752). 
48
 „Report on the Progress of Arakan Under the British Rule from 1826 to 1869‟, para. 91. 
49
 Ferguson, Empire, 118; Simon Schama, A History of Britain vol.3: 1776-2000 The Fate of Empire, 
(London: BBC, 2002), 107-8; Rebecca Fraser, A People’s History of Britain, (London: Pimlico, 2004) 
525-32; John Pollock, Wilberforce: God’s Statesman (East Burn: Kingsway, 1977). 
50
 Pollock, Wilberforce; Ferguson, Empire, 116-8. 
  
 226 
in India. The Clapham Sect had close links with the administration of India, since two 
of its prominent members, John Shore and Charles Grant, had been chief advisers to 
Cornwallis, and many members of the Clapham Sect were personal friends of the 
Directors of the Company.
51
 Besides, during the first half of the 19
th
 century, numerous 
societies sprang up in Britain to press for reforms in India, and petitions poured into 
Parliament from all over Britain.
52
  
 
Then, starting from 1830 when the Select Committee of the House of the Lords 
heard the evidence of Indian officials,
53
 Parliament itself began to show concern over 
slavery in India. Moreover, section 85 of the Charter Act of 1833 laid down that „the 
Governor-General in Council shall and is hereby required forthwith to frame Laws and 
Regulations for the extinction of Slavery‟ throughout British Indian territories.54 
 
Eventually, the Indian Government was pushed by Parliament and the Court of 
Directors to show its commitment to the gradual extinction of slavery in India. The 
resulting Act V of 1843 did not abolish slavery in India directly; rather, it mainly made 
it illegal for the British officers to assist the maintenance of slavery. First, it prohibited 
British officers from allowing the sale of slaves for the realisation of revenue arrears or 
any other public demands. Second, it prohibited them from dealing with any cases on 
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behalf of a master against his slaves. Third, all slaves were given right to own properties 
they had acquired. Finally, as a result of the insistence of the Governor-General, any 
acts that would be a penal offence if done to a free person also became punishable if 
done to a slave; therefore, making it impossible for a master to discipline a slave.
55
  
 
Indirect though it may have been, the effect of this Act on the owners of slaves was 
clear: it became virtually impossible for any slave owner to impose servitude on their 
slaves.
56
 Moreover, slavery had already been curtailed even before the proclamation of 
this act. In Bengal, Regulation X. of 1811 was promulgated, in the aftermath of the 
abolition of the slave trade in Britain, to guard against the importation of slaves from 
Assam. For this purpose, it had declared it a criminal offence to „remove slaves‟ from 
territories outside British rule into territories under the British for the purpose of 
trafficking. The wording in this regulation caused a problem when Assam became part 
of British India, since the importation of slaves from Assam into Bengal, both of which 
were now under the British, was not illegal any more. After a series of discussions 
among local officers and secretaries of the Government, it was finally decided to declare 
all sale and purchase of slaves illegal, regardless of where the slaves originated, and 
Regulation III. of 1832 of the Bengal Code was promulgated for the extension of the 
provisions of Regulation X. of 1811.
57
  
 
Then in 1836, as part of the preparation for the „Rules for the Administration of 
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Civil Justice in Assam‟, all the frontier officers were asked to submit their opinions and 
suggestions, regarding the best mode of abolishing slavery. The local officers, even 
though none disputed the general idea of gradual abolition of slavery, could not agree on 
the best mode to put this into practice, and the whole matter was in the end left to the 
process of the general rule being prepared by the central Government.
58
  
 
Slavery in Assam, as all the officers agreed, was of the most benign form, if it 
could be called slavery at all: slaves in Assam were treated better than domestic servants 
in England at the same period, and many of them sold themselves voluntarily as slaves 
during times of exceptional need. In fact, Scott had openly advocated slavery in Assam 
by allowing freemen to sell themselves and parents to sell their children as slaves, and 
he also allowed individuals to fulfil their revenue arrears through the sales of slaves 
during a severe famine in Assam.
59
 When the children were sold as slaves, he 
emphasised, they were in such circumstances that the only way to preserve their lives 
was by selling their liberty.
60
 In a similar vein, Jenkins argued that the immediate 
abolition of slavery would certainly cause serious injustices both to the slaves and their 
owners.
61
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Nevertheless, in the course of these enquiries more than six thousand slaves were 
emancipated by the authorities in Assam.
62
 Besides, Jenkins pointed to the indirect, but 
definite, effect against slavery that had already been done and wrote to the Chief Civil 
Court (Sudder Dewanny Adawlut) in 1837 that:  
I consider that the Government, by withholding a regulation making it 
legal to have recourse to the criminal courts for the apprehension and 
restitution of slaves, have virtually abolished slavery; the means of escape 
from their owners being so great, and the difficulty and expense of recovery 
through the civil court being so great, that no slaves above the age of 
childhood need be detained in bondage except with their own free will.
63
 
 
In Arakan, the local officers went further than those in Assam. The issue of slavery 
in Arakan first came to light through the reports by Jenkins and Pemberton in 1831. 
While praising the efficiency of the „Mugh Levy‟ or Mugh Sebundy Corps, they 
reported that „among the sepoys of the Mug Levy were two Munipoorees, who had been 
sold as slaves while they were in Kachar‟.64 This provoked an immediate reaction from 
the Governor-General who ordered an enquiry into the conditions under which they 
were permitted by their masters to engage in such employment and what proportion, if 
any, of their salary went to the master.
65
  
 
Lieutenant Boscawen, former commander of the Mugh Levy, replied that the 
Manipuris had generally been claimed as slaves by merchants from the neighbourhood 
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of Ramoo, Akyab and other places on the coast. He had been told that the merchants 
had purchased them when young, either from the Burmese, who constantly carried off 
the women and children from villages to sell them as slaves, or from their own parents, 
in times of want and distress. These latter, who had been sold by their parents, were 
Manipuri refugees in Sylhet and Cachar and they stated that there were three to four 
thousand Manipuri slaves in Arakan who became slaves under similar circumstances. 
Lieutenant Boscawen made a compromise with the owners and deducted two three or 
four rupees from the pay of the sepoy until the fixed sum was liquidated.
66
 
 
When further enquiry was made by Lieutenant Boscawen‟s successor, Captain 
Robert Innes Delamain, most of the Manipuris denied being slaves. They told him that 
their parents gave them up to any individual who could feed and clothe them, but 
according to custom they became free to seek other services on reaching a certain age 
and paid a portion of their pay to those who had „supported them in early life‟.67 This 
change is likely to have been caused by the fear that they would be removed from the 
service. When another enquiry was made a month later, none of them admitted to 
sending a portion of their salary to their former masters, fearing that they might be 
discharged from the service, and only five admitted to being in a state of bondage and 
they did so „under some difficulty on the part of the commanding officer‟. They were all 
known to have become totally naturalised to the Arakanese culture and did not wish to 
return to Manipur where they would be regarded as having lost their caste.
 68
 
                                                 
66
 Letter from Lt. H. A. Boscawen, Commanding Mugh Sebundy Corps, to Swinton, Chief Secretary 
to the Government of India, 14 October 1831, para. 1-6 (House of Commons, „Correspondence‟, 54). 
67
 Letter from Captain Robert Innes Delamain, in charge of the Mugh corps, to the Commissioner of 
Arakan, 16 September 1831; Letter from N. J. Halhed, Commissioner of Arakan, to Swinton, Chief 
Secretary to the Government of India. (House of Commons, „Correspondence‟, 55-7). 
68
 Letter from Halhed to Swinton, 31 October, 1831 para.6 („Correspondence on Slavery in India 
1838‟, 59-61); Letter from Captain Robert Innes Delamain to N. J. Halhed, Commissioner of Chittagong, 
  
 231 
 
The Governor-General was satisfied and reported to the Court of Directors that 
these individuals could not be considered to be slaves, and no private rights were 
infringed by retaining them in the service.
69
 The Directors, however, ordered a full 
enquiry into the nature of slavery in Arakan.
70
 In the meantime there had already been 
communications on the subject of slavery between the Commissioner of Arakan, Mr. H. 
Walters and the officers in Arakan in 1833. Mr. Walters specifically asked for their 
opinions regarding two measures he suggested for the mitigation of slavery in Arakan. 
First, in line with Regulation X 1811 of the Bengal Code, he proposed to prohibit the 
sale and purchase of slaves imported from other districts and countries. Second, he 
proposed to release any persons from their bondage as slaves if they made a petition to 
the Criminal Court, while any person illegally restraining them would render himself 
liable to punishment.
71
  
 
Captain Dickinson, the Superintendent of Arakan, was worried that such measures 
would create a considerable sensation among the more influential classes,
72
 but Captain 
White, Assistant Superintendent at Sandoway, disagreed with Captain Dickinson and 
wrote that „slavery or domestic slavery throughout this province might be entirely 
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checked by the enforcement‟ of the two measures suggested by the Commissioner.73 Mr. 
Walter concurred with White and ordered the Superintendent to declare all slaves and 
bondsmen free, if he thought he could do so with safety. According to Captain Boggle, 
who became the Commissioner of Arakan in 1837, this proclamation occasioned 
considerable dissatisfaction, but no disturbance was created. Some petitions from 
former slave owners were presented to Boggle, but he discouraged the petitioners, 
fearing the encouragement of similar cases.
74
  
 
The changing ethos of an empire seeking to improve the living conditions of its 
people was bound to cause a deeper intervention into the lives of the people than any of 
the routine bureaucracy of the administration. Moreover, when such action was taken 
without a close understanding of the context, it inevitably resulted in unforeseen 
difficulties for the people. 
 
The abolition of slavery in Arakan affected debt-slaves as well as slaves captured 
during raids and sold. As Lewin later observed, the custom of debtor-slaves was in fact 
a form of labour-sharing which benefited less fortunate people who could choose to 
serve as menial servants until the debt was paid or cancelled.
75
 Similarly, Buchanan had 
commented that this institution was „a more rational way of treating debtors than that 
prescribed by the Law of England‟.76 Besides, such arrangements were used by hill 
                                                 
73
 Letter from Captain M. G. White, Assistant Superintendent Sandoway, to H .Walters [reply to the 
circular by Walters], 1 October 1833, para.2 (House of Commons, „Report of Indian Law Commissioners‟, 
653). 
74
 Evidence no. 35, Captain Bogle, Commissioner of Arracan (House of Commons, „Report of Indian 
Law Commissioners‟, 485-6). 
75
 Lewin, Wild Races, 85. 
76
 Van Schendel, Francis Buchanan, 90 (18 April 1798). 
  
 233 
chiefs who could borrow labour in return for the services that a chief could perform for 
the individual or the village. As a result of indiscriminate emancipation of slaves such 
customs were shaken to their roots. The poor among the hill people then became an easy 
prey to money-lenders who, knowing that the hill people understood little of the law or 
the language of the courts, expounded the law to their own advantage. Besides, the hill 
people could no longer seek assistance from their chiefs, and with the demise of the 
chiefs‟ authority on labour, collective works could not be carried out at all, and when the 
government wanted to cut a road, they had to import labourers from other districts.
77
  
 
On the other hand, the hill people from outside British jurisdiction continued to 
attack villages and take people for ransom or for trade as slaves. One such case came to 
the notice of the British authorities in 1835. Two men were held in a jail in Arakan, 
sentenced to seven years with labour in irons, for purchasing two slave girls in 
Chittagong. The officers in Arakan, upon enquiry, found out that these two women had 
been captured from a hill village in Arakan during a dacoit raid in which four men and 
nine women had been killed and twenty females had been carried off as slaves.
78
 One of 
the men lodged a petition to the Chief Criminal Court (Sudder Nizamut Adawlat) 
pleading ignorance of the circumstances in which these two women became slaves and 
T. C. Robertson, who was then a Judge in the Chief Criminal Court, decided the case in 
favour of the petitioners, as the proceedings of the trial appeared to have been very 
irregular. Also, in view of the prevalence of slavery in Chittagong, Robertson ordered 
them to be released immediately as the period they had served in jail was enough for 
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their guilt of purchasing without knowledge of the circumstances.
79
 
 
Thus, within British jurisdiction, even benign forms of slavery were abolished and 
those who purchased slaves were jailed, but the British officers could not protect their 
own taxpayers from being taken and sold as slaves. Phayre mentions one anecdote in 
which a „Khyeng‟ chief whose slaves had been freed had to till the field by himself, 
which he had not done for so many years that he lost one of his fingers, and showed this 
mutilated finger to Phayre as a protest.
80
 The pressure therefore became greater on the 
British officers to protect the people under their rule against marauders. 
 
 
 
2) Expeditions in Arakan 
 
The first expedition sent by the Company against a group of Chin people in Arakan 
was in this context: to retrieve people who had been taken as slaves. In October 1838, a 
chief of „Lung-khes‟ attacked a village of a Kumi chief named Hleng-kreing on the 
Koladyne. Between thirty and forty people were killed, and thirty-eight women and 
children were taken as slaves. The Government immediately sent eighty sepoys led by a 
havildar on a punitive mission, but when the troops arrived at the site of the village, the 
villagers had fled into the depth of the hills together with their captives. Later 
intelligence confirmed that these slaves had been sold to a hill chief in the Chittagong 
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Hill tracts. Upon this, Phayre requested the Magistrate of Chittagong for help and thirty 
three slaves were recovered from Chittagong: of the other five, two were killed during 
the retreat and three sold to the „Shendus‟ living further inland.81 
 
Shortly after the recovery of the slaves, Leng-Khung, the chief who was 
responsible for the raids, and his brother came to Phayre in order, according to Phayre, 
to „answer for their crimes‟. Nevertheless, no punishment was meted out to these two, 
who boasted of the success of their attack. As in the case of the raids in the northern 
frontier, he justified the attack as a revenge for former maltreatment.
82
 Soon after this 
meeting, however, Leng-kung was killed in an attack by another group and his people 
dispersed among other groups.
83
 Whatever had been arranged between Leng-Kung and 
Phayre in the first recorded meeting between a Kuki-Chin chief and a British officer 
was thus nullified. 
 
Raids continued to disturb the northern hills of Arakan, and another expedition was 
sent against a section of Kumi named „Waklaings‟(or „Walleng‟ as spelt by Fytche) in 
1842. Phayre and Fytche directed this expedition, and it was the first time that European 
officers accompanied an excursion into the Kuki-Chin Hills.
84
 The progress of this 
expedition is described in Fytche‟s memoir of Burma published later in 1878.85 The 
troops, consisting of 80 men of the Arakan Local Battalion accompanied by Kumi 
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guides, left Akyab on the 10
th
 of January 1847. Soon after their departure they were 
caught up in heavy rains, which interrupted their journey up the Koladyne, and after 12 
days of struggle up the swollen stream, they gave up the original plan of wading 
through the river and decided to take a more difficult route over the hills. After two 
days‟ march through the jungle, they confronted some Walleng fighters who hurled 
down „numerous masses of rock, trunks of trees, and other missiles‟ as well as 
occasional volleys of muskets. The Walleng fighters were so well hidden that the British 
troops could not see any of them: the only clue for their position was the smoke from 
the guns. Fytche ordered the troops to detour from the main road and the Kumi guides 
proved most helpful in this as they skilfully cut through the bamboo jungle with their 
dahs. When they finally reached the village, the Wallengs had already evacuated to the 
summit of a hill, where the troops could not follow. All that the British troops could do 
was to burn the site of the village and return. This only emphasised the difficulties of an 
expedition through the hills.
86
 
 
In 1846, Phayre planned another expedition against an Anu Kumi village on the 
Koladyne that had attacked Mru villages in Arakan and in Chittagong. Lieutenant 
Hopkinson carried out this plan in the following year.
87
 Hopkinson‟s expedition, which 
left Akyab in December 1847, consisted of fifty sepoys with native officers, with 
musketeers and burkundazees. After a seven-day boat trip up the Koladyne, the troops 
started an arduous march over the hills: though streams, stumbling over the boulders 
and leaping down a „frightful precipice‟. The guides, people from the Mru villages that 
had been attacked, themselves got lost several times. After two days‟ march in such 
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conditions they finally located the village of the Anu Kumis named Akhoung on 
Christmas day.
88
  
 
Until musket shots were fired upon the troops Lieutenant Hopkinson did not 
believe that they had found the village itself. Most of the resistance came from „block 
houses‟ built on top of tall trees overlooking a deep valley, connected by a bamboo 
suspension bridge. On the approach of the troops the women and children were ushered 
into these structures with a few fighting men as escorts who kept firing on the troops. 
Others hid themselves on the hillsides and fired on the British troops. When the troops 
entered the village, Hopkinson ordered his men to fire into the block houses and during 
the skirmishes he captured a „six to seven year old boy‟ being „aware of the importance 
of any capture‟. This boy proved to be a son of the headman of the village and just 
before sunset two headmen of this village came up to make a peaceful settlement. 
 
A ceremony of oath took place, in which these headmen pledged entire submission 
to the Company: to pay tribute and to become dutiful and obedient subjects. On the 
British side there were three casualties – one dead and two injured – and fourteen on the 
side of Kumis, including seven deaths and two mortally wounded. Afterwards 
Hopkinson had leisure to inspect the defences of the village, which, he remarked, „four 
resolute men might have maintained against a whole battalion‟: his success was 
attributed to good fortune, and the surprise with which the attack was carried out.
89
  
 
On the next day Hopkinson began a tour of the other Anu villages in the vicinity 
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accompanied by the chief of the village he had just brought under submission. In one 
sweeping march, he visited three Anu villages and received tokens of submission. 
Nevertheless, by the time the troops started for home, the sepoys were already showing 
signs of extreme fatigue: „unable to carry their muskets, walking lamely with a stick, 
and so on.‟90 More than half the original number was found to be incapacitated, and the 
entire troop had to halt to recover in the middle of their return journey. During this halt, 
a deputation arrived from the „Khons‟, through whose land had lain the route to the 
Shendu, and who were known to be second only to the Shendu in power and influence. 
The chief of this people expressed his wish to place himself under British protection and 
settle within the British frontier on the bank of the Koladyne. Hopkinson reported this 
as a more important event than the submission of the Anu, because the Anu were „but 
feudatories of the Khons‟.91  
 
Such vivid descriptions of the difficulties of expeditions into the hills provided by 
Fytche and Hopkinson excited more alarm than praise in Calcutta. After receiving 
Hopkinson‟s report, the Commissioner of Arakan commented on the unconquerable 
nature of the hills and the Governor-General pointed out the folly of punitive 
expeditions.
92
 As in the northern frontier, after the failure of these expeditions in the 
1840s, the Government‟s policy became even more firmly against further expeditions. 
The situation remained the same as before: the frontier area was left unprotected with no 
finite boundary of the authority of the British Government. As Hopkinson summarised 
later in 1856, along the Koladyne, and as one moved further north, there were first 
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Kumis acknowledging British rule, then Kumis who had thrown off their allegiance or 
never sought any alliance with the British, and finally those unknown people for whom 
the name „Shendu‟ became familiar to the British.93 
 
While succeeding in approaching those near the Shendus, the expeditions failed to 
make any impression on the Shendus, who were by this time known as the powerful 
people behind all the raids in Arakan and Chittagong. Raids continued on the Arakan, 
and, to the embarrassment of the government, a sepoy from the Arakan Local Battalion 
was kidnapped in 1850, and the Government had to issue sanction for reimbursement of 
the 150 rupees paid by Fytche for the ransom.
94
 Again in 1855 the Government paid 
another ransom of 190 rupees to a Shendu chief to retrieve captives.
95
  
 
In the meantime, the situation in the Chittagong Hills also became unstable. During 
the 1830s the country of the Phru was undergoing a period of political chaos similar to 
that of Manipur. After the death of Satung Phru (or „Sa-du Phru‟ the eldest son of 
Kaung-la Phru mentioned in Buchanan
96
) the Marma country of the Pru family was 
made over to Om Phru, a brother of Satung Pru. During Om Pru‟s rule the Pru family 
disintegrated, and conflicts for supremacy ensued among members of the family with 
different villages of Phru families raiding each other, assisted by other hill people. As 
Mackenzie surmised, the raids by Mrungs, Kumis or Bonjugis on Pru villages in the 
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1830s were in fact part of these family feuds.
97
 
 
Such a crisis on the frontier threatened the villages in the foothills as well, but 
action from the government did not come swiftly. The Government preferred a stable 
Marma polity under one leader who would voluntarily take up the defence of this 
frontier. Interference was not even contemplated until the second half of the 1840s. In 
1846, however, new troubles began in the hills when Om Phru died and his son 
Komalagnio Phru succeeded him. As the incursions of the hill people increased, the 
Government requested information regarding the defence of his people from 
Komalagnio. In reply, he informed the Government of the existence of a line of 
stockades constructed by his predecessor, which he was willing to repair and maintain 
with the help of the Government. The Magistrate of Chittagong, Henry Ricketts, agreed 
to this and recommended a remission of 1,000 rupees to provide for „the defence of his 
own estate‟. At this, the Government directed the Magistrate of Chittagong to make 
enquiries into the whole subject of the defence of the eastern frontier of Chittagong.
98
 
 
The report by Henry Ricketts came in 1848. First of all, he recommended 
upholding Komalagnio as the chief among his people, regardless of his actual influence 
over them: in his own words, „we [the British Indian Government] must manage 
through him or not at all‟. Other than through the Phrus, he could see no way of 
managing these inaccessible territories and it would be far easier if the Phrus were under 
one chief. For this purpose, he suggested strengthening Komalagnio to stop the family 
feuds among the Phrus and insisting that the chieftainship become „an impartible 
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heritage‟. This, he recommended, should be accompanied by clarification of the position 
of his territories within the judicial and administrative system of British India, and by 
demarcation of the boundary between his territory and that under the British. 
Additionally, as the Government was transferring its duty of defence to its subject, he 
argued, a remission of Rs. 1,645 from the revenue should be made to cover the cost of 
that defence. The Government sanctioned those recommendations on the defence and 
the remission, but other points were left unheeded.
99
  
 
This, however, did not have much effect in stabilising the frontier. From the 
information supplied by officers in Arakan, it was obvious that the problems in both 
places were related, since raiders moved freely between the provinces attacking both 
sides and retreating out of the British reach; but after the failure of the expeditions in 
Arakan, the officers on both sides of the frontier were at their wits‟ end as to how to deal 
with the situation. Every now and then, local officers suggested measures such as the 
demarcation of a boundary, another punitive expedition into the heart of Shendu country, 
or the establishment of a line of defensive posts garrisoned by the „Mugh battalion‟ in 
Arakan and the „Jumeea police‟ in Chittagong, under hill chiefs.100 The Government‟s 
opinion, on the other hand, was clarified in a review of policy regarding the Chittagong 
frontier made in 1854. First of all, matching force for force was rejected, as it would 
only be „fatal to the forces‟. Second, the demarcation of a boundary between the settled 
part and the „joom tract‟ of Chittagong, and rendering only the settled part under 
Government responsibility, was rejected on the ground that the „joom tract‟ had always 
been „a part of the British dominion‟ and the responsibility of the government could not 
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be shaken off. In addition, the expenses and difficulties involved in the operation of 
laying down the boundary made it impracticable. Third, separating the hill tracts from 
the settled district and from the operation of the civil and criminal regulations was 
opposed because of the abnormality of having two regulations in one district and also 
the same difficulties of demarcating the boundary. Fourth, opening up communication 
with the Shendus from Arakan and subsidising the chiefs to refrain from raids was also 
suggested, much in line with the policy of blackmailing, but was not regarded as a 
reliable method. In the end the only policy that received government‟s favour was the 
same as Mr. Ricketts‟ settlements in 1848: strengthen the paramount chiefs of the 
Chakma and the Phru, arm them with muskets and „manage‟ the country indirectly 
through them.
101
  
 
 
2. British Knowledge of the Kuki-Chin People 
 
a) Kuki-Chin Categories 
 
By coincidence, in both the northern and southern Kuki-Chin frontiers, there were 
expeditions against the Kuki-Chin people in the 1840s. In both cases, these expeditions 
were possible through the help of the Kuki-Chin people, who guided the troops to the 
villages of the offenders. In this sense, the British ignorance of the geography of the 
frontier was compensated for by the existence of the Kuki-Chin people who were 
friendly to the British Indian Government, which in itself was a result of the 
consolidation of administration in the plains. These expeditions all failed to guarantee 
the security of the frontier, but they were not totally without their fruits; at least, the 
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frontier authorities now had a better idea of the people they were facing in the hills. In 
fact, one of the priorities of an expedition was to discover the identity of the offender, 
and through these enquiries the frontier officer became aware of the names of peoples 
and chiefs, their locations, and their political relationships. 
 
Besides, on the northern Kuki-Chin frontier, with the influx of more Kuki people 
into the administered area, new categories of the Kuki were identified, such as Thado, 
Changsen, Rankul, Cheelu, Tewtang and Lushai.
102
 These categories were, without 
exception, regarded as sub-groups of the Kuki. The practise of suffixing them with 
„Kuki‟ in the documents demonstrates this. Even the term „Lushai‟ was linked to the 
Kuki as „Loosai tribe of Kookies‟103, or „Luchye Kukis‟104.  
 
In this manner all these names were related to each other by being related to the 
term „Kuki‟. Any attempt to find what kind of affinity is represented by the term „Kuki‟ 
is impossible, precisely due to this: because, as a term given by outsiders, the limits of 
the term „Kuki‟ at this period depends not on the people meant by the term but on the 
people who use this term, and the different individuals used it with different extensions. 
Yet the frontier officers found it a more convenient term with which to designate the 
people rather than having to explain each and every group of whom they hardly knew 
anything. Besides, the vagueness of the term „Kuki‟ also meant that the term could be 
applied to others without causing much contradiction. In this manner, the word Kuki 
became an umbrella term for all these categories or, in other words, it was given a status 
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of a higher category over the others, which were regarded as sub-categories of „Kuki‟. 
 
„Lushai‟ was also a name given to the people by others. This term first appeared in 
documents in the context of the movement of the Kuki people, who themselves pointed 
to a people called Lushai as a stronger people from whom they were fleeing. Therefore, 
as in the case of Kuki, this name could not have been co-extensive with a real unit of 
people in any sense – political, linguistic, cultural or ethnological – but it described, 
from the outsiders‟ point of view, a general, stereotyped image of „enemies‟. This 
indeed was the same image the British officers developed in their subsequent 
relationship with the Lushai: that they are a group of powerful enemies. 
 
One notable fact about the category „Lushai‟ is that over a relatively short period of 
time it became the most prominent subject of official correspondence from the northern 
Kuki-Chin frontier. As a result, by the time Lister came back from his expedition, 
„Lushai‟ became familiar enough not to need „Kuki‟ attached to it. In other words, the 
term „Lushai‟ began to break out of the umbrella of the term „Kuki‟ and become an 
independent term. Lister‟s observation of the Lushais, that they are „a cross between the 
Kukis and Burmese‟, assisted the tendency to regard them as a separate people from the 
Kukis. In this, he did not mean the existence of intermarriage but that they were more 
powerful than the Kukis, that they were more sedentary with more permanent 
settlements and better organised in political and military terms with better equipment 
including fire-arms. Therefore, in the differentiation of Lushai from Kukis, the 
stereotype of them as being a „powerful tribe‟ played a major role. 
 
The situation on the Arakan and Chittagong frontier was different from that in the 
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northern Kuki-Chin frontier. „Khyen‟, which had been the most noted term, if not the 
umbrella term, for the hill people north of Arakan during the early days of annexation 
up to the 1830s, was not even mentioned in relation to the events in the 1840s. The 
difference in the location of the people seems to have affected this. In fact, the category 
„Khyen‟ in Arakan was applied for those hill people near Burma – on the Aeng Pass or 
towards the source of Talak – while „Mru‟ and „Kumi‟ were used for the people towards 
Chittagong near the source of Koladyne to the north. With the withdrawal of the district 
headquarters from Aeng in 1837, the British administration also seems to have 
withdrawn their interest on this tract and no more mention can be found in the British 
documents about the „Khyen‟ during the 1840s.  
 
On the other hand, „Kumi‟ and „Mru‟ were the categories that appeared most 
frequently in relation to raids. Some sub-categories of the „Kumi‟ were also found such 
as „Waklaing‟ and „Anu‟. Yet in Arakan and Chittagong, there was no one single name 
that was used as a generic term, like the term „Kuki‟ in the north. Rather, names such as 
Kumis, Mrus, Khyen, Khons, Lung-khes, Bonjugi were used as equally generic terms 
without any suggestion of hierarchy among them. There was no incidence when a Mru 
or Kumi group was referred to as „Mru-Khyen‟ or „Kumi-Kheyn‟, nor were they related 
to „Kuki‟ in the way that it happened in the north, in such construction as „Thado Kuki‟. 
The words „Mru‟, and „Kumi‟ were both names given by the people to themselves, from 
the word meaning „man‟ in their own languages. It is therefore likely that closer 
interaction between these people and those in the plains resulted in the adoption of these 
categories by the people of Arakan and Chittagong, and subsequently by the British 
officers. 
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Apart from the administrative reports, there were three articles in the Journal of the 
Asiatic Society of Bengal during this period that contained descriptions of the Kuki-
Chin people.
105
 All of these referred to powerful people deep in the hills of Arakan and 
Chittagong: the Shendu or the „Bonjogi‟. Phayre‟s article provides the most complete 
view of the ethnic categories in Arakan, listing „Khyoung-tha, Kúmé or Kwé-mé, 
Khyeng, Doing-núk, Mroong and other tribes‟ as the „hill tribes‟ of Arakan.106 In the 
later part of his article he provides a detailed description of a tribe called „Lung-khe‟, 
based on the testimony of Leng-Kung, the chief who had visited him. Lung-khe, Phayre 
wrote, was the name given to the tribe by the Kumi and Arakanese, but they were also 
called „Boung-ju‟ and „Bound-jwe‟, which is apparently the Bawm-zo or „Bonjugi‟. 
Phayre‟s conclusion, however, was that „Lung-khes‟ and „Boung-ju‟ had been separate 
people but were conquered and reduced to slavery by a third, or „Shindu‟. Leng-Kung, 
the chief of „Lung-khes‟ told Phayre that he was from one of the clans of Shindu and 
had conquered the Lung-khes whom he called „slaves‟ of his family. Therefore, though 
the people were still called „Lung-khes‟ by the Kumis, they were in fact ruled by a small 
number of Shendu conquerors. 
 
Leng-Kung himself did not use any generic terms but „Que-sak‟, meaning „upper 
people‟, to describe those that Phayre called Shendu. The word „Que-sak‟ here appears 
as the same word as „Kachak‟ used for the Lushai by the Thadoe Kukis, both of which 
designate „others from further inland‟ without specifying a particular entity. According 
to Phayre, „Shindu‟ or more properly „Tsen-du‟ was the Kumi corruption of what he 
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wrote as „Hlaing-ji-u, Hlaing-chou, Hling-ju, and Hleng-tchyo‟, which was simply the 
name of a clan among twelve others of the same nation mentioned by Leng-kung:  
  1. Tjin-dza   7.  M‟lhul  
  2. Za-tang   8.  Tinglhoul  
  3. Keng-lot   9.  Ti-a-dai  
  4. Lhon-shin   10. Rul-bu  
  5. Til-teng  11. Boi-kheng  
  6. Rwol-lweng  12. Chung-ngla  
      13. Hlaing-ju
107
 
 
Most of the names in the above list seem to have been forgotten in history, but the 
description of the Shendu lands found in the article suggests a link between the Shendu 
and the Lai-Chins: they were known to have horses; build substantial houses in timber; 
and, more crucially, to trade with „Yan‟,108 which can be none other than a misspelling 
of „Yau‟ or „Yaw‟ in Burma. 
 
Another article regarding the Shendu people by Captain S. R. Tickell
109
 supports 
the liaison between Shendu and the Lai Chin even further. This article was occasioned 
by a visit of two men - a chief named „Lebbey‟ and his follower -, from the people 
called Shendu who came as „emissaries or spies‟ to a hill village of Arakan in 1850. The 
visiting party identified themselves as „Heumá‟, which was a part of the „nation‟ of the 
Shendu. Lebbey told Tickell the following names as „the others of his nation‟: 
 1. Bookee (Lebbey) 6.  Yanglyng (Khenoung) 
 2. Thubbau (Tynkho and Wantlye) 7.  Hoothe (Kheachoo) 
 3. Lalyang (Tawho) 8.  Mowtoo (Gebbo) 
 4. Tumboo (Khooloung) 9.  Tantlang (Whuhnyn) 
 5. Roongfe (Shíko) 10. Hekká (J‟hachow) 110 
                                                 
107
 Ibid., 710. 
108
 Ibid., 709-711. 
109
 Captain S.R. Tickell, „Notes on the Heumá or “Shendoos.” A tribe inhabiting the hills North of 
Arracan‟, JASB, vol.21, no.3 (1852): 207-13. 
110
 Tickell, „Notes on the Heumá‟, 208 (names of chiefs are in brackets). 
  
 248 
 
„Bookee‟ was the nearest village to the British frontier, where the informants came 
from. From here the above names of villages were stated in geographic order from the 
one nearest to Arakan to the farthest in the north-east. The last three names of the 
villages mentioned by Tickell, i.e. Mowtoo, Tantlang, and Hekká, correspond with Matu, 
Thlantlang and Hakka of the current Chin State in their pronunciation as well as 
geographic locations. Beyond this last village was the Yo country of Burma. Lebbey 
himself told Tickell that he had only travelled so far as Mowtoo but gave a description 
of Hekká from what he had heard
111
, which was identical to the description of the 
„Shindu lands‟ by Leng-Kung.  
 
More conclusive evidence is the sketch of Lebbey that accompanies the article (see 
Illustration 1 on the next page). In this picture Lebbey is depicted as holding a spear and 
a shield of the sort commonly found among the Haka Chin chiefs; wearing a blanket, 
tied on his left shoulder to make a cross in front of him as was the custom when they 
were travelling; and, most important of all, wearing a headdress peculiar to the Lai 
people of the Haka area. These are the unmistakable marks of a Lai Chin chief. 
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Illustration 1. Lebbey, the ‘Abéu’ or Chief of the Bookee Clan of the Heumá or Shendu 
(from Tickell, ‘Notes’) 
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Parry wrote that the term „Lakher‟ was the Lushai term for the „Măras‟ and that the 
Arakanese also called the same group „Shendu‟, though in the latter sense it included 
„all the Hakas‟.112 According to Bareights, the oral tradition among the „Lautu‟, another 
group of the Lai Chin, tells of „others‟ who had occupied the current site of the Lautu 
but moved southwards at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Among these were a 
chief named Tanku who ruled over a village named Taungbu and Bareights identifies 
both of these names as „Tynkho‟ and „Thubbau‟ in the above list given to Tickell. 
Furthermore, this village was said to have been two days journey away from another 
village named „Heuma‟. The villagers of Heuma then moved further towards the west 
and others occupied this village and changed the name to „Mala‟.113 This word „Mala‟ is 
later taken to be the name of the „Lakhers‟ or „Mara‟. 
 
Summing up all these explanations, it could be conjectured that a certain group of 
people, who were somewhat related to each other, moved from the current Chin State 
towards the Arakan-Chittagong frontier. There does not appear to have been one name 
that the people themselves used, but they were named „Shendu‟ by the hill people in 
Arakan, possibly a corruption of the name of a village, which term was adopted by the 
British. The term „Lakher‟ seems to have been a Burmese corruption of the name of a 
chief or a section of the people called „Lung-khe‟, which was in fact a people conquered 
by those called „Shendu‟. From Lung-khe the Bengali corruption „Lunctas‟ originated 
and from another name of the conquered people „Bawm-zo‟, another Bengali corruption 
„Bonjogi‟ originated, which was then adopted by British officers in Chittagong. The 
term „Mara‟ also seems to have originated from a section of this people. While there are 
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certain grounds for believing that all these terms were used to denote those who had 
some affinity with the Lai group of Chin people, any efforts to identify these terms with 
any actual groups and equate them to the groups as we know them now seems futile, 
since all these terms were used in such a confused manner by different people in the 19
th
 
century.  
 
Nevertheless, the term „Shendu‟ was used as a definite stereotype, if not with 
definite extension, by the British officers – that of rapine and plunder. In this sense, it 
was similar to „Lushai‟ in the north: they were used to denote whoever came from a 
certain unknown position and were dreaded for their raiding propensity. Despite the 
inaccuracy of the terms, by the end of the 1840s, they came to be assumed as names of 
definite groups by the British officers. What the administrators needed was, in fact, any 
term that can name a situation conveniently: the complicated reality was not the main 
interest for them when they were reporting on subjects such as raids. 
 
 
b) The Movement of the Kuki-Chin People 
 
Apart from the fact that they were names given by outsiders, such terms as „Kuki‟, 
„Lushai‟ and „Shendu‟ were prone to lead to problematic conclusions when they were 
regarded as the names of „tribes‟. This was related to the „multi-ethnic arrangement‟ of 
villages and the British administrators who had a deeper knowledge of the Kuki-Chin 
people, Lewin and Edgar, pointed to the folly of regarding these categories as the names 
of separate groups. 
 
Lewin rejected using such words as „tribe‟ or „clan‟ to describe various 
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denominations of the Kuki-Chin people because the similarity of manners, customs, and 
religion suggested by the word „tribe‟, and of common ancestors suggested by the word 
„clan‟, did not exist among the Kuki-Chin people. Rather, he observed: 
They seem to recognize some sort of division of race or blood among 
themselves; but in one village you will find eight or ten different „castes‟: one 
man will say „I am a Puntey‟, another, „I am a Poitoo‟, a third will be a 
Lushai; all these different „castes‟ have individually special peculiarities of 
language and custom which render them easily recognizable among 
themselves. It does not, however, seem to follow that a village should be 
composed wholly of Poitoos of Rang, Tehaks, or indeed of any one caste; they 
are all mixed up together.
114
 
 
Edgar also pointed to similar situations: the people in the village of a Thado chief 
in Cachar were in fact the same as those under a Poitoo chief in Sylhet or under a 
Lushai chief in Tripura. The people from Lushai villages constantly came and settled in 
villages within the British jurisdiction and people from British territory from time to 
time joined the Lushai chiefs; moreover, at times whole villages, with their chiefs, 
moved in and out of British jurisdiction.
 115
 
 
Such a situation had already been noted by some of the frontier officers during the 
1840s. Thus, Lister observed that the Lushai were not one but a „set of people consisting 
of Lushais, Chilings, and Gattaes‟ collectively called Lushais and their fighting force 
consisted of Lushais, Burmese, as well as „refugees and outlaws from Manipur and our 
own frontier‟.116 Similarly, Phayre had noted that the people of Leng Kung, though 
under a Shendu chief, consisted of Lankhes or Lakhers. The whole truth of the process 
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leading to the emergence of such mixed polities is not available from the British 
documents, but what is implied in all these cases is the existence of a constant war of 
conquest among the Kuki-Chin people. Lewin wrote of the politics of the Kuki as 
follows: 
Certain families among them are recognized as pre-eminent, and from these 
families only chiefs appear to be chosen. Whether a man shall be powerful or 
an insignificant leader rests with himself. If a powerful chief has able sons, 
family ties keep them together, and each son, as he sets up a village of his 
own, adds to the joint power of the family.
117
 
 
This was the state of things in the northern Kuki-Chin frontier area. The Sailo 
family of the Lushais became prominent in the early 19
th
 century and began to expand, 
conquering and driving other Kukis into the British districts of Sylhet and Cachar. In the 
case of such political expansion of a family of chiefs, the conquered and the conquering 
usually came to constitute one village. A part of the conquered people may have moved 
out of their original place together with their own chiefs but an entire people seldom 
migrated en bloc chased by their enemies. Edgar described this situation as below: 
When one Chief became more powerful than any of his rivals, the latter used 
to move up into Cachar, taking with them as many of their people as remained 
faithful: but the majority of the clan generally went over to the village of the 
stronger Chief. It was just as if in a feud between the Campbells and the 
Mcgregors, the former had proved better men and had driven the Macgregor 
chief, with some of his clan, to take refuge in the lowlands; the Campbells 
taking all the clan lands and inducing the greater number of Macgregors to 
remain on them and acknowledge the head of the Campbells as their chief.
118
  
 
Thus, the Lushai raids of the late 40s were not just for head-hunting or taking 
slaves: they were wars of conquest, and in a Lushai conquest the conquered soon came 
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into the fold of the Lushais. The 429 Thado „captives‟ who had made their escape from 
the villages dependent on Mura‟s village during Lister‟s expedition were more likely to 
have been such remnants of the former chief who took the opportunity of the 
destruction of his main village to make a belated escape into Cachar, rather than people 
taken from their village during the raids. 
 
This situation provided the basis for what is often called „the northward movement 
of the Kuki-Chin people‟. Carey and Tuck provide one of the examples. Discussing the 
affinity among the Chin, Kuki and Lushai, they conjectured, „without any pretension to 
authority‟, that these people lived as one people in Tibet before they moved south into 
Burma; then they added: 
As far as the Chins are concerned, we know from our own experience, as well 
as from the records of Manipur, that the drift of migration has changed and is 
now towards the north. The Nwitè, Vaipé, and Yo Chins, who within the 
memory of man resided in the Northern Chin Hills, have now almost entirely 
recrossed the northern border, either into the hills belonging to Manipur or to 
the south of Cachar, and their old village sites are now being occupied by the 
Kanhow clan of Sokte Chins, which also is steadily moving northwards.
119
 
 
What is neglected in the above statement is that the movement of the people was 
not, as implied by the authors of the above passage, an en bloc migration describable as 
the „drift of migration‟. Moreover, there are evidences that such movements happened 
towards the south and south-west as well. Leng-Kung provided an obvious example of 
such conquest and Phayre wrote that the Kumi tribes represented themselves as being 
driven further south each succeeding year by „fiercer tribes beyond them‟.120 This was 
repeated in a note Phayre supplied to Hodgson which was published in 1853, in which 
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Phayre wrote that the Kumis had driven Mrus, and „were themselves pressed forward in 
a westerly and southerly direction by Khyengs and other powerful tribes‟.121 Tickell 
described the „Heumá‟ as being at war with a tribe in the north east and east with a 
people who were said to have „their legs tattooed like the Burmese‟, who were probably 
Lushais with Burmese musketeers as reported by Lister.
122
 Rev. Barbe, in his article 
regarding the „Banjogi‟ or the Bawm-zo wrote that they were being pressed by the 
Kukis who, being stronger and more numerous, subjected the Bawm-zo to their yoke.
123
 
Bareights concludes from oral tradition and British records during the colonial period, 
that „it is certain that Khumi and Mru of Chittagong and Arakan Hills lived in the hills 
peopled by Lakhers and Lautu at present‟.124 
 
The reason why the northward movement has been better noticed than the 
southward or south-westward movement seems to be related to the different conditions 
of the boundaries at the two ends of the Kuki-Chin frontier. As the boundary was better 
demarcated and therefore more exposed in the northern frontier, the movement was 
more likely to have been noted by the British authorities than in the south, where such 
movements would have been absorbed by the existing hill chiefs through whom the 
British dealt with the frontier indirectly. Carey and Tuck were not able to grasp this 
situation as they had „knocked out‟ the narratives regarding Arakan125 because Arakan 
was not related to the British conquest of the Chin Hills in the 1890s which was the 
topic of their work. 
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Behind each of these movements was a stronger group. Every group told of 
stronger people pressing them from behind: Kukis moving into Cachar alluded to the 
Lushais; Kumis were pressed by Shendus; Chakmas and Marma in the Chittagong Hills 
alluded to a powerful people called the Bonjugis while the Bonjugis were also pressed 
by other Kukis from the north; Heumás by those from north and north east; even Lushai 
themselves told Lister about a more powerful tribe call „Poi‟ to the south who exacted 
tribute from the Lushais.
126
 In another interesting coincidence, those powerful others 
such as the Shendu and the Poi were invariably represented as having trade relationships 
with Burma, or more specifically „Yaw country‟. From this, it appears that a certain 
development had taken place that strengthened those around the central Chin Hills, the 
traditional centre of the Lai, resulting in the expansion of certain families of chiefs 
outwards. The likely reason, from the evidence of documents, is the acquisition of 
firearms. 
 
When the British first annexed Cachar, the Kukis to the southwards were 
represented as not acquainted with the use of fire-arms, and who thus held such 
weapons in great awe. This convinced Fisher that by providing fire-arms to Cachari 
chowkidars or Manipuris the Kuki raids would be deterred. Yet in 1832, when Jenkins 
was on the survey mission in Cachar he met a group of Kuki settlers who told him that 
they were fleeing from others to the south who were „well armed with their common 
weapons but having besides a few musquets.‟127 Twenty years after the first annexation 
of Cachar, the British finally came face to face with this musket-bearing people: the 
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Lushai. In fact, when Sukpilal came down to visit Lister in December 1850, he was 
accompanied by two „Chillings‟ who had American-made muskets with the name „G. 
Alton‟ on the lock. The Bengali interpreter Gobind Ram, said that there was „one of 
these muskets in each house in the raja‟s village‟ and the Lushais told Lister that they 
procured the muskets from the Pois in exchange for slaves. Though not always on 
friendly terms, the Lushais had a trading relationship with the Pois who in turn traded 
with Burma where they acquired these muskets.
128
 
 
The situation was different in Arakan. While Lieutenant Trant reported that the 
Khyeng in the vicinity of Aeng were not acquainted with the use of fire-arms,
129
 the 
Junior Commissioner in Arakan wrote in the Calcutta Gazetteer that „the Khyang‟ in 
Talak had matchlocks among them though they did not understand how to manufacture 
powder.
130
 Then in 1841 Phayre wrote that „even the most distant Kumis now possess 
muskets, which are conveyed up the Kola-dan by petty merchants, and thence passed 
from tribe to tribe far into the interior‟.131 Tickell also confirmed such an arms trade 
when he wrote that the Heuma bought, among others, „muskets, lead and powder‟ from 
the people nearer to the plains.
132
 Later on in 1853, Henry Yule, then on special survey 
duty of the Arakan Yoma after the Second Anglo-Burmese War, wrote that „nearly all 
Kyengs possess fire-arms‟.133 Ten years later in 1863, Phayre, then Chief Commissioner 
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of British Burma, reported the difficulties of preventing the practice of supplying fire-
arms to the Kukis in the Chittagong hills through Arakan.
134
 In 1864, the Inspector 
General of Police of British Burma reported that „Maro, Kumi, Koon-tso (or the Khons) 
and Shendu have flint muskets in large numbers and these they keep in good order and 
ready for use‟. 135  
 
It seems that the kind of control on the firearms mentioned in the Calcutta Gazette 
in 1790
136
 had made it relatively easier for the Kuki-Chin people near the southern 
frontier to acquire firearms. If firearms were being traded from Arakan, more could 
have been expected in fact from Burma. Yule reported the Yaw people as „the chief 
peddlers and carriers of northern Burma‟ and that they had communications with the 
people in the Koladyne Valley.
137
 This trade is also well described by Lehman and it 
was the Lai people who dominated all the trade routes from both east and west.
 138
 The 
Lai people therefore became stronger through their trade with Burma and began to 
expand outwards.  
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CHAPTER 7  
 
THE LAST DECADE OF THE COMPANY: the1850s 
 
 
1. Rapprochements with the Kuki-Chin People 
 
a) Development of Relationships on the Northern Frontier 
 
1) Opening Communications with the Lushais 
 
In 1850, following Lister‟s recommendations, the Government raised the Kuki 
Levy and placed it under the command of Lieutenant Robert Stewart. It was also 
intended to give employment to Kuki youths, whose love for fighting, it was hoped, 
would find a legitimate use in defending the British frontier, but not enough Kuki 
recruits could be found and half of the number had to be filled with Cacharis.
1
 The 
Government also urged Lister and other frontier officers to open up communications 
with Barmooeelin, the powerful chief mentioned in Lister‟s report, who they thought 
would have been overawed by British arms on this occasion. The British frontier 
officers, however, did nothing to follow up this suggestion. In the meantime, overtures 
for peace came from the Lushais first and in October 1850, a muntri (a minister or high 
official) of Sukpilal came to Silchar, together with messengers from four other chiefs. 
This unexpected turn of events ushered in a new era of dialogue between the British 
administration and the Lushai on the northern Kuki-Chin frontier.  
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The messengers from the Lushai chiefs told Lister that they wished to place 
themselves under the protection of the Company against the Pois to the south, in return 
for tribute. Lister deferred the decision and sent them back saying that the chiefs would 
have to come in person to discuss such arrangements. He knew very well that protecting 
the Lushais, who were out of the British jurisdiction, would be impractical, therefore he 
suggested that the government should reject their overtures to become tributaries. On 
the other hand, he thought it necessary to take this opportunity to achieve some form of 
control over the Lushais. To this end, he recommended measures such as laying down a 
boundary and binding the Lushais to a treaty to give up offenders. He also suggested 
taking „hostages among young chiefs‟ who might be sent by the Government to school 
to receive a western education. The central authorities, however, did not allow Lister to 
make any further engagement with the Lushai other than inducing them to respect the 
boundaries while continuing the momentum of friendship.
2
  
 
Those five chiefs who sent the messengers were recorded as Sukpilal, Barmooeelin, 
Boottai, Langroo, and Lalpoo.
3
 Of these only Sukpilal came in person in December 
1850. The rest did not come with him fearing that they might meet the same fate as 
Lalchokla. Sukpilal admitted the enmity between his people and the Kukis, which had 
resulted in the raids of 1849. Had the Lushais known that the Kukis were under British 
protection, argued Sukpilal, they would not have attacked the Kukis. He assured Lister 
that the Lushai chiefs did not wish to be at war with the British Indian Government and 
promised, on behalf of all the Lushai chiefs, that they would not molest the Kukis under 
the British. Furthermore, he promised to search out and restore all British subjects in 
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captivity in his country when he returned to his village. As a token of friendship, or 
„submission‟ in Lister‟s words, Sukpilal gave Lister an elephant tusk and Lister 
presented him with some woollen clothes in return.
4
 
 
Despite the friendly atmosphere of this meeting, nothing concrete came out of it: 
Sukpilal failed to acquire Lister‟s assurance on British protection and Lister received no 
guarantee regarding the security of the frontier other than the verbal commitment of one 
chief. The recovery of captives also did not happen despite Sukpilal‟s promise. 5 
Nevertheless, this first meeting between these two was meaningful as the first step 
towards building confidence. The effect of peace was not felt immediately, but 
according to Captain G. Verner, who succeeded Lister as the Superintendent of Cachar, 
regular trade started between Sukpilal‟s people and the inhabitants of Cachar close to 
his village soon after this meeting.
6
 
 
Four years later, in 1854, three more Lushai deputations visited Cachar. The first 
was only identified as a group of Lushais that came to Cachar in May 1854, but no more 
detail can be found in the records.
7
 Then in November the same year, Sukpilal again 
sent a deputation and, at around the same time, the third deputation arrived from the 
„Rajah of Moara‟, or Mura whose village had been destroyed in 1850. The purpose of 
these visits was to confirm the Indian Government‟s friendship and, as before, to seek 
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protection against the Pois. The Lushai chiefs also proposed moving their villages 
nearer to the border to facilitate trade with the inhabitants of Cachar. In reply, Captain 
Verner assured them that the Government was friendly disposed as long as the Lushais 
refrained from raiding its territories, but reiterated that the Government could not 
defend the Lushais against the Pois.
8
 All three deputations presented elephant tusks and 
Captain Verner did not neglect his part of hospitality as the bill submitted by him shows: 
182-14-2 rupees were realised by the sales of the elephant tusks while 163-3-10 rupees 
were spent on presents and food for the visitors.
9
 Captain Verner reported these visits as 
a great gain on the part of the Government and remarked that this would „no doubt tend 
towards the development of this district‟ by encouraging settlement of the southern 
tracts.
10
 
 
After the visit of the messengers from Mura, Verner sent a return mission to this 
village; Mura then sent another deputation led by his brother „Mang or Leng Mang 
Rajah‟. When this „Leng Mang Rajah‟ arrived at Cachar, Captain Verner requested him 
to release a son of one of the Thado chiefs, who had been captured during the raids back 
in 1849. This time, the release of the prisoner was swiftly carried out and Leng Mang 
returned with the young man a few days later. There was a reason for such a swift 
release. At this time, a Lushai chief named Belging, known to be a maternal uncle of 
Barmooeelin, was in jail in Manipur and the Lushais hoped that the British Government 
would press the Manipur Rajah to release him in exchange for the release of the son of 
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the Thado chief. Leng Mang also promised, on behalf of the other Lushais chiefs, that 
the Lushais would never attack Manipur again if this chief were to be freed.
11
 
 
According to Verner, Manipur and the Lushais were at enmity for years and seldom 
a season passed without Lushai attacks on one or another village dependant on Manipur. 
In early 1853 a group of Lushais had attacked Naga villages around the Manipur-Cachar 
road, burned several villages and carried away many captives. A party of Manipuri 
troops was despatched to Kala Naga to prevent further raids and by a stroke of luck, 
they met the raiding party led by the said chief, Belging. It was on this occasion, that the 
Manipuri soldiers captured Belging and five others.
12
  
 
Chandra Kirtee Singh, the Rajah of Manipur, later recalled the same incident, or 
the capture of an uncle of a Lushai chief, but, according to his account, the name of the 
captured chief was „Nuntoorow‟ who was a maternal uncle of „Vonolel‟.13 From this, it 
appears that Barmooeelin, whom Lister recorded as a powerful chief to the south of 
Mura, was the same as Vanhuiliana (or Vonolel), son of Lalsavunga, whose identity was 
confirmed during the Lushai Expeditions of 1871-2. How „Belging‟ and „Nuntoorow‟ or 
Nunthara could have been one person is a mystery, as well as who Mura and Leng 
Mang Rajah were. According to Edgar, Mura, the chief of the village destroyed by 
Lister, died soon after the expedition itself. He left an infant son, Vonpilal, and during 
the latter‟s boyhood the village was managed by the widow of Mura, Impanu. It is 
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possible that Impanu invited Vanhuiliana, who was the nearest chief, to protect her 
village during this period. This was the normal custom among the Lushai chiefs, and 
Impanu was recorded to have asked the protection from another chief named Bhuta in 
1870 when Vonpilal died at the age of twenty.
14
 In this case, it is possible that the 
deputation from „Mura‟ received by Captain Verner was actually from Vanhuiliana, 
Mura being the name of the village rather than the chief. 
 
There were many such uncertainties regarding the identity of chiefs who sent 
deputations. This is no surprise as British relationships with the Lushai chiefs had only 
just started. Of the five chiefs that sent deputations in 1850, Sukpilal‟s identity is the 
best established due to his continuing relationship with the British till his death in 1880: 
he started British-Lushai rapprochements and remained the main channel of 
communication between the Sailoo chiefs of the Lushai and the British, despite 
occasional implication in raids.
15
 Of the other four, it seems fairly certain that Boottai 
was also called Vutta, an uncle of Sukpilal,
16
 but there is no other evidence for this than 
the similarity of the sounds. The remaining two, „Langoo‟ and „Lalpoo‟, seem to be 
Lunglena, a son of Vutta, and Lalpoong, a son of Lalsavung, respectively, but these are 
only conjectures even wilder than that for Boottai. 
 
In any case, the communication thus started was an important development in the 
British relationship with the Lushais, and Captain Verner urged the Government to make 
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representations to the Rajah of Manipur through the Political Agent for the release of 
Lushai chief Belging.
17
 This suggestion was forwarded to Captain McCulloch, the 
Political Agent in Manipur, in March 1855; however, McCulloch was not inclined to 
follow this suggestion. In fact, McCulloch had already started negotiations with the 
Lushai chiefs soon after the capture of Belging in 1853. The negotiations, however, fell 
apart as the Lushais refused to return Naga captives. Lushai raids into Manipur re-
commenced and Moirang was attacked in October 1854 with many killed and captured. 
In the meantime, Belging, seeing no hope of being ransomed by his relatives, made an 
attempt to escape with two others, but the Kukis under Manipur found them near their 
village. Belging escaped into the hills but two of his followers were killed and Belging 
himself was recaptured.
18
  
 
The matter was left at this stage until November 1854 when deputations from the 
Lushais arrived in Cachar. Obviously, the Lushai chiefs hoped to secure the release of 
Belging through the Cachar authorities with whom they were on better terms than with 
the Manipuris. McCulloch was not idle either: when he heard of the contacts between 
the Superintendent of Cachar and the Lushais, he urged the Rajah of Manipur to send a 
message to the Lushai chiefs through Captain Verner. Then he himself volunteered to 
negotiate with the Lushai chiefs in Cachar bringing Belging along with him, but from 
the following passage found in his letter to the Government, it appears that this scheme 
was foiled by Captain Verner‟s refusal to cooperate:  
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This [bringing Belging to Cachar] I did without consulting Captain 
Verner, thinking that he would not object to, but would promote my object. In 
this I was mistaken and though the Rajah had sent Belging and he had come 
as far as Kala Naga I ordered him back.
19
  
 
For some reason, the Superintendent of Cachar did not want to enter into 
negotiations on behalf the Rajah of Manipur, with Belging physically present. Perhaps 
Verner wanted to keep the negotiation with the Lushais under his own control and 
secure the release of prisoners from Cachar first. In any case, when the tables were 
turned and Verner suggested the release of Belging in 1855, McCulloch was not 
disposed to act according to Verner‟s wishes. Besides, there had already been contacts 
between the Manipur Rajah and Vanhuiliana, and McCulloch reported that the 
intervention of the British Government in obtaining the release of Belging at this time 
was unnecessary.
20
 The Manipur Rajah later released Belging on the promise that the 
Lushais would not molest the Kukis in Manipur any more. The Lushais kept this 
promise till the very late 1860s.
21
  
 
Sukpilal again came to Cachar in 1855 for the same purpose as before: to solicit 
British support against other hill chiefs, claiming to be a tributary to the British 
Government, since he had presented elephant tusks.
22
 Yet the Government did not 
recognise the exchange of gifts as an agreement for the protection of Sukpilal‟s country: 
Verner reiterated that the Government could not defend Sukpilal against hostile tribes in 
the jungle and no such overtures to become a „Company‟s ryot‟ would be accepted as 
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long as Sukpilal‟s people remained outside the boundary. Reviewing the series of 
exchanges between Cachar and the Lushais, the Directors concurred with Verner, and 
emphasised that the Lushai could only be protected if they moved their villages within 
Cachar to become subjects of the Government.
23
 
 
The rapprochements between the British and the Lushais made Cachar free of raids 
for twenty years after Lister‟s expedition. During this period of peace, cultivation 
expanded towards the southern hills of Cachar. In addition, an indigenous variety of tea 
was found in Cachar in 1855 and Europeans began opening tea plantations in the 
southern hills of Cachar.
24
 Edgar commented that this was a result of the success of 
Lister‟s expedition, which made „such an impression on the Lushai‟ through „its rapidity, 
secrecy, and boldness‟.25 On closer inspection, however, the friendly intentions of the 
Lushai should be acknowledged not as a fear of further retribution from the British, but 
as a result of their reassessment of the situation in which they regarded the British as a 
potentially useful ally in their political struggle against the others, notably, the „Pois‟. 
 
 
2) Relationship with the Kukis in Manipur 
 
Judging from the proceedings relating to the release of Belging, it appears that the 
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communication between British officers, and the coordination of their activities by the 
centre, were poor. Yet this was precisely what was needed if the Government wanted to 
deal with the problems caused by the Kuki-Chin people effectively. Another incident 
between Manipur and Cachar that had happened about the same time as the capture of 
Belging demonstrates this as well. 
 
In May 1853 a Thado chief from Manipur named Koodingkai, with his brother 
Thoohel raided a village of Thlangum Kukis in Cachar called Koombie, and took two 
villagers as well as the chief of the village named Pael as captives.
26
 Verner immediately 
requested McCulloch, the Political Agent, to arrest and deliver the offenders and 
procure the release of captives. A month and a half later, on 19
th
 July, having heard no 
news of progress from McCulloch, Verner sent another letter to urge action by the 
Manipur government. Captain McCulloch had his own excuses for the delay. The 
Manipur Rajah had immediately sent an officer to Koodingkai‟s village, but this person 
was reported to have died on the way back. Another group had been sent, but contact 
had been lost due to the flood. McCulloch believed that the prisoners had been released 
but under the circumstances he could not confirm it. Verner sent another letter in 
September that Pael and his followers had not returned to his village. Similar events 
continued and officers were repeatedly sent to capture Koodingkai but it was only on 
11
th
 December that Koodingkhai, Thoohell and two other Kukis were finally delivered 
to Cachar. Pael and the other captives returned on the 20
th
 December: the delay was 
caused because, as a defeated chief, he could not return to the village without an 
appropriate ritual.
27
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Koodingkai was tried in Cachar. He defended himself by saying that this attack 
was a retaliation for past grudges: some eight years before this raid, Koodingkai stated, 
his people were fleeing from the Lushais into southern Cachar and asked the Thangum 
Kukis for help, but the Thlangum Kukis maltreated them instead. After hearing the case, 
Captain Verner released the Thado chiefs on the promise that they would not seek 
further retribution. The result was as recommended by Captain McCulloch who pleaded 
on behalf of the Thado chiefs that the Kuki custom demanded retaliation as an absolute 
necessity.
28
 
 
In this instance, the delay was caused by the inefficiency of the administration of 
Manipur. Around this time, the chronic problem of Manipur, and the insecurity of the 
kingship had again erupted. In 1850 Nar Singh died and his brother Debindro Singh 
succeeded the throne. At this, Chandra Kirti Singh, who had been in exile in Cachar, 
collected a sizeable force and marched to Manipur to claim the throne. He was arrested 
in Cachar and the Government ordered him to be removed to Dacca; however, he 
managed to escape from his guards and when McCulloch realised that Chandra Kirti 
Singh‟s cause was gathering popular support, he urged the Government to make a volt-
face and acknowledge him as the Rajah of Manipur.
29
 Thus the tables were turned 
against Debindro Singh and he began making attempts at the throne together with his 
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brothers.  
 
According to Captain McCulloch, Manipur was lapsing out of control and the 
situation resembled the years immediately before the First Anglo-Burmese War. As a 
solution, he suggested stationing European troops in Manipur to maintain stability as the 
best method, but, knowing that the government would not agree to such a financial 
burden, he requested that a public declaration should be made confirming the 
government‟s intention to uphold the Rajah, by force if necessary. Therefore, in 1852, 
after years of non-intervention in the internal matters of Manipur, the Government made 
a public avowal „to uphold the present Rajah, and to resist and punish any parties 
attempting to dispossess him‟. This public declaration seems to have had little of the 
desired effect, as Mackenzie observed, but the Directors were more worried that through 
this declaration the Government might be bound to guarantee the tyranny of the Rajah.
30
 
 
Under these circumstances, villages at the fringe of Manipur, those of the Kukis 
and Nagas subservient to Manipur, were subjected to frequent raids from the hill people 
to the south, the „southern Kukis‟ and the Lushais.31 The trouble with the Lushais ceased 
by the mid-50s to due the circumstances relating to Belging as described above, but 
during the second half of the 1850s, another new powerful people began raiding the 
southern part of Manipur: the Soktes.
32
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In 1856 the Soktes committed a particularly serious raid, and the Manipur 
Rajah decided to send a punitive expedition. McCulloch solicited Government support 
for this mission by providing ammunition to 1,500 Manipuri troops, and the Rajah 
himself led the expedition into the area, currently part of the Chin Hills. The result, 
however, was „disgraceful‟: Manipuri troops were lured deep into the jungle where they 
got totally destroyed and the Rajah barely escaped.
33
 
 
The opinion of the Directors was that such hostilities, or „oppression‟ in their own 
words, by the Manipur Rajah might adversely affect relations between the British and 
the Kukis, and warned McCulloch not to encourage another expedition, especially 
because part of the expense was covered by the British Government in the supply of 
ammunition.
34
 Despite such warnings, McCulloch continued to support the Manipuri 
throne through thick and thin and the government again supplied powder and 
ammunition to the value of 2,500 rupees in 1859 against the Soktes.
35
  
 
In 1861, when the discontinuation of the post of Political Agent of Manipur was 
under discussion, Major McCulloch wrote a memorandum on his duties. In this 
memorandum, he mentioned the Lushai and Sokte as „powerful and dangerous‟, though 
both of them professed friendship at the time of writing. Nevertheless, he was of the 
opinion that Sokte chiefs should be attacked if possible. As an alternative measure, he 
wrote that he and the Rajah of Manipur had established villages of Kukis to the south, 
armed by the Government. These were not to be restricted in terms of cultivation but 
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they were to perform the duties of scouts during the dry season. Called „sepoy villages‟, 
they were „not quite settled‟ yet, but he reminded the government that „by care they 
might be brought to a proper state of usefulness.‟36 With the failure of the expeditions, 
policy in Manipur returned to defence through the establishment of Kuki villages.  
 
 
b) Developments in the Southern Frontier 
 
1) The Annexation of Pegu 
 
The origin of the Second Anglo-Burmese War was very different in many respects 
from the first. Whereas Burmese territorial expansion and the ambition of Bagyi-daw 
were in part responsible for the first war, the second was a result of the downright 
imperialism of the Governor-General, Marquess of Dalhousie, and Commodore 
Lambert; there had not been a single security threat over the borders or any other 
polities involved in the events leading up to the war; and diplomatic efforts to avoid the 
war seemed to have been shortened to the length of the temper of a naval officer. There 
was, however, one common factor for the two wars. In a minute arguing for the 
necessity of a war, Dalhousie wrote:  
British power in India cannot safely afford to exhibit even a temporary 
appearance of inferiority. . . The Government of India cannot, consistently 
with its own safety, appear for one day in an attitude of inferiority; or hope to 
maintain peace and submission among the numberless princes and people 
embraced within the vast circuit of the empire, if, for one day, it gave 
countenance to doubt of the absolute superiority of its arms, and of its 
continued resolution to assert it.
37
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In this statement, which echoed John Malcolm to the letter, the necessity of maintaining 
the prestige of British invincibility was argued more clearly and consciously than any of 
the statements that had been made during the years leading up to the first war. Thus, it 
was not merely for the sum of a thousand pounds, but to repair the damaged pride of the 
British in India, that the Governor-General opted for another war with Burma. 
 
The British pride, or their arrogance, had indeed been strengthened during the 
intervening years. One basis for such pride was the view that British, or European, 
civilisation was superior to that of the natives, which had been expressed in the 
„Anglicist‟, as opposed to the „Orientalist‟, view regarding the management of India. 
This, coupled with utilitarian ideas, which viewed the land and people against the 
criteria of the realisation of their potential utility, provided another justification for the 
war. William Laurie, in his contemporary account of the Second Anglo-Burmese War, 
hailed the war as an agent to advance „the cause of civilisation‟ in Burma.38 The land of 
Burma was represented as „fertile and beautiful‟, but wasted under the mismanagement 
of Burmese despotism, which „like other oriental despotisms before it, is worn out by its 
own vice and tyranny‟, propped up by „a few blustering Burmese officers, the 
representatives of a self-interested rabble‟. In this view, the British war effort was all for 
the peace and prosperity of Burma and the Burmese, which he trusted might „be so 
employed until peace secures in her fair dominions the entire human family.‟ 39 
 
At the beginning of the war, the plan was to occupy three ports – Rangoon, Bassein, 
and Martaban – and wait for the King to submit during the rains. This was a 
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miscalculation. The ports were easily captured in April 1852, but the King did not 
submit, and in July, Dalhousie visited Rangoon to discuss a new course of action. 
Annexation of the whole country was regarded as pointless on military and economic 
grounds, but the annexation of Pegu was thought to be the best option as it deprived the 
Burmese kings of their main economic assets, weakening them further. Besides, it 
would link Arakan and Tenasserim, making it easier to manage the isolated province of 
Tenasserim.
40
 Economic gain was a major factor that attracted both the Government and 
other observers of the war. Laurie quoted a pro-East India Company magazine - the 
Friends of India - and argued that unlike the financial drain of Tenasserim, or the 
„swamps of Arakan‟, the province of Pegu was rich with „inexhaustible forests of teak, 
its fertile soil, its noble rivers, its mineral resources, and its industrious population‟. In 
addition, the British could secure four to five million „consumers of our 
manufactures‟.41 The moral justification was that if placed under British control, the 
whole province would prosper for the „infinite delight of Peguese‟.42 
  
During the ensuing cold season, new campaigns began for the conquest of Pegu. 
Prome was taken on the 10
th
 October and Pegu on the 22
nd
 November. Then on the 20
th
 
December the entire province of Pegu was announced to be a British province with 
Arthur Phayre as the first Commissioner.
43
 Such actions were taken unilaterally without 
treaty or negotiation, as Pagan Min showed no sign of submission. At this point, the 
question for the British was how to end the war: marching troops to Amarapura and 
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toppling the King was not regarded as the best option as this would mean the annexation 
of the whole country, but there seemed to be no other option.  
 
While the British troops were preparing for a final march against Amarapura, with 
reinforcements of 300 elephants conveyed through the Arakan Yoma, a new 
development took place within the Burmese palace: Mindon Min, who had been the 
head of a palace faction opposed to continued fighting, staged a successful coup in 
February 1853. Immediately after his accession to the throne, Mindon Min sent a 
delegation to Phayre and peace talks began. In March, Phayre met a Burmese delegation 
with a ready-made treaty including the cession of the province of Pegu to the British. 
The northern boundary was to be drawn north of Meaday. Prome was regarded too 
unhealthy and the British could not leave the thick teak forest between Meaday and 
Prome. The Burmese objected strongly and peace talks broke up in May, but the British 
went ahead with their occupation and Mindon Min had no alternative than to accept this 
as a fait accompli.
44
 Eventually, there was peace between two countries without official 
recognition and in 1862, the province of Pegu, together with Arakan and Tenasserim, 
became a province named „British Burma‟ with Phayre as the Chief Commissioner. 
 
 
2) Chin Police of Arakan 
 
The military actions of the Second Anglo-Burmese War were confined to the 
Irrawaddy Valley, so the war had even less implication on the Kuki-Chin people than 
the first war. There was, however, one important event during the war that introduced a 
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new development in the British-Chin relationship. Towards the close of the war, a Chin 
chief named Nga Kee Kay
45
 voluntarily came to Major C. Maling, the commanding 
officer in Arakan, with a piece of intelligence that the Burmese were building a stockade 
at Naragain on the Aeng Pass. He even offered to lead British troops to the exact 
location, and Captain Barry, commanding the Arakan Sebundy Battalion, set out to turn 
the enemies out of the position. The assault did not take place owing to „circumstances 
over which Nga Kee Kay had no control.‟ Nevertheless, in December 1852, Major 
Maling requested the government to reward Nga Kee Kay for his assistance. He added 
that the attack would have been perfectly feasible with better management and more 
time to allow the troops to move.
46
 The Government sanctioned a sum of 150 rupees as 
a reward in Jan 1853.
47
 This stockade at Naragain was captured by Captain Nuthall in 
January 1853, again with the assistance of Nga Kee Kay. On this occasion, Captain 
Nuthall rewarded Nga Kee Kay with an additional 150 rupees from his own pocket and 
the Government reimbursed this sum and presented Nga Kee Kay with a sabre and a 
rifle.
48
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At the cessation of hostilities, Captain Henry Yule was ordered to survey the 
Arakan Yoma on the 23
rd
 January 1853. Like the earlier work of Jenkins and Pemberton, 
this was mainly for the purpose of defence. Yule‟s report revealed that virtually nothing 
had been done regarding the defence or management of the Aeng Pass and its vicinity. 
He remarked that the region was generally deprived of population, which was the main 
difficulty for the security of the area. The populated – though not populous – areas 
ended as soon as one entered into the outskirts of the long spurs of the Yoma and from 
thence only intermittent Chin villages and their jhooms were observed becoming scarcer 
towards the interior of the mountains. From the top of the central ridge of the Yoma, 
there was hardly any visible sign of human inhabitation.
49
 Yet the traffic along the road 
was still alive with travellers, merchants, drovers with bullocks and buffaloes, emigrants 
from Burma and so on.  
 
Safety of these travellers was the problem. All those who passed through, 
according to Yule, complained of such „grievous instances‟ as robberies. The offenders 
were identified as the Burmese bands and the „Araings‟ or „wilder Kheyngs of the 
northern districts‟.50 Even the sepoys of the British Indian Army were not safe from the 
marauders. Captain Henry Hopkinson, the commissioner of Arakan, wrote that the 
Chins on either side of the Aeng Pass had. . .: 
. . . for a long time infested the road and interrupted communication between 
the military out-posts, plundering travellers, and carrying off the coolies 
employed with the troops into captivity, so that the pass could not be traversed 
except under a strong armed escort.
51
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The coolies and sepoys thus captured had to be ransomed as expeditions were 
regarded as impossible. This made kidnapping „unsuspecting sepoys or over-burdened 
coolies‟ a lucrative source of income for the Chin people around the Aeng Pass and 
Hopkinson observed that every ransom paid induced more to be kidnapped.
52
 The Aeng 
Pass and its vicinity was practically out of the Government‟s control. 
 
As a remedy for this situation, Yule recommended the employment of, none other 
than, the „shrewd and energetic man‟ Nga Kee Kay. He also recommended employing 
20 to 25 men of „his own race‟ under permanent pay - the chief at 25 rupees, one 
Jemadar at 15 rupees and 24 men at 7 rupees each.
53
 Provided with good muskets from 
the government, these men were to patrol the passes constantly and watch Burmese 
movements under the supervision of a district officer who was to keep an eye on Nga 
Kee Kay so that his men did not abuse their increased power. Such a measure, Yule 
calculated, would encourage others, who had deserted their jhooms in fear of the 
„Araings‟ to the north, to return to the vicinity of the Aeng Pass, making the area more 
populous and therefore safer for the travellers. With yet another war with Burma in 
mind, Yule also suggested binding all the Chin population in the vicinity, nearly all of 
whom possessed fire-arms, to come out en masse on extraordinary occasions when 
summoned by Nga Kee Kay.
54
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This was a radical suggestion that had no precedent. It was different from the Kuki 
Levy of Cachar, which was under European command and was within the structure and 
command of the British Indian military. According to Yule‟s suggestion, Nga Kee Kay 
was to become a commander of his own people who were to be armed and paid from 
the Company‟s treasury, while the role of a British officer was to be that of supervision 
after events, without practical control over his conduct. 
 
Naturally, the Government hesitated to reach a conclusion. In the mean time, the 
humiliation of British forces in Arakan continued in the Aeng Pass. In one occasion, 
four coolies who had been transporting supplies to Captain Barry of the Arakan 
Battalion were captured by the „Araings‟ or „Khyen Yaings‟ in May 1853. As Captain 
Sharp, the Principal Assistant to the Commissioner at Ramree, noted in his letter to 
Captain Hopkinson, this was only one of the many similar occasions in which those in 
the British Indian army were kidnapped. No retribution had been attempted because the 
offenders‟ villages were thought to be unreachable.55 
 
In January 1854, while Captain Sharp was at Aeng with Captain Sutherland of the 
Arakan Local Battalion and Major Maling, two of the captives escaped and returned to 
Aeng. They identified the village to which they had been confined as Ayetso, and, in 
addition, gave the names of two other villages – Singan and Moonyain – which 
cooperated in the kidnapping. Having thus identified the offenders, the officers decided 
to destroy these villages in retaliation for the years of humiliation the British suffered 
from the Chins, but for this they needed a reliable guide. At this moment, Nga Kee Kay 
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again came forward to help the British. Another sum of 150 rupees was promised on the 
spot and they marched against the three Chin villages without further delay. 
 
Captain Sharp proceeded with Nga Kee Kay on the 1
st
 of February and Captain 
Sutherland followed a day later with a party of the Arakan Battalion. A hundred Chin 
fighting men collected by Nga Kee Kay from around Talak accompanied them. After 
much caution and delay they reached the neighbourhood of the three villages on the 
evening of the 8
th
. They were small villages: Singan and Moonyain contained fifteen 
houses each and the Ayetso just seven. All three villages had stockades, but when the 
British troops found them, they were neither guarded nor maintained but left in a 
dilapidated condition: the villagers obviously did not expect an attack. 
 
At daybreak next morning, the British troops attacked and destroyed the village of 
Moonyain. The surprise was complete and no resistance was reported. One man was 
shot by the Talak Chins and another by the sepoys: these were the only casualties 
reported. Captain Sharp wanted to take some hostages, hoping to exchange them for the 
remaining British subjects still under captivity. He had ordered Talak Chin men to 
surround the rear of the village and capture the fleeing „Araings‟, but the Talak Chins, 
who were sympathetic to the „Araings‟ did not even try to surround the village. This did 
not affect Captain Sharp‟s appreciation of Nga Kee Kay, who appeared to have done his 
best to carry out the order. In fact, the Talak Chins were not under the authority of Nga 
Kee Kay nor had they known him before. 
 
In spite of this, Captain Sharp managed to capture one old woman and a little girl 
of 3 or 4 years wounded in the leg while at the village of Moonyain. They also found 
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another woman hiding in the jungle and these three were carried back as hostages. The 
villagers from the other two villages had already defected into the jungle before the 
British troops reached them. Thus, after burning down all three villages, British troops 
returned and reached Talak after a day‟s march on the evening of the 10th February. 
 
In addition to these three captives, Captain Sharp also took six other Chins on his 
return march and briefly kept them hostage. These were not in any way related to the 
raids, but were Chins from a village named Kyontso who were coming down to Talak to 
trade buffaloes. Nga Kee Kay stopped them and Captain Sharp took six of the nine 
traders and sent the remaining three back to their village with word that those six would 
only be freed if the villagers of Kyontso ransomed British captives known to have been 
kept in their neighbouring village Phetso. He knew that this measure was not „strictly 
justifiable‟ but nonetheless he thought it to be a clever way of retrieving British captives 
without using Government‟s resources. 
 
Of course, there was no way to justify Captain Sharp‟s detention of the Kyontso 
Chins. Upon receiving this report, Captain Hopkinson ordered them to be released 
immediately. Yet regarding the captives from the village of Moonyain, Captain 
Hopkinson was particularly hopeful that, in future, the „Araings‟ would refrain from 
taking more captives, as they would realise that instead of bringing in 100 to 200 rupees 
per head, it would only result in the destruction of their villages and being taken 
prisoners themselves.
56
 The Government also sent „great praise‟ to those concerned in 
the expedition.
57
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This was the first report of success from the Aeng Pass against the Chin. As a result 
of this success, Government‟s trust in Nga Kee Kay increased. Two months after the 
return of Captain Sharp, on the 15
th
 of April 1854, the Government ordered Captain 
Hopkinson to employ Nga Kee Kay and 25 of his followers as a police force in the 
Aeng Pass and its vicinity. It was done as Yule had suggested, except that the payment 
for the twenty-four followers of Nga Kee Kay was reduced from 7 rupees to 6 rupees 
per month per person.
58
 This reduction was in line with the normal payment for the 
sebundies, or the irregular native soldiers: sepoys normally received 7½ rupees per 
month, while the sebundies received 6 rupees.
59
 The Government, however, was still 
hesitant to commit itself fully to this extraordinary measure and made a compromise by 
making it an experiment subject to revision two years later.
60
  
 
When the prescribed two years expired in November 1856, the government was 
still not ready to decide on the permanent employment, and authorised another two 
years‟ extension of the experimental employment. At the same time, British officers in 
Arakan were ordered to draw up reports regarding the feasibility of the retention or 
otherwise of Nga Kee Kay and the „Khyeng Police‟.61 Another two years passed, and in 
November 1858, Captain T. W. Ripley, the Principal Assistant Commissioner of Ramree, 
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submitted a report concluding that the employment of the Chin Police of Nga Kee Kay 
had been successful. Captain Ripley wrote that the efficiency of the police had been 
sufficiently proved, since not a single crime had occurred in the portion of the District 
covered under Nga Kee Kay‟s men, in contrast to other parts where bandits still 
rampaged.
62
 He not only solicited sanction for permanent employment, but also 
suggested an increase in the number of the Chin Police with one more Jemadar and 16 
more men at the same rate of payment. According to him, the inhabitants from 
neighbouring villages had petitioned for the increase of Nga Kee Kay‟s force to cover a 
wider area and he supported this request.
63
  
 
This report was conveyed to Major G. Verner, the officiating Commissioner of 
Arakan, then it was forwarded to the Government of Bengal and from there to the 
Government of India. Major Verner was of the same opinion as Captain Ripley. Apart 
from the „great success‟ of the scheme, he added that the military officers of the Arakan 
Battalion and others had been speaking of Nga Kee Kay and his force in the highest 
terms since he took his office. Regarding the increase in numbers recommended by 
Ripley, he went further and suggested the creation of more Chin Police parties 
throughout the District of Akyab where dacoities committed by the hill tribes were of 
frequent occurrence.
64
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The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal also concurred and stated that the absence of 
trouble should be sufficient evidence for the excellence of the force, and solicited 
sanction for further employment as suggested by the local officers.
65
 At this, the 
Government finally sanctioned the permanent employment of Nga Kee Kay and twenty-
five of his followers on the 29
th
 of December 1858. Regarding the increase, however, 
the decision was deferred. They merely stated that it would be „considered should it be 
found needful‟.66 
 
Next April, Major Verner requested an increase in the „Khyen Police‟ to 63 men, at 
a monthly cost of 455 rupees, but in July he further requested permission for 16 more 
men, totalling 79 men of all ranks at a monthly cost of 592 rupees. It was almost double 
the number that had been previously proposed by Captain Ripley. The reason for this 
increase was the increased need for armed police, created by the withdrawal of the 
military post at Naragain, and the reduction of the Arakan Battalion.
67
 In addition, 
Major H.M. Garstin, commanding officer of the Arakan Battalion, made yet another 
suggestion, that the Khyen Police should be increased to 114 men at a monthly cost of 
1,002 rupees and placed under the military.
68
 Verner and Garstin could not narrow their 
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differences on the necessary scale of increase, or the nature of the duties to be 
performed by Nga Kee Kay‟s men. In the end two proposals were laid before the 
Government, which decided in favour of Major Verner and the increase he had proposed 
in April – i.e. 63 men at 455 rupees per month – was sanctioned but a further increase 
was deferred again as it was not a matter in the hands of civil authorities.
69
 
 
The whole affair relating to the employment Nga Kee Kay shows an interesting 
contrast to the abolition of slavery a decade earlier. Whereas the authorities in London 
and Calcutta had pressed for the abolition of slavery, hesitation by the central authorities 
delayed the employment of Nga Kee Kay, which was regarded as essential by all those 
immediately engaged in the management of the frontier. In fact, the abolition of slavery 
was an exceptional case among all the administrative actions that affected the Kuki-
Chin frontier during the Company‟s period. Most of the measures for the defence of the 
frontier had been initiated from the frontier officers in consideration of the local 
situation. The conciliation and cooperation between the British and the Kuki-Chin 
people in Cachar and Arakan during the 1850s produced the unprecedented effect of 
peace on the frontier, but in both cases it was the Kuki-Chin people who first 
approached the frontier officers. The Government, especially the central authorities, 
were not willing to take initiatives for the peace of their own frontier, and, overall, the 
British administration remained defensive, passive, and hesitant to implement policies 
along the Kuki-Chin frontier. 
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c) The Mutiny and the Kuki Levy of Cachar 
 
According to Lawson, indecision and hesitation was not confined to the frontier 
policy but was a general feature of the Company‟s rule in India. This, he argues, 
originated from an intrinsic flaw in the structure of the Company: it was a commercial 
establishment that had to operate as a ruling body in India. This latter role outgrew its 
original purpose. In 1813, with the renewal of the Charter Act, the Company lost all the 
trade monopolies in India, but was left with „the least glamorous function of all‟, which 
was to provide „bureaucrats as agents of royal power in India‟. 70  As a result, the 
Company became, in effect, a department of state, ruled by an all-powerful Governor-
General, running bureaucrats whole and complete in itself. The flaw in this structure, as 
Lawson says, lay in the lack of a unified purpose motivating all those involved in its 
operations: „everyone wanted to make the eastern empire profitable but hardly any 
group in the civil and military administration possessed a unitary vision of how to 
achieve this goal‟. The Directors wanted a low-cost, lean and efficient bureaucracy, but 
in reality, as Dalhousie perceived, the military were at the core, holding the whole 
territory and continuing to expand, absorbing all trade surpluses and adding financial 
pressure to the Company.
71
 The final undoing of this drifting institution came from a 
crisis created within this core aspect of its rule through the Mutiny of 1857-8. 
 
In the year 1857, what many British had feared came true. The inability of the 
British officers to satisfy discontented Indian soldiers led to a rising at Meerut. Then, 
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once the British were defeated in Delhi, it exploded into an emergency for the whole of 
British rule in India. The war lasted more than a year and shook the morale of the 
British in India to its foundations.
72
 When the storm of the Mutiny had died down, 
Viscount Canning, who had held the office of Governor-General from 1856, continued 
to hold that position, but in November 1858 he was made a Viceroy of Queen Victoria – 
no more a servant of the Company but a representative of British sovereignty in India. 
With this, what had long been the actual state of affairs was finally acknowledged: 
British India was no more a territory under a company‟s management but a political 
entity under the British Empire. 
 
British districts in the Kuki-Chin frontier area were little affected by the Mutiny. 
Arakan was generally quiet except for a case of alleged insubordination by a naval 
brigade at Akyab
73
; King Mindon of Burma suppressed suggestions to strike at British 
Burma while they were at their weakest
74
; no mutiny took place among the native 
soldiers in Cachar and Sylhet; the Rajah of Manipur and the chiefs of the Lushai 
remained friendly to the Company. In Chittagong, however, the 34
th
 Native Infantry rose 
against the British late in 1857. The suppression of the mutiny is worth mentioning in 
some detail here, as it involved Sylhet and Cachar, where the mutineers were finally 
mopped up by the joint forces of the Sylhet Light Infantry, the Kuki Levy and other 
Kuki volunteers. 
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The news of the mutiny first reached Dacca on the 21
st
 November 1857. The 
Government responded by sending a naval brigade and volunteers, who disarmed most 
of the sepoys in Chittagong, but the 34
th
 Native Infantry, numbering over two hundred 
and fifty, resisted with force and fled after a battle.
75
 The mutineers crossed the Fenny 
on the 22
nd
 November and made their way into Hill Tripura, intending to proceed 
through the hills either to Sylhet or to Manipur and thence to Nepal or westwards.
76
 
They had freed convicts from jails, who accompanied them as coolies. Among these 
were several Kuki prisoners who guided them through the hills.
77
 They had also looted 
cash amounting to 280,000 rupees from the Chittagong Government – enough to hire 
hill people to guide or to cut roads for them.
78
 
 
Nevertheless, the mutineers were bound to come to the plains to look for food. 
There were also women, children and other dependents who were not physically well 
enough to bear the toilsome marches in the jungle. Therefore, the Government asked the 
authorities in Sylhet and Cachar to intercept them before they reached Manipur and sent 
Her Majesty‟s 54th Regiment to Sylhet for this purpose. At the same time, the 
Government asked the Rajah of Tripura and the chiefs of Chakma for any information 
relating to the movement of the mutineers.
79
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On the 5
th
 of December, J. Allen, officiating collector at Sylhet, received 
intelligence that the mutineers had been spotted in the jungle south of Sylhet, moving 
towards Manipur. Fearing the influence of the mutineers on the native soldiers, the 
Government had ordered Mr. Allen to disarm the Sylhet Light Infantry on the arrival of 
the 54
th
 Regiment. Yet the progress of the 54
th
 Regiment was very slow, much 
encumbered by tents and baggage, and they were not expected in Sylhet before the 19
th
 
of December. At this, Mr. Allen wrote to the commander of the 54
th
 Regiment not to 
proceed to Sylhet but post his troops at Ajmiriganj and Chhatak, in case the mutineers 
changed their direction towards the northwest. He had every confidence that the Sylhet 
Light Infantry would remain loyal to the Government. Moreover, there was a large 
detachment of Sylhet Light Infantry on duty in Cachar to defend this „prosperous and 
improving province‟, so if he went on to disarm those in Sylhet, taking advantage of the 
presence of European troops, the defence of neighbouring Cachar would immediately be 
disorganised.
80
 
 
His confidence in the men of the Sylhet Light Infantry was fully justified. Without 
any support from European regiments, the Sylhet Light Infantry routed the mutineers in 
a series of skirmishes from 17
th
 December 1857 to 22
nd
 January 1858. The first 
encounter was near a village called Latu on the 17
th
 December 1857.
81
 The mutineers 
came down to acquire food but were repelled back into the jungle. They then joined in a 
large group and moved eastwards into the hills south of Cachar. On the 23
rd
 and 24
th
 
December Lieutenant Ross, commanding the Sylhet Light Infantry, attacked the main 
body of mutineers near a Kuki village called Mohunpore south of Hailakandi in Cachar. 
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The mutineers were beaten back into the jungle. Reporting this, Mr. Allen commented 
that the Lushais would attack them if they went further south, both for the sake of 
plunder and to show their friendship to the Government. Thus, instead of pursuing them 
into the jungle, troops under Lieutenant Stewart, commander of the Kuki-Levy and the 
officiating Superintendent of Cachar, were placed at the foot of the hills to intercept 
them when they re-emerged from the jungle.
82
  
 
Both for the British Indian Government and for the mutineers of the 34
th
 Native 
Infantry, it was important to acquire cooperation from the denizens of the hills. In this 
respect, the British had the upper hand. They had already won over the Kukis who 
worked as scouts, armed with government muskets. In addition, the Government had 
issued a reward of 50 rupees for every armed mutineer killed or captured. Thus, Kuki 
scouts followed the mutineers in the jungle and reported their movements to the 
Government as well as killing stragglers. Lieutenant Stewart especially praised the 
conduct of Kuki scouts from a village in the estate of the Cachar Tea Company who, 
directed by the manager of the Company, kept Stewart continually supplied with most 
reliable information on the movement of the mutineers.
83
  
 
The condition for the mutineers in the jungle was extremely miserable. The Kuki 
scouts came across several of them who had died of hunger and disease, and found the 
bodies of their children, whom they had dashed on the ground, being unable to carry.
84
 
When they came nearer to the plains, there were the combined forces of Sylhet Light 
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Infantry and Kuki Levy waiting for them, leaving no other choice but to flee back into 
the jungle. This pattern continued into January, during which time the mutineers kept 
moving eastwards, obviously with the intention of entering Manipur. 
 
According to Stewart, the Manipuri princes in the hills saw this as an opportunity 
to promote their own interests by seizing the throne of Manipur. Some of them were 
even known to have joined the mutineers. To prevent this, Stewart had kept six of the 
Manipuri princes in jail. This action further estranged the Manipuri inhabitants in the 
Cachar Hills.
85
 On the other hand, the Manipur Rajah was firmly on the side of British 
India. He had sent four hundred soldiers and placed them at the disposal of Lieutenant 
Stewart while strengthening the defence of his own territories to intercept mutineers or 
any incursion of Manipuri pretenders.
86
 Though appreciative of the Manipur Rajah‟s 
support, Stewart was doubtful about the fidelity of the Manipuri soldiers in Cachar: 
according to him, they were unwilling to take arms against a Manipuri prince and did 
not mind a change of dynasty in their own country.
87
 
 
On the 12
th
 January 1858, the mutineers, joined by a Manipuri prince and his 
followers, appeared at a small village west of Binnakandi, near the hills that separated 
Manipur from Cachar. The Sylhet Light Infantry and the Kuki Levy immediately 
engaged them and the mutineers were beaten from house to house, at last dispersing and 
fleeing back into the jungle to the south. On this occasion a total of twenty mutineers 
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were killed: seventeen were killed during the action, two taken prisoner and executed, 
and one straggler killed by scouts. The victory not only dispersed the mutineers but also 
disheartened the Manipuri, who totally deserted the mutineers.
88
 
 
The survivors of Binnakandi were divided into two groups, thirty or forty each; 
one group remained in the dense jungle south of Binnakandi, and another fled 
southwards. The former were attacked again on the 21
st
 and 22
nd
 January, with the help 
of a Kuki chief named „Marijihow‟. He was described to have been „particularly active 
and zealous in tracing and attacking the mutineers‟ and, together with his followers, he 
killed no less than sixteen mutineers during this attack. The Manipur Rajah also seized 
five of the mutineers who tried to flee into his country.  
 
After this battle, Allen reported, there were only forty or fifty left of the mutineers. 
They were bound to die of starvation if they remained in the jungles where they had 
been last seen; if they came out, they would be destroyed by the military force; and if 
they broke up and dispersed, they would be either killed or captured by the Kukis. 
Therefore, he concluded that nothing more needed to be done about the mutineers from 
Chittagong.
89
 In March, the Secretary to the Government of Bengal reviewed the 
official correspondence and concluded that only 20 out of 253 of the 34
th
 Native 
Infantry were unaccounted for, but some could have died in the jungle before they 
reached Sylhet and, therefore, an even smaller number had escaped alive.
90
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There was one case in which a Kuki chief was found harbouring two mutineers in 
his village and providing food to those in the jungle,
91
 but, overall, most of the Kukis in 
Cachar cooperated with the Government and their support was vital for the success of 
British operations against the mutineers in the hills of Cachar. Stewart described the role 
played by the Kuki during the operations in the most favourable terms. Apart from the 
services of the Kuki Levy, Kuki villagers, who had been given arms and employed by 
Stewart as scouts, killed or brought in as many men of the mutineers as were killed in 
action by British troops.
92
 
 
Thus, in a letter reporting the end of operations in Cachar, Stewart strongly urged 
the Government to increase the size of the Kuki-Levy from 200 to 640 men. This, he 
thought, would provide for the effectual defence of Cachar and the frontier in general at 
less expense. He also intimated that the Kukis had „neither political power nor prestige‟ 
and were therefore less likely to stage another mutiny, but they were, at the same time, 
„naturally brave and inured‟ to the climate and to the warfare of the frontier of Cachar. 
The Kukis, he continued, could act as a better check against the Manipuris, since they 
had „no sympathy with the caste or creed of any other in Hindoostan‟, but were bound 
to the British for protection, which they had received ever since they came into the 
British territories.
93
 
 
The Government, however, was not as confident as Stewart of the capabilities of 
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the Kuki as soldiers. The Governor-General thought the Kukis in particular, and the 
„warlike tribes in Assam‟ in general were more suited to police duties than military 
service. Earlier, in June 1857, men and officers of the Kuki-Levy had come to Stewart 
and volunteered to become a General Service Corps, ready to be stationed at any part of 
India,
94
 but the Governor-General objected to this on the above grounds.
95
 The same 
position, in fact, was reiterated when suggestions for enlisting Nga Kee Kay‟s men 
under the military was made by Major Garstin, the Commander of the Arakan Battalion, 
at the withdrawal of the military post at Naragain.
96
  
 
The proposal by Stewart for the increase of the Kuki Levy seems to have received 
a similar rejection. In 1863, the Kuki Levy was amalgamated with the police. Yet the 
Kukis proved ill-suited as police: they could not adapt themselves to the organisation of 
the police, and their fellow native officers looked down upon them as people without 
caste, while people regarded them with both „contempt as hill men and hatred as 
policemen‟.97 As Edgar commented later, this made the Kukis, whom both Lister and 
Stewart praised for their pluck and love of fighting, „the meekest and most inoffensible‟ 
of constables.
98
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2. Ethnic Categories of the Kuki-Chin People 
 
a) British Administrators and the Categories of the Kuki-Chin 
 
In general, the same observations as the previous chapter can be made for the 
1850s: i.e. „Kuki‟ continued to be the generic term in Cachar and Manipur with „Lushai‟ 
somewhat distinguished from the „Kuki‟; and in Arakan, „Khyen‟, „Shendu‟, „Mru‟, 
„Kumi‟ and „Kami‟ were used as distinctive categories.  
 
In Cachar, with the establishment of the Kuki Levy, Lieutenant Stewart, as the 
commander of the Kuki Levy, developed a deeper knowledge of the Kuki people and 
contributed an article to the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
99
 In this article, 
Stewart made the first explicit distinction between „New Kukis‟, who had recently 
arrived, and the „Old Kukis‟ who had been around Cachar for a long time. This 
distinction became standard practice throughout the colonial period. Independent of 
Stewart, the Manipuris had maintained a similar distinction, calling the „Old Kukis‟ by 
individual clan names but using „Khongjai‟ as a blanket term to cover all the „New 
Kukis‟.100 
 
Other than this new distinction, the practice of suffixing „clan names‟ or „sub-
categories‟ with „Kuki‟ continued. „Lushai‟ was not an exception, as „Luchey Kukis‟ 
was the term used by Captain Verner for the people. Yet continuing talks with the chiefs 
had confirmed the family relationship among the Lushai chiefs and this, coupled with 
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the idea that Lushais were more powerful and better organised than the Kukis, 
encouraged the separation of „Lushais‟ from other sub-groups of the Kukis. The 
following remark by the Directors in 1858 on the progress of talks between Captain 
Verner and the Lushais shows this tendency most clearly: 
The Superintendent very properly informed the Loochais, that your 
Government could not defend them against hostile tribes in the jungles, but 
that if compelled to take refuge in Cachar, they would be protected in the 
same manner as the Kookies.
101
 
 
In the above passage, the term „Loochai‟ was used as an independent category from 
the „Kookies‟. Moreover, it is clear that the Directors understood „Lushai‟ as the ones 
outside British jurisdiction in contrast to the „Kukis‟ who were now subservient to the 
Company. Thus, the understanding of different political relationships between the 
Company and the Kuki on the one hand and Lushai on the other affected the 
development of differentiation between the Kuki and the Lushai in the context of 
Cachar. It is also important to note that it was the Directors, who had no first-hand 
knowledge of the frontier, who developed a clearer idea of distinction between Lushai 
and Kuki, while the local officer still used „Lushai‟ as a sub-category of „Kuki‟. The 
further from the actual context, the easier it was to adopt simplified forms of existing 
categories. 
 
In Arakan, the category „Khyeng‟ appeared most frequently in the official 
documents during the 1850s, while no correspondence took place regarding the people 
around the Koladyne River, such as „Kumi‟, „Mru‟ or „Shendu‟, who had dominated 
official correspondence in the previous decade. This was due to the sudden change in 
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the situation around the Aeng Pass produced by the cooperation of Nga Kee Kay, in 
contrast to the stalemate created towards the Koladyne River. Obviously, this does not 
mean that the raids from the „Shendu‟ had stopped in Arakan and in Chittagong; rather, 
it seems that after the failure of expeditions in the 1840s, described in the previous 
chapter, British officers seem to have lost interest in ameliorating the relationship with 
the Kuki-Chin people towards the source of Koladyne. 
 
The overall situation of the ethnic categories in the Arakan Hills continued to be 
described in the same way as by Phayre: the British officers still used those categories 
of „Khyeng‟, „Kumi‟, „Kami‟, „Mru‟ and „Shendu‟ as principal categories, when 
describing the situation of the Arakan Hills as a whole.
102
 The same situation continued 
until at least the early 1880s. In the British Burma Gazetteer, published by the 
Government of Burma in 1880, the Chin people were discussed under two separate 
classes, one definitely of „Burma stock‟, such as „Khami‟ and „Mru‟ and other „outlying 
tribes‟ whose „tribal relations are doubtful‟ such as „Khyeng‟, „Anoo or Khoung-tso‟, 
„Khyaw‟, „Toungtha‟ and even „Kookie‟.103 The broad classification of these categories 
into two was based on the familiarity of each group to the British officers, distinguished 
by their known ethnic affinities; therefore, it was similar to the division of independent 
and subjected Chin as held by the Burmese. Yet in essence, all these categories were 
regarded as separate groups from each other, in other words, there was no concept of 
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„sub-‟ or „supra-‟ category regarding the Kuki-Chin people in Arakan. 
 
This was in part because all the officers and authors based their judgement on 
Phayre, particularly his articles in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal: as the 
Chief Commissioner of British Burma, as well as one who had first published articles 
on this topic out of personal experience of the people, his opinions remained 
unchallenged. Yet not all this continuity can be reduced to the personal influence of 
Phayre‟s authority. Unlike the Bengalis in the northern Kuki-Chin frontier who used the 
term „Kuki‟ as a blanket term, the dwellers in Arakan plains do not seem to have 
employed „Khyen‟, or any other term, as a generic term inclusive of other known 
categories. 
 
In this, geographic difference seems to have been a main distinguishing factor. As 
in Phayre, the categories in Arakan continued to be distinguished mainly according to 
geographic location. „Khyeng‟ was used to denote the people along the Arakan Yoma, 
especially near the Aeng Pass and those who lived around and east of the Talak River; 
while Kumi, Mru, and Shendu were used for the people around the Koladyne River. 
Thus, there were two, geographically distinguished, contexts in Arakan: one was the 
area around Arakan Yoma to the east where the distinction of „independent‟ and 
„subjected Kheyng‟ dominated, and another was around the Koladyne River and 
towards the source of it, where „Kumi‟ and „Mru‟ denoted those nearer to the plains, 
while „Shendu‟ was the category for the remote marauders. A political relationship was 
also implied in this categorisation. „Shendu‟ represented the remote marauders out of 
British control towards the source of the Koladyne, while in the Arakan Yoma it was the 
terms „Khyen Yain‟ or „Araings‟ which were used in contrast to the „Khyen‟ such as the 
  
 299 
people of Nga Kee Kay.  
 
From this it can be deduced that the geographic differentiation was related to the 
different political situations in different parts of Arakan. Around the Koladyne River, the 
Kumi and Mru of the Kuki-Chin people had a closer relationship with the plains, and 
hence they were known by the names they called themselves, while those further inland 
were known to the British by the name the Kumi had given, „Shendu‟. In Arakan Yoma, 
however, the strong influence of the Burmese distinction coupled with the long neglect 
of the issue by British officers, resulted in the continuation of the Burmese distinctions 
of the Kuki-Chin people. 
 
The map compiled by Yule (see M8 on the next page), which accompanies his 
Narratives of the Mission to the Court of Ava, displays this distribution most explicitly. 
Following the tradition of Pemberton, Yule filled the blanks of the map with the names 
of people known to reside in the area. Of the Kuki-Chin people, there were, from north 
to south, „Kookees‟, „Looshaee‟, „Wild Khyens‟, „Mrus‟, „Kami and Kumi‟ and 
„Khyens‟. Yule, however, did not adopt the term „Shendu‟, or „Poi‟ alluded to by the 
other officers, but instead wrote of an „unexplored Mass of Hills inhabited by a great 
many tribes of Indo-Chinese type in low stages of civilisation‟, to the east of Hill 
Tripura around the Blue Mountain. Apparently he did not regard the rumoured and 
unconfirmed information regarding Poi or Shendu to be accurate enough to place on the 
map. On the other hand, he was the first to argue for the affinity between the Kuki and 
Chin. This was based on the name of the divinity the people worshipped. Lieutenant 
Stewart had noticed that the „New Kukis‟ recognised „one all-powerful God as the 
author of the universe‟, whom they termed „Puthein‟. Yule compared this with the 
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„Pasine‟, the name of the deity worshipped by the „Khyens‟ around the Aeng Pass as 
reported by Trant, and concluded that they must be closely related to each other.
104
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Map 8. Part of the New Map of Burma, by H. Yule (1857) (Yule, Narrative) 
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b) Rise of Ethnology and the Kuki-Chin Categories 
 
As seen so far, by the mid-nineteenth century, there were a fair number of 
publications on the Kuki-Chin, mainly by the administrators. These included, on the one 
hand, those who freely wrote of the „curiosities‟ they observed, such as Robert Lindsay 
or T. A. Trant; and on the other, those, such as Francis Buchanan, or Arthur Phayre, who, 
through more devoted research and a longer stay, could accumulate a more intimate 
knowledge of the Kuki-Chin people. The contents as well as the reliability of the 
information in these works necessarily varied, but taken together they provided a wide 
range of information on the physical appearance, customs, religion, political and civil 
institutions, and language of the Kuki-Chin people to their readers in Britain and Europe. 
 
Some of these authors did more than provide facts about the Kuki-Chin people, 
and included analysis of their own. One common topic of analysis was the affinity of 
the Kuki-Chin people both among themselves and with others. The interest itself was 
most clearly expressed by Francis Buchanan, who suggested employing the method of 
comparative philology to reveal the „migrations and connections of nations‟. 105  As 
already shown, Buchanan stopped at providing lists of words and suggesting the 
directions for further research; however, there were others who approached the same 
topic from different angles. 
 
Pemberton related the Kuki to the Malay, and traced their origin to the south on the 
evidence of appearance and the impression of their spoken language. This was in 
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contrast to the Naga, whom he regarded as of „Tartar stock‟.106 Phayre disagreed with 
Pemberton on this, and argued that the Kuki-Chin people were akin to the „Myam-má‟ 
race and distinct from the Malay. The evidence, Phayre argued was, first the oral 
tradition of the Khyens and Kumis, and second that the Malays had only recently moved 
to Malacca and Kedah, and therefore, could not have come further north into the eastern 
hills of Bengal.
107
 
 
On this topic John Crawfurd was partly of the same opinion as Phayre and partly as 
Pemberton. He argued that all the  nations of Burma – including Burmese, Mon, Shan, 
Karen, Chin and so on – had the same „physical type‟ which differed widely from the 
„Chinese and Hindoos, and approached more nearly to the Malays‟. Yet he immediately 
added that they also differed from the Malays „so considerably that even a stranger may 
distinguish them without difficulty.‟108 For Crawfurd, physical appearance was the most 
important factor in determining affinities among people, and from such evidence he 
related the Chin people to the other nations of Burma. All of these then were related to 
the „Indo-Chinese‟ which was distinguished from Chinese, Indian or Malay. 
 
Such analytical interest in the affinity of people was not confined to the Kuki-Chin 
or the people in India, nor was such interest held by just a couple of British officers in 
India. In fact, it was an almost obsessive pursuit of the Europeans of the time, in relation 
to the other peoples of the world. By the end of the eighteenth century, a large and still 
growing amount of information regarding non-Europeans had already been accumulated 
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within Europe through the activities of traders, travellers, explorers, missionaries, 
administrators and soldiers. This stimulated a vigorous interest in, and debates on, the 
diversity of mankind which, in the early nineteenth century, was summed up under one 
discipline named „ethnology‟, which, according to Stocking, was „the most general 
scientific framework for the study of the linguistic, physical, and cultural characteristics 
of dark-skinned, non-European, “uncivilised” peoples.‟109 
 
The beginning of ethnology is usually traced to the formation of the Ethnological 
Society of London in 1843.
110
 Yet, as seen through the examples regarding the Kuki-
Chin people, similar interests had long been prevalent among the intellectuals of Europe, 
and James Cowles Prichard, the leading ethnologist of the time, had already begun 
publishing his magnum opus, Researches into the Physical History of Mankind, back in 
1836. 
 
The paramount interest of Prichard was to explain observed human diversity with 
the theory of the unity of the human race. The influence of religion was obvious in his 
approach to the subject, since it was intended to defend the biblical „monogenism‟ as 
found in Mosaic Records against the „polygenism‟ of French „philosophes‟ based on 
comparative anatomy.
111
 For Prichard the main task of ethnology was: 
to trace the history of the tribes and races of men from the most remote 
periods which are within reach of investigation, to discover their mutual 
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relations, and to arrive at conclusions, either certain or probable, as to their 
affinity or diversity of origin.
112
 
For such an enquiry the „direct authority of history‟ furnished but „very imperfect 
insight into the origins of nations‟, so he suggested employing the indirect evidence 
reflected in languages, civil and religious institutions and mythologies, manners and 
customs. The most important and reliable of these was the comparison of languages.
113
  
 
The Researches, however, were hardly successful in this task. The only 
comprehensive argument on human affinity in the whole series was that between the 
ancient Egyptian and the Indian, which he argued through the affinity in languages, 
political and religious institutions, and myths. The least satisfactory of all was the last 
chapter concerning „the other principal races of men, and their connexion in origin with 
the foregoing‟, which dealt with the Scythian, Goth, Celtic and lastly, „the Mongoles 
and other races resembling them in form‟. Regarding the Mongols, he started by quoting 
several articles that had appeared in Asiatic Researches at the turn of the century, 
including the article on the Kuki by John Rawlins, and made a broad observation that: 
„the natives of several mountainous districts of India, whether from the influence of 
local causes or other less obvious circumstances, are observed to vary considerably in 
their figure, and especially in the outline of the face, from the character common in the 
low country.‟114 Apart from this, as he admitted, he was unable to trace their origin 
satisfactorily due to the lack of information concerning the ancient history of the 
natives.
115
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The problem for Prichard was that the data for his argument were often inadequate. 
Prichardian ethnology was an exercise exclusively in the „study‟ not in the „field‟, so the 
ethnologists relied on published sources supplied by travellers, explorers, administrators 
and missionaries who wrote what they had observed during their travels. Inevitably, the 
individual differences in content and the reliability of the information made it difficult 
to adopt them for uniform analysis. Prichard was aware of this problem and much 
concerned as well. In 1839 at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science, he read a paper regarding the „Extinction of some varieties of the Human 
Race‟.116 In this paper he pointed out:  
. . . the irretrievable loss which science must sustain, if so large a portion of 
the human race, counting by tribes instead of individuals, is suffered to perish, 
before many interesting questions of a psychological, physiological and 
philological character, as well as many historical facts in relation to them, 
have been investigated.
117
 
Therefore, „to rescue and to preserve these from oblivion‟ for the interest of „science 
and humanity‟, he prepared a list of questions as a guideline for travellers in the field. It 
comprised 89 questions divided into 8 sections: 49 questions regarding „Physical 
Characters‟; 3 questions on „Buildings and Monuments‟; 2 questions on „Works of 
Arts‟; one question on „Domestic Animals‟; 13 questions on „Government and Laws‟; 7 
questions on „Geography and Statistics‟; 2 questions on „Social Relations‟; and 13 
questions on „Religion, Superstitions, & c.‟  
 
It was an attempt from „studies‟ to control the process of the collection of data in 
                                                 
116
 J. C. Prichard et al. „Queries respecting the human race, to be addressed to traveller and others, 
drawn up by a committee of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, appointed in 1839, 
London‟ in JASB vol.13, no.155, (1844): 919-32. [reprinted from the original proceedings in 1839 by the 
editors of JASB] 
117
 Ibid. 919. 
  
 307 
foreign „fields‟. Britain was not alone in this either. The Ethnographical Society of Paris 
had also printed a set of questions on the same subject for the use of travellers, with 
similar contents. Naturally, there was a sense of competition that occurred among the 
British whenever the French were associated with the same project. The committee 
added that:  
Britain, in her extensive colonial possessions and commerce, and in the 
number and intelligence of her naval officers, possesses unrivalled facilities 
for the elucidation of the whole subject; and it would be a stain on her 
character, as well as a loss to humanity, were she to allow herself to be left 
behind by other nations in this inquiry.
118
 
 
The same article was reprinted in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 
1844. The editors of the journal introduced this list as an important paper, „as pointing 
out to so many residents in India a kind of knowledge which they may so easily acquire 
and communicate, and which offers so many points of interest to every thinking mind‟. 
Special attention was drawn to „the more savage races of India‟ including those of the 
Eastern Frontiers, from the study of which many „scientific laurels‟ were to be gathered, 
eventually to become „useful knowledge with many humane results.‟119 
 
It is doubtful, however, that any of the British officers in India had enough time 
and energy to follow this instruction item by item. On the other hand, similar interests 
had already been widespread among British officers independent of Prichard or his list. 
Buchanan, Phayre, and John Crawfurd had already shown a similar interest in the 
connections between people as already shown, and the interest in the developmental 
stage of civilisation of different peoples was commonly found among the surveyors and 
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administrators after the First Anglo-Burmese War. If there indeed was an observable 
current among different writers that can be termed as a „Prichardian paradigm‟ it was 
not because others followed Prichard‟s lead but because Prichard‟s work itself was 
based on the popularity of this particular interest. 
 
In this sense, the contribution of Prichard to ethnology was through the 
amalgamation of already existing interests and tendencies in a way that provided the 
broadest framework for the history of the dispersion of mankind. Similarly, it included, 
within its analytic purview, most of the contemporary disciplines of human science, or 
the ways of seeing different human groups: such as anatomy, philology, mythology, 
zoology, and the undercurrent of strong consensus on the developmental stages of 
human civilisation. On top of this was the attraction of Prichardian monogenism, which 
was acceptable to the religious sentiments of the British middle class. 
 
On the other hand, the popularity of this paradigm did not end within the study and 
conference halls, but inspired non-expert travellers with the idea of „science‟ regarding 
non-European foreigners. For example, recalling his encounter with „very extraordinary 
looking specimens‟ of the human race at Tonghoo, William Laurie wrote in his narrative 
of the Second Anglo-Burmese War:  
It struck the Author that it would be time well spent were a medical man to 
commence in this new country a series of practical investigations regarding 
the varieties of mankind, starting from the general conclusion that all the 
human races may have had a common origin. Then, after this, would come an 
inquiry into the bearing of philological evidence upon the question, the 
zealous student finishing his labours by persuading live specimens to 
accompany him to London!
120
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„Specimen‟, „varieties of mankind‟, were the terms for the natives, and the one who 
was proposed to engage himself in this „practical investigation‟ was a „medical man‟; 
this was the confident rhetoric of „science‟. Moreover, this science was to be carried out 
on the basis of the „general conclusion‟ which was Prichard‟s starting-point. In other 
words, such study was designed to contribute to the completion of Prichard‟s grand 
project by adding another part of the jigsaw. The influence of the „Prichardian 
paradigm‟ on Laurie is also made clear when he later quoted the divisions of „Asiatic 
Nations‟ as suggested by Robert Latham, who was an advocate of Prichard.121  
 
Laurie observed in Burma that the Burmese had the physical and linguistic features 
that resembled more nearly the „Hindu‟ than the Siamese who were themselves nearer to 
the „Chinese.‟ This, he argued was proof that the changes within the „Seriform stock‟ of 
people were gradual. „Seriform stock was a category suggested by Latham to include all 
the people over „China, Thibet, the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, and the base of the 
Himalayan range of mountains‟. The obvious problem for such a category was the 
difference among those included, but, by pointing to the gradual changes, Laurie was 
defending the category „seriform stock‟ as genuinely one family despite the difference 
between the „Chinese‟ and the „Hindu‟.122  
 
In the above argument, the Indo-Chinese formed the key to the affinity between the 
Chinese and Indians. John Crawfurd‟s already quoted argument, that the „Indo-Chinese‟ 
was a distinctive group from the „Chinese‟ or the „Hindus‟, was an anti-thesis to what 
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Laurie argued, following Latham.
123
 This debate was the main theme of Brian Houghton 
Hodgson, who provided a more researched article on the same question. 
 
From 1847, the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal started publishing a series 
of articles on the „aborigines of India‟ written by Hodgson, a former Resident to 
Nepal.
124
 The first article, titled „A Brief Note on Indian Ethnology‟, summarised his 
intention to build on the success of comparative philology in the demonstration of „the 
unity of the Arian family, from Wales to Assam‟, and carry out a similar investigation 
among the „Tamúlian‟ or non-Arian population of India125. The first object of such a 
study was to ascertain when, and under what circumstances, this dispersion of „the 
ancient owners of the soil‟ took place and the second was to determine the stage of the 
progress they have made in moral and material terms.
126
  
 
He advocated using physical, linguistic and cultural evidence for this study. Among 
these, language was the most important tool that could display accurately „the point of 
advancement which the aborigines had reached in thought and in action‟. He was 
convinced that every distinct effective idea must have an appropriate word to express it; 
therefore, presence and absence of certain concepts in the vocabulary could demonstrate 
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the moral and physical status of each people.
127
  
 
His analysis of the Kuki-Chin people appeared towards the end of the series in 
1853 under the title „On the Indo-Chinese Borders and Their Connexion with the 
Himalayans and Tibetans‟. As the title suggested, the main point he made was the 
affinity of the Kuki-Chin people with the Indo-Chinese or the oneness of the Indo-
Chinese people including the Kuki-Chin group. Most of the data he used was from 
Phayre, whom he regarded as a „warrant for authenticity‟.128 In fact half of the article 
was a mere reprint of the notes on „Khyeng‟, „Kami‟, „Kúmi‟, „Mrú‟ and „Sák‟ supplied 
to Hodgson by Phayre. 
 
The contents of the portion written by Phayre were not much different from 
Phayre‟s own article on Arakan published ten years earlier. The only notable addition 
was that here he provided accounts for the names when available. Here, Phayre argued 
that not only the names „Kumi‟ and „Mru‟ but also „Khyeng‟ were based on their own 
words meaning „man‟. He stipulated that „Khyeng‟ probably was a corruption of Kláng, 
their word for „man‟: according to Phayre, an Arakanese interpreter wrote the word 
from the mouth of a man of this race as „Khyeng‟, but it sounded to him closer to 
„Kláng‟.129 
 
Hodgson‟s idea on the origin of the names, however, differed from Phayre. In a 
footnote, Hodgson added that „Kyáng‟ or „Khíang‟ was a well-known ethnic designation 
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among Chinese, Tibetans and many Indo-Chinese. He drew particular attention to the 
fact that similar elements appear in the names of the people around the region. For 
example, „Ká‟ appeared in „Kambojian‟, „Ká Khyen‟ and „Kariens‟, while the 
Kambojian „Kyo‟ reappeared in the „Kho‟ of the „Koladyne‟ River and Siamese or „Tai‟ 
appeared again in the „Moi-Tay‟(or Meithei) which was the ethnic name of the 
Manipuris. All of these, he argue testified for the affinities among them.  
 
In a similar way, he interpreted the name „Khyeng‟ as related to „Khyi‟ or „Khyáng‟ 
of Chinese,
130
 which he used as a proof of the affinity between the two.
131
 Also, when 
Phayre wrote of a „curious tribe‟ called „Khyau‟(Cho, apparently the same as the „Kio‟ 
of Buchanan), Hodgson added a note that this must be the „Kyo‟ of Kambodia. He then 
extended his analysis to include Kuki and conjectured that „Khyi‟, „Kyo‟, „Khyen‟, and 
„Kuki‟ might be „radically one and the same term‟, all of which derived from one word 
similar in sound and widespread among the nations of Indo-China: „Khyi, Kyi, Ki, or 
Ku‟ meaning dog, which, in his opinion, was the epithet bestowed on them by the 
dominant races of Indo-China. „Ka‟ of „Kami‟ was easily interpreted in the same light as 
to mean „men of the Ka tribe‟. Then Hodgson‟s ever-vigilant mind related this to the 
Himalayas and Tibet where „Ka‟, mutable to „Ki‟ and „Ku‟ was a prefix widely 
prevalent as the word „mi‟ for man is widespread among the people of the Arakan Hills. 
 
This was, in fact, a sub-plot to his main argument: contrary to the conventional 
view that the people living at the fringe of Indo-China were related either to the Chinese 
(or Tibetan) or to the Himalayans (or Hindus), Hodgson argued, from the analysis of the 
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vocabularies of less than three hundred words from each tongue, that there was „one 
type of language prevailing from the Káli to the Koladân, and from Ladakh to Malaca, 
so as to bring the Himálayans, Indo-Chinese and Tibetans into the same family.‟ 
 
Hodgson‟s approach, when contrasted to that of Phayre, reveals the defining 
characteristics of the ethnology of the period. Of these two, Phayre was the one who had 
a closer understanding of the people through his personal experiences. His approach 
was to learn from the people and his opinion on the topic of the affinity of the people 
was based primarily on the traditions among the people themselves. Therefore, he 
concluded that the Khyeng and Kumis were an off-shoot of the „Myam-má race‟ based 
on the evidence of their own tradition.
132
 On the other hand, Hodgson regarded the 
„fanciful ideas of the past‟ as remembered by people at what he regarded as a low stage 
of civilisation as unreliable; so he gave priority to his own analysis: an analysis of 
words taken out of context, dissected and processed for universal comparison. The same, 
in fact, was true of Buchanan, who had adopted the same method for the people of 
Burma. For both Buchanan and Hodgson the language was regarded as having a one to 
one relationship with the people who used them, and each of these groups was 
presumed to have a homogeneous culture and physical type. This was why Buchanan 
was confused when he found such a number of different languages among the people 
with similar physical and cultural traits.
133
 
 
This is what Pels noted as the changing academic current from the „Orientalist‟ to 
the „Anglicist‟ approach. Whereas the orientalists of the 18th century learned the 
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languages of the natives and studied their manuscripts, the ethnology of Hodgson 
involved the study of languages dissected into their component parts, without paying 
heed to the context, or even trying to learn the languages as such. History was no more 
derived from the texts or how people remembered them, but reconstructed from the 
comparative analysis of words in the universal, or „scientific‟ context of ethnology.134  
 
In this sense, Pels pictures Hodgson as one who introduced the transition of 
subjects from „texts‟ to „bodies‟. To judge Hodgson like this, however, is an over-
projection of the scientific racism of the late nineteenth century onto a trend just 
emerging from the amalgam of different interests about the natives of India. On the one 
hand, Hodgson‟s main material was still words, if not texts, rather than bodies. The 
interest in vocabulary and affinities among different groups had already been visible in 
the works of Francis Buchanan half a century earlier. There was no abrupt transition: in 
fact, the person who had sparked off Hodgson‟s interest in affinities, by providing the 
basis for the hypothesis of the unity of Indo-European languages, was none other than 
the most representative of the orientalists, William Jones.
135
 Besides, the contemporary 
interest in „bodies‟, as seen in Pemberton or Crawfurd, was not yet based on 
measurements, but on impression; therefore, Hodgson as well as Prichard regarded 
language rather than bodies to be the scientific basis upon which to build the affinity of 
the people and the history of their migration.  
 
It was, however, the notion of „science‟ that set Hodgson apart from the others. The 
influence of natural science, especially zoology and botany, was strong in the way he 
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pictured human affinities. As in the works of Prichard, behind such a hypothesis of 
human affinities was the analogy of a tree with trunk and branches that had been 
modelled after the division of the animal world: the system of kingdom, class, order, 
family, genus, and species. Moreover, unlike Pemberton, Crawfurd or Phayre, 
Hodgson‟s works had data for analysis with a clear methodology, and unlike Buchanan, 
he had a clear orientation: to prove the unity of the non-Arian population of India as a 
contribution to similar studies over the whole of mankind. 
 
One such global framework was provided by Christian Bunsen in 1854 in his 
Philosophy of Universal History.
136
 Here he subsumed most of the languages that 
cannot be tied to the Indo-European languages to a category called „Turanian‟, which 
included not only the bulk of Asian languages, but also the American, Malayan, 
Polynesian, and even the Papuan and Australian as well. „Turanian‟, together with 
Iranian, was understood to be a sub-branch of the „Japhetic race‟ and the „Japhetic race‟ 
was one of the three main divisions of the whole human language: the other two were 
„Chamitic‟ and „Semitic‟ – from the names of three sons of Noah in the Book of Genesis. 
Bunsen regarded these three as „three steps of development of one and the same stock‟. 
With this, he encompassed all the languages of the world under one single monogenetic 
framework that matched the explanation in the Mosaic Records of the Bible.
137
 
 
It was Friedrich Max Müller, a German philologist who came to London in 1846 to 
consult East India Records, who provided a chapter on the „Turanian Language‟ to 
Bunsen‟s Universal History. Facing a vexing diversity among all the languages classed 
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under „Turanian‟, Müller based his explanation on the morphological classification of 
languages.
138
 In the three-way classification of languages into „isolating‟, „agglutinative‟ 
and „inflexional‟, Turanian languages were classed as agglutinative, i.e. expressing 
grammatical relations by prefixes and suffixes.
139
 The diversity of the Turanians was 
then explained by this structural principle of agglutination, which led to rapid 
differentiation of dialects under the conditions of nomadic life. 
 
The three-way division of language also implied developmental stages, which was 
then related to the migration of people. According to Müller, from the common centre of 
all mankind, the first group went to China where the development was arrested at the 
first stage of the development of language, then came the migration of Turanians and, at 
last, the migrations of the Semites and „Arians‟, whose languages had passed out of the 
stage of „mechanical crystallisation‟, and achieved „such settled principles and such 
intense individuality in grammar and dictionary, that the national character . . . of its 
descendants could never obliterate or efface the stamp of their common parent.‟140 
 
Müller subdivided the Turanian family of language into Northern and Southern 
divisions.
141
 The Southern division of the Turanian family was again divided into „Taïc‟, 
„Malaic‟, „Gangetic‟, „Lohitic‟, „Munda‟, and „Tamulic‟. Of these, Lohitic included the 
languages spoken by the people in the Eastern Frontier of India and Burma, along with 
the six categories of the Kuki-Chin people – Kuki, Khyeng, Kami, Kumi, Shendus, and 
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Mru.
142
 
 
Most of the data Müller used to describe this family of language was from 
Hodgson, whom Müller regarded as „our highest living authority and best informant on 
the ethnology and phonology of the native races of India.‟143 As Hodgson himself did 
not have much data on the different groups of Kuki or Lushai people, the above list 
shows more categories of the Chin people in Arakan, which in turn was due to the 
influence of Phayre, who had been the major informant for Hodgson.  
 
This process of the flow of data from the actual field to London reveals an 
important point about the categories of early ethnology. For Müller, these categories 
were primarily linguistic categories, which meant that the names appearing in the above 
table were the names of languages, and they were distinguished by linguistic 
characteristics. On the other hand, Hodgson, from whom Müller took these categories, 
used them primarily as names for different groups of people, or ethnic categories, and 
language was just one feature he adopted for discussion of human affinity. This was also 
the case with Phayre, for whom they were the names of peoples in Arakan. 
 
This was what Müller has been always criticised for: even though he, more than 
any other mentioned so far, opted for a strictly linguistic analysis, his categories pulled 
him into an area larger than language. Müller, in later days, was strongly against 
confusing ethnological and phonological categories.
144
 Nevertheless, at least during the 
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1850s, he used these categories as more than just linguistic groups. He sometimes 
attempted to project even those imaginary categories such as Turanian and Arian as 
actual groups, especially when he discussed their migration. When explaining the 
diversity of Turanian languages, he alluded to the nomadic lifestyle of the Turanians and, 
similarly, he often talked of Arians as an actual group with specific territories and their 
own way of life.
145
  
 
John Crawfurd was highly sceptical of this current that sought affinities among 
people and languages, and he severely criticised Müller for his argument that „the Indo-
European was a language ever spoken by such a thing as the Aryan race‟. For him it was 
utterly groundless to argue that „all the languages of Europe and Asia from Bengal to 
the British Isles, however different in appearance, to have sprung from the same stock, 
and hence, all the people speaking them, black, swarthy and fair, to be of one and the 
same race of man‟.146  
 
Another problem with the categories used in ethnology, more general and intrinsic 
to the discipline, becomes apparent when the Kuki-Chin categories in the above table 
are compared with the original usages in their local contexts. For an example, as seen in 
the last chapter, the category „Shendu‟ in Arakan was an indefinite term that was used 
by different people to mean different entities. The only common feature the „Shendu‟ 
had perhaps was their comparative unfamiliarity to and independence from the people 
nearer to the British-ruled plains. In this sense, the category „Shendu‟ could overlap 
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with the category „Khyen‟, especially with the „Independent Khyen‟ or „Khyen Yain‟. 
Further evidence for this is that „Shendu‟ in Tickell‟s article implied the Lai group of 
Chin people who were centred in the area described as inhabited by the „Khyen Yain‟ in 
the maps by Pemberton and Yule. Therefore, „Khyen‟ and „Shendu‟ were not two 
separable entities but they were categories used in different contexts: the one by the 
people near the Arakan Yoma, and the other by the people near the Koladyne River; the 
same observation can be made of the difference between „Kuki‟ and „Shendu‟, and 
„Kuki‟ and „Khyen‟.  
 
What actually distinguished one category from another in this case was the context, 
not the innate characters of the thus-named groups. This was especially so as the names 
– Shendu, Kuki, and Khyen – were given by outsiders. The complication is much 
greater than this, since some of the terms in the table, such as Mru, Kumi, and Kami, 
were the terms the people employed for themselves. Yet, all these names were treated as 
equally independent categories, comparable to each other, even with fixed locations and 
with the implication that each category was a unit of migration, with a unique language, 
culture and, for some, physical traits. 
 
A part of such transformation of categories had been the responsibility of British 
administrators: in their need to identify names, and, in their position as the rulers over 
vast territories across different cultures and contexts, the administrators inevitably 
introduced a degree of standardisation. Yet, when such information was transferred from 
the administrators in the field, to the ethnologists in their studies, the categories went 
though a much more thorough de-contextualisation through the „scientific‟ process of 
standardising data for global comparison – dissecting objects into components. As the 
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main concern of the ethnologists of those days related to the affinities and migrations of 
„mankind‟ on a global scale, they did not think much of the delicate local contexts. 
Therefore, within the context of the ethnology of the nineteenth century, the categories 
of the Kuki-Chin people were transformed into one of the many base units for the global 
categorisation of mankind – whether these were called, races, tribes, or even „species‟ – 
which can be compared, distinguished and grouped with the other categories that came 
from all over the world through a similar process. Through this, the context fusion that 
had been introduced locally in administrative forms was now made global. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
1. British Management of the Kuki-Chin Frontier 
 
During the East India Company‟s rule in India, British interactions with the Kuki-
Chin people increased. Whereas the first frontier administrators at Sylhet and 
Chittagong had barely heard of the name Kuki, by the end of the 1850s there were Kuki 
villages established under British administrators in the southern frontier of Manipur, 
Cachar, and Sylhet. In Cachar, a Kuki-levy had been formed under European command, 
and diplomatic exchanges had been made between the Lushai chiefs and the 
Superintendent of Cachar, following a decade of raids and expeditions. In Arakan, a 
group of Chin people were employed as a police force guarding the Aeng Pass, and the 
villages of the Kumi and Mru around the Koladyne River were paying annual taxes to 
the Company. The development of direct relationships in Chittagong and Tripura had 
been minimal, since the British only indirectly managed the frontier in this quarter, yet 
even here British awareness of the situation increased during the period of the Company. 
 
Most of this increase in relations took place after the First Anglo-Burmese War. 
Though the British had had contacts with the Kuki-Chin people via Sylhet, Chittagong 
and Tripura before the war, no effort had been made to manage the frontier: the only 
action they took against the Kuki-Chin after raids was to close markets temporarily to 
all the Kuki, while the customs already established under the Mughals, such as paying 
blackmail to the Paitu Kukis, continued without much interference. 
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One reason for the change was the geographic expansion of British India after the 
war: Cachar and Arakan came under direct management while Manipur came under 
British influence. All these places already had close relationships with the Kuki-Chin, 
and more contacts were inevitable between the British administration and different 
groups of the Kuki-Chin people. More important than the geographic expansion, 
however, were the changes in the attitude of the British Frontier administration, 
especially a heightened interest in the defence of the frontier. The surveys during the 
years immediately after the conclusion of the war testify to the interest in the defence of 
the frontier, which had formerly been utterly neglected. While such renewed interest 
was only natural after a war with Burma, another factor that influenced the change was 
the growing consolidation of British rule in the plains, with increasing rationalisation of 
British administrative practice. 
 
Had the Kuki-Chin people been isolated in the interior of the hills with little 
interaction with the others around them, it would have been much easier for the British 
to manage the frontier. Yet all the polities in the frontier were interrelated in an intricate 
web of relationships, both political and economic. On top of this, any polity in the 
frontier was composed of different ethnic elements, which van Schendel described as 
„multi-ethnic arrangements‟. The actual boundary of a polity relied on its power to hold 
these different elements in an alliance and was only loosely defined, since those at the 
outskirts of influence could easily break off from the centre and realign with their 
enemies. Thus, the balance of power in the frontier was extremely volatile and crisis in 
one polity tended to spread over to its neighbours, as can be seen in the events that led 
to the First Anglo-Burmese War. 
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Hence British efforts to consolidate administrations in the newly acquired 
territories met with trouble. Some of the Kuki-Chin villages were already within their 
administration. Some of them at the fringe had prearranged tributary relationships with 
the rulers of the plains that the British came to replace. At times individuals as well as 
villages as a whole moved in and out of the administered area, from one area to another, 
or simply threw off what feeble influence the British had over them. Local rebels often 
joined hands with the hill people. On top of all these, Kuki-Chin raids were reported 
from all over the frontier, scaring farmers away from the tracts at the foot of the hills.  
 
Such a situation was unsatisfactory for the British administration, especially 
because by this time British rule in India had already made progress towards a rational 
government: impersonal rules provided by a set of regulations with administrators 
carrying out prescribed duties rather than ruling on their own account as feudal lords. 
The orientation for such development can be seen from the moment Hastings took over 
the duties of revenue administration directly and provided a central ruling structure for 
the administration. It was, however, Cornwallis who introduced visible changes through 
a series of reforms in revenue collection and administrative procedures. Then, in later 
years, there was also a change of attitude among the British that affected the 
administrators and propelled further changes: the utilitarian principles of the role of 
government, the growing influence of Christian evangelism among middle-class Britons, 
together with the notion of the „level of civilisation‟ as the measure of the development 
of different groups of people, all converged into bringing a more „Anglicist‟ viewpoint 
to the administration of India. By the time of Bentinck‟s Governor-Generalship, the 
influence of this new spirit was obvious in the Indian administration, and this in turn 
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increased governmental intervention into the everyday lives of the people. The 
Company‟s servants in India had transformed into administrator-sahibs from the 
freebooting nabobs exemplified by Robert Lindsay of Sylhet. 
 
For the duration of the Company, however, such changes were not complete and 
remained mainly as an „orientation‟ at the central level. Changes were, however, felt at 
the frontier, at the edge of the empire, where the British administration was still 
struggling to gain control over local circumstances. The state of boundaries shows this 
clearly. A boundary is necessary for a rational administration: it delimitates the duties 
between different officers, marks the limit within which the rules and regulations can be 
applied, and distinguishes the tax-payers, or clients under the government‟s protection, 
from outsiders; hence it marks the limits of the duties and rights of a government. It was 
especially imperative for the British Indian government, which, as an alien to the 
country and people, did not have any traditions to rely on.  
 
Yet the British could not draw the boundary on the frontier with the Kuki-Chin 
land. The geographic difficulty of finding clear enough landmarks was one important 
obstacle. There was no river or mountain ridge that could conveniently be taken as a 
boundary; in fact, the Kuki-Chin lived in the middle of hills which were normally used 
as markers of boundaries between two powers in the plains as the limits of their 
domains. Besides, no proper survey was made of these hills or even their outskirts due 
to the impenetrable nature of the jungle, the climate and the risks in a sending group of 
surveyors into an unknown area inhabited by potentially hostile people. 
 
A more serious obstacle, however, was of a political nature. In essence, a boundary 
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divides responsibilities, but in the Kuki-Chin frontier, British officers encountered a 
barely-known people with whom the British had little communication and who 
regularly moved their villages. It was impossible for the British even to conceive 
negotiating a boundary with such people. In other words, the British concept of 
boundary was not susceptible in the frontier with the Kuki-Chin to the particular feature 
of Kuki-Chin society. Thus, it was only towards those whose political constitution was 
similar to that of the British that a boundary could be negotiated. The examples were the 
southern boundary of Sylhet with Hill Tripura, whose Rajah was already under British 
influence, and boundaries with Burma in Manipur and Arakan in the aftermath of the 
First Anglo-Burmese War: the other parts were left unsurveyed and undemarcated. The 
only way of obtaining a boundary against the Kuki-Chin land would have been to 
demarcate a convenient line unilaterally and defend it by a line of military posts, as the 
authorities at Chittagong suggested at times, though the government was not prepared to 
bear such expenditure. 
 
Thus, while growing consolidation of the administration increased the pressure for 
the government to protect the tax-payers under its administration, the reality of the 
unspecified boundary left this very task muddled over the question of who was to be 
defended against whom and what other measures should be adopted for theis defence.  
 
In this situation, actual administrative actions in any frontier situation were decided, 
item by item, as a result of interplay between the frontier administrator‟s assessment of 
the situation and the consideration of strategic and financial feasibilities, which usually 
loomed larger with the central authorities in Calcutta and London. In general, frontier 
officers, armed with their undisputed authority on the situation at the frontier, 
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improvised administrative actions, usually preferring active solutions that encouraged 
engagements with the Kuki-Chin people. At the other extreme were the Directors in 
London whose main concerns were financial feasibility, and who as a rule preferred to 
avoid engagement outside the administered area, since it had proved to be expensive 
and politically embarrassing at times. In between were the Governor-Generals, 
supported by departmental secretaries. They were usually those with visions for the 
empire, which, however, were not directed towards the hills but to the other more stable 
polities that occupied the wealthier plains. Among them, there was no consistent policy 
in relation to the management of the frontier and an inbuilt reluctance to confront the 
problem. 
 
The first measure adopted by frontier officers was indirect defence by a line of 
friendly villages. In Cachar, Sylhet and Manipur this was done by settlements 
established using an otherwise mobile population of Manipuri and Kuki immigrants. In 
Arakan and Chittagong such arrangements were made through the villages that had 
already come under a tributary relationship to the governments in the plains before the 
British occupation. In essence, these were the actual frontier villages that were at the 
very limit of British India: the actual administrative limits of British India towards the 
Kuki-Chin frontier lay in the nominal control the British had over these villages.  
 
Also, through these villages the British Empire was spilling over towards the 
outside. When these villages were strong enough to fend off the Kuki-Chin raids, they 
worked as shields protecting the plains by deterring or absorbing the Kuki raids. But the 
government in the end had to take up the responsibility of protection when these 
villages themselves were attacked. In Arakan, the British interest in these villages was 
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only in the collection of nominal tributes, but as British influence grew over these 
villages, it became more necessary to punish those who attacked the villages under 
British protection, to show that the government could protect its clients.  
 
Thus, expeditions were attempted in the 1840s. If the increased relationship with 
the frontier villages was a reason that made expeditions necessary, it was also a factor in 
making possible such military deployments into the hills: the existence of friendly 
groups of Kuki-Chin people who were willing to guide British troops to the villages of 
culprits was an essential factor in making such adventures possible. These expeditions, 
however, only confirmed British limitations and the policy returned, even more firmly 
than before, to the defensive. 
 
The effect of this policy on the Kuki-Chin people was not immediately noticeable. 
Definitely, however, the Kuki-Chin people knew that the British had taken over from 
the local rulers in the plains and some of them even tried to form alliances with the 
British. Yet the British were wary of expanding their political influence into the hills 
through such alliances. The British principle was definite: the boundary had to be 
maintained and British influence should be confined within it, even though the actual 
line of the boundary was non-existent. They welcomed trade but politically they wanted 
to draw a sharp line: defence would be provided only when the people moved inside the 
boundary, so becoming the Company‟s subjects, but once they had moved in, they were 
requested not to move between different administrative units, not to mention in and out 
of the British administration. Meanwhile, life in the plains came under stronger control 
and certain activities such as the trans-border trade in guns and slaves were prohibited; 
with the clear long-term effect of increasing the isolation of the hills.  
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2. Administration and Ethnographic Knowledge 
 
The consolidation of the administration in the plains coincided with the growth of 
British knowledge of the frontier people including the Kuki-Chins. It was an inevitable 
result of proximity and increasing interaction. Until the First Anglo-Burmese War, the 
administrators as individuals reported on the Kuki-Chin people out of their own interest. 
This was even the case with Buchanan. The occasions that enabled him to collect 
information on Burma and the Chittagong Hills were definitely administrative, with the 
clear purpose of collecting information that would be useful for the administration. 
Nevertheless, his interest in the people was not just a direct result of these 
administrative enquiries. It was just as much driven by a desire to acquire a general 
knowledge about the people and territory, and the specific direction of his enquiries was 
influenced by the scientific-framework, set in a broader context than the administration 
of India.  
 
The surveys after the First Anglo-Burmese War were a different case: they were 
purposefully orchestrated for administrative benefits, of which ethnographic knowledge 
was also a part. The most important information for the administration at the time was 
geographical knowledge, which was vital in finding the best mode of defence and 
possibilities for economic improvement. Ethnographic knowledge was only sought after 
as a part of general knowledge of the area under British influence. Each different 
individual collected different information according to his own interests and there was 
no prescribed ethnographic information that was sought after from the surveys.  
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Nevertheless, there was a general tendency that can be found among those who 
reported on the Kuki-Chin people: they all commented on the usefulness of the people 
in terms of their contribution to wider society, gauged by the possible role they could 
play in helping the administration of the British Indian government. The origin of this 
point of view, however, does not lie in the pursuit of narrow administrative benefits. 
Indeed, such suggestions were also meant to be beneficial for the people, since they 
were to be brought into „civilisation‟. Rather it was the changes of attitude in nineteenth 
century Britain that also affected the changes in the British Indian administration – a 
mixture of utilitarianism, interest in human progress gauged by the stage of civilisation, 
and evangelism.  
 
The person who most explicitly suggested the pursuit of ethnographic – even 
ethnological – knowledge for the benefit of administration was Brian Houghton 
Hodgson, who argued that a „statesman‟ could also profit from ethnological studies of 
the Tamúlians, which would unlock the secret of the diverse conditions to which 
different groups of the human race had been subjected. These studies would help unlock 
the secret of why certain people progressed and others did not – and in the end facilitate 
the colonial government‟s effort to bring progress among the Tumúlian as well as the 
Arians. Yet even for him, this was an added benefit rather than the main reason for such 
studies. 
 
In fact, early ethnology was also under the influence of the same intellectual trends 
that had affected the administrators in the mid-nineteenth century. A very similar 
interest in „civilisation‟ – not „race‟ as physical types as yet – as the measure for the 
different capacities of human groups can also be found in the ethnological works. Yet 
  
 330 
ethnology also guided the interest in expanding the study of mankind in specific 
directions, which it had inherited from its predecessors, such as comparative philology: 
the affinity among different groups of mankind and the origin of their difference. 
Whether one agrees with one paradigm or another, the academic debate had created a 
general direction for enquiries into mankind. Given that the rise of ethnology was in 
turn based on the literature produced in colonial circles through the activities of 
administrators and travellers, this in fact was what Baber termed as the „co-production‟ 
between scientific knowledge, technology, institutions, and colonialism in the context of 
British India.  
 
 
3. Categorisation of the Kuki-Chin People 
 
By the end of the period of the Company, „Kuki‟, „Lushai‟, „Khyen‟, „Shendu‟, 
„Mru‟, „Kumi‟ and „Kami‟ were the main generic categories of the Kuki-Chin used by 
British officers. The usage of such terms was, without exception, what the British 
inherited from the local non-Kuki-Chin population with whom the British had closer 
relationships – such as the Bengali, Manipuri, Burmese, and Arakanese. These were the 
first to tell the British about the people further in the hills, at a time when the British had 
never even met one, and as the British administration expanded closer towards the hills 
while becoming closer to the people under its administration, more detailed knowledge 
became available in place of a mythical representation of the Kukis as half brutes living 
in the trees. 
 
It would be impossible to know the exact situations of the ethnic categories in the 
local contexts, but for the work of Buchanan, who provided valuable accounts of the 
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ethnic categories used in Burma and the Chittagong Hills. As his work shows, in both 
Burma and the Chittagong Hills a group of people was known by a set of different 
names according to the person categorising them: there were multiple systems of 
categorisation. Also, different names had different extensions and intensions according 
to the individuals using them. There seems, however, to have been a degree of 
standardisation or consensus among these people who were relatively close to each 
other, or who shared a similar culture.  
 
This means, on the other hand, that where different cultures overlapped the task of 
ethnic categorisation would be most complicated. This is best exemplified by the case of 
the Chittagong Hills where there were Arakanese, Bengali, and Tripuri influences – to 
mention but a few of the better known, without regard to the accuracy of such divisions 
– projected over the already complicated ethnic scenery. For example, there was a 
category that described the mode of cultivation employed by the people, namely 
„Jumma‟ and there were categories which originated in Arakan that divided people 
according to their proximity to the plains, i.e. „Chaungtha‟ and „Toungtha‟. Again, the 
same names were corrupted into different tongues as in „Lakher‟, „Layngga‟, „Lanke‟, 
„Linta‟ and „Bawm-zo‟, „Bong-zu‟, „Bonjogi‟ with added local interpretations regarding 
the origin of the terms, as in the Bengali interpretation of what they heard as „Lannga‟ 
as having originated from their word „Nagga‟ meaning „naked‟. „Longshe‟ or „Lushai‟ 
were used in some places to refer to the same people others referred to „Langga‟ or 
„Kuki‟; and different individuals used each term with a different extension.  
 
Not all the terms were pure labels externally imposed, and many of these terms 
seem to have had a local origin from the name of a chief or a section of the people, but 
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all of these went through a certain distortion by the local outsiders among whom the 
terms usually received wider usages than their original meanings. The terms used in 
Arakan, such as Mru, Kumi and Kami, were known to be the words in their own tongue 
meaning „man‟. This seems to prove that the Arakanese had a longer relationship with 
the people thus named; however, towards Burma, or along the Arakan Yoma, the 
practice of calling the people by a name not recognised by the people concerned 
reappears, as in the name „Khyen‟. Therefore, in the Arakanese system of categorisation, 
or as understood by Phayre and followed by other officers, these were geographically 
distributed into certain locations, and none of these was used as a generic term to 
include all the others.  
 
It is probable that when the British annexed the whole of Burma in 1886, the word 
„Khyen‟ was replaced by the Burmese pronunciation „Chin‟ not only in its spelling but 
also as a generic term in the context of British Burma. Whether this was the case or not, 
for the period of the rule of Company they were used as separate categories. Other than 
these, there was another category „Shendu‟ which was the name for little-known 
marauders from further inland towards the source of the Koladyne. The term itself, 
according to Phayre, originated from the Kumi corruption of the name of a village and 
was widened to mean the whole people. There was the same process of distortion, as 
when the term „Lannga‟, which originated from „Lakher‟, was used to mean the whole 
of the Kuki people by the Bengalis in Chittagong. It is interesting to note that the 
marauders in Arakan Yoma, on the other hand, were labelled „Khyen Yain‟ or „Araing‟ 
in contrast to „Khyen Yeen‟ which followed Burmese tradition. From this, it appears that 
there were at least two separable contexts of ethnic categorisation within Arakan: one 
nearer to the Burmese categorisation along the border area and another, different set for 
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those around the Koladyne River who were closely connected to the people of the 
Chittagong Hills. 
 
It is also important to note that the British usage of the term „Shendu‟ was adopted 
from the Kumi. This shows that the British administrators kept acquiring new names of 
unknown people from those that were in their immediate neighbourhood. Thus, they 
hear first of Khyen from the Burmese and Arakanese, then of „Mru‟, „Kumi‟ and „Kami‟ 
from the Arakanese near Koladyne, then of „Shendu‟ from the „Kumi‟. A similar process 
can be found in the case of „Lushai‟ whom the British heard of from the „Kukis‟ in 
Manipur and Cachar. Then from the „Lushai‟ the British heard of the „Poi‟, yet stronger 
people further inland. Therefore, the British administrators kept acquiring names of yet 
other people (B) from those others closer to them (A); and by the time the British 
became more acquainted with „B‟ and became aware of the names they called 
themselves (C), the term „B‟ had already become so well-known in the administrative 
documents that it was difficult to replace. Besides, the term „C‟ in many actual 
occasions had a different extensiveness from „B‟ as used by „A‟. Therefore, it became a 
standard practice to suffix the better-known term „B‟ in describing the people also called 
„C‟, as „C-B‟. Such a practice built up the hierarchy among the ethnic categories, in 
which the vague and broader usages of the outsiders became the generic names for the 
more specific terms of the insiders.  
 
Various categories that came under „Kuki‟ illustrate this process. The term „Kuki‟ 
in local contexts differed in its extension from place to place. For example, in Manipur, 
„Kuki‟ was mainly a term employed in contrast to „Naga‟ – the two constituted the 
whole system of categorisation of the hill people around Manipur. Yet, in reality, which 
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group belonged to Kuki and which to Naga could not always be clarified. There were 
also other generic categories used by local people used in conjunction with the „Kuki‟, 
unique to Manipur, such as „Khongjai‟ and „Kuchoong‟. These were at first noted by 
Pemberton who used them in a confusing manner without an indication of a clear 
relationship with the Kuki, but soon it became standard practice to use such categories 
as „Khongjai-Kuki‟. „Lushai‟ was also used as a sub-category but growing interaction 
with them in the context of Cachar meant that they came to carry a somewhat separate 
status among the other sub-categories of the Kuki and tended to be seen as an 
independent category. 
 
The exact usages, and extensions of the terms are not clear, but they were applied 
to what in later years became known as the „new Kukis‟. In this sense it was a very 
Manipuri-oriented categorisation, which differentiated Kuki people according to the 
time they had been known to the Manipuris. This tendency was exactly what was found 
in the division between „Khyen Yain‟ and „Khyen Yeen‟ in Arakan and Burma; and the 
British themselves adopted the same for Cachar. In fact, the British administrators 
inherited a similar context in terms of the political relationship with the Kuki-Chin 
people as the plains people of Manipur, Cachar and Arakan before them, which explains 
the general currency of such distinctions, and the continuation of such categorisations 
developed from the description of the different political positions of the Kuki-Chin 
people. 
 
Nevertheless, there were also certain characteristics that distinguished the British 
categorisations, or, more properly, the British administrative usages of categories. One 
important feature is related to the consolidation of administration in the plains 
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mentioned earlier. This increased not only the instances of British interaction with the 
Kuki-Chin people but also the needs for the frontier officers to report such cases 
through the hierarchy of the administration. In this, the British administration relied, 
more than any other local polities, on written accounts that were circulated over wider 
areas than those of other, previous, polities. This provided for the easier, deeper and 
more durable fixation of categories. 
 
Through such administrative practice, existing categories were standardised into 
British administrative usages. Standardisation of course meant a more consistent form 
of the spellings which at the end of this period were being fixed into such forms as 
„Kookie‟, „Loosai‟, „Khyen‟ and so on. More important, however was the 
standardisation of the extension of such terms in a more simplified form than in the 
local contexts. The process of giving hierarchy over the categories was crucial in this 
respect, as this guaranteed that, for example, the usage of „Kuki‟ could be justified over 
a wider group than the actual local usages. On the other hand, certain terms such as 
„Linta‟ in Chittagong and „Khongjai‟ in Manipur came to be dropped in preference for 
the term „Kuki‟ which was more widely recognised. 
 
Another difference in the British administrative standardisation from any other 
local categorisation was that it had included a wider area as the basic context of 
categorisation. Compared to the local contexts of Arakan, Manipur, Cachar, Chittagong, 
or even Burma, the area which came under the consideration of the British 
administration was by far the largest at the end of the Company‟s period. Thus, the 
inconsistencies among the frontier officers in the usage of categories, as exemplified in 
the different names used for the same group of people by different officers, became 
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reduced as British rule continued over an enlarged geographic extension, which 
subsumed many different local contexts.  
 
In relation to this, what is prominent in British understanding of categories is the 
geographic distribution of these categories. When adopted into administrative usage, 
these categories were understood as names of certain people occupying certain 
geographic locations within British India. In this way, the categories were transferred 
from their local contexts or even the contexts of the individual frontier administrative 
units into the context of the whole of India, where names from other places were all 
regarded as the same, comparable names of different groups of people. Thus, the 
categorisation of Kuki and Lushai as well as Khyen, Mru, Kumi, Kami and Shendu 
came to be understood in one enlarged context of British India beyond the local context 
from which the categorisation originated. Maps provide the best illustration for this 
transformation of categories, since names of people were also displayed as part of the 
geographic information. Therefore, the British administration had created a new context 
within which the categories were projected beyond their original local contexts.  
 
The simplification or de-contextualisation of the category was also facilitated when 
the categories were transferred further from the actual frontier or even out of India 
through administrative channels. Thus, the Directors in London were more susceptible 
to the view that Lushai was a different group of people from the Kuki. More than this, 
with the circulation of information outside the closed circuit of administrative channels, 
such terms became even more de-contextualised. This is most prominent in their usage 
by ethnologists, who understood these names as an indication of the existence of 
differentiable entities, which can be discussed in a global context as units that contain 
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linguistic, cultural, or physical traits. 
 
About a century and half has passed since the management of India was transferred 
to the British and more than half a century since the British finally devolved the 
government to the people. In between, the ethnic categories of the Kuki-Chin people 
went through more changes and are still in the process of change. During these 
intervening years, „Lushai‟ became more separated from Kuki as a separate generic term 
which is nowadays replaced by „Mizo‟; „Khyen‟ then was changed in the context of 
Burma to „Chin‟ and came to include „Mru‟ and „Kumi‟, though the old form „Khyen‟ is 
still used in Bangladesh in the context of the Chittagong Hill Tracts; „Kuki‟ which had 
the widest extension of usage is now comparatively reduced to the people within 
Manipur and the Sagaing Division of Burma, with occasional employment of the term 
in the Chittagong Hills. Nevertheless, some of the features introduced by the British 
administration during the period of the Company still persist: notably, the rise of generic 
terms which had been names used by outsiders to become the most widely recognised 
names and, indeed, the most common way of designating the people. 
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 Appendix A 
 
‘Vocables’ of the Kuki-Chin collected by Buchanan 
 
 
English Koloun 
Mru 
(Edgong) 
Mru 
(King-dai) Zou 
Kiaung Sa 
(Marma) 
Sun Konee Tanee Sat Nee Nee 
Moon Klow Pulaw Law-ma Hlaw Law 
Star Assay Kray Kray Ar-see Kree 
Earth Day Kraung Kraung Toil Mo-ree 
Water Tooee Too-ee  Tee  
Fire May Mai Mai Mei Mee 
Stone Aloong Tow-hoa Mai-hua Loong Kiouk 
Wind Klee Rlee Lee Hlee Lee 
Rain Yoo  Mo-whang Koa Mo 
Man Kloun Mo-roo Mo-roo Moo Loo 
Woman Patoo Mee-sar Mo-sheewa Noo-nau Mee-ma 
Child Saemee Na-sa Mo-roo-sha Ngau Loo-shee 
Head Mulloo Loo Lo Loo Gaung 
Mouth Mawkoo Nor Nor Moor Ko-naung 
Arm Maboam Boung Baung Ban Lay-maung 
Hand Mukoo Roo-koom Roo-pa Koot Lay-wa 
Leg Manwam Sae-pom Klaung Pe-rai Kree-ei 
Foot Koaung Ko-koum Ko-paw Pe-paw Po-wa 
Beast Pakyoo Ko-paw    
Bird Pakyoo To-waw Wa-ouk O-aw Hngaek 
Fish Ngoo Dam Dam Ngaw Nga 
Good Poaelahoe Yoong Yaung Tcha-zaek Kaung 
Bad Saelahoe Yoong-duay Yaung-da Mee-tcha-lo Ma Kaung 
Great Ahlayn A-yoo-ko Yoog-ma A-yaen Kree 
Little Amee A-tsoi-tsa Sum-tcha A-tom Shay 
Long Asaw A-krang Klang-ma Sei A-kree 
Short Sooaehay A-toung A-tong-sha A-toi A-to 
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Appendix A – Continued.  
English Koloun 
Mru 
(Edgong) 
Mru 
(King-dai) Zou 
Kiaung Sa 
(Marma) 
One Moo Lou Lak Hak-ka Tay 
Two Pahnee Pray Pray Pan-nyee-ka Hnay 
Three Paton Soum Soom Toom-ka Soum 
Four Poonhee Ta-lee Ta-lee Lee-ka Lay 
Five Poonhno Ta-nga Ta-nga Nga-ka Nga 
Six Poosouk Ta-rouk Ta-ro Roop-ka Kro 
Seven Pooaesae Ra-neet Ra-neet Se-ree-ka Ko-ney 
Eight Pooaesay Ree-at Ryat Riet-ka Shay 
Nine Poongo Ta-koo Ta-ko Koa-ka Ko 
Ten Poohaw Ha-moot Haw Som-ka Tsay 
Eat Kayawae Tsa Tsaw Hae-ro Tsaw 
Drink Kowayae Cam Kam Tae-in ro Souk 
Sleep Eitsha Ma-ny-b[o] Eim-moi Een-ro Eit 
Walk Hlayaeshoe Eeep Tsam-psa Pa-rol-tee Hlay 
Sit Own Tsom Tsam Choo-ro Tein 
Stand Undoon Roo Roo Deeng-ro Ta 
Kill Say,oe Taep Too-tay-moi Haem-ro Koy-may 
Yes Ashaeba Na-za Na Too-ta-ka-
ne-bro 
Hooi-ou 
No Seehay Na-do[i] Po-da-po Bou Ma-hou-poo 
Here Naea Wang Oay Me-keen Heea 
There Tsooa Pai-ko[u] O-ro Ma-hou A-wee-ma 
Above Akloengung O-roo-ko[..] Mo-kaung Chun-chooa Gaungka-ma 
Below Akoa Krong-k[..] Tooa Koen-to-ya A-nee 
 
NOTE: The vocabulary of the Chin, or ‘Koloun’, is found in Buchanan’s manuscript 
‘Burma Journal’ as well as his article in Asiatic Researches; the others are as in 
Buchanan’s journal of South-Eastern Bengal. 
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 Appendix B 
 
Genealogical Table of the Turanian Family of Language. – Southern Division,  
F. M. Müller. 
 
 
LIVING LANGUAGES 
DEAD 
LANGUAGES BRANCHES CLASSES 
T
u
ra
n
ia
n
 F
a
m
ily. 
S
o
u
th
e
rn
 D
iv
is
io
n
 
Dialects of the Siamese   
 
Taïc 
 “ Ahom  
 “ Laos  
 “ Khamti  
 “ Shan (Tenasserim)  
 “ Malay and Polynesian Islands. (see 
Humboldt, Kavi Sprache) 
 Malaic 
 “ Tibetan  
 
 
Trans-
Himalayan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gangetic 
 “ Horpa (NW. Tibet, Bucharia) 
 “ Thochu-Sifan (NE. Tibet, China) 
 “ Gyarung-Sifan (NE. Tibet, China) 
 “ Manyak-Sifan (NE. Tibet, China) 
 “ Tapka (West of Kwombo) 
 “ Kenaveri (Setlej basin)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub- 
Himalayan 
 “ Sarpa (West of Gandakéan basin) 
 “ Sunwár (Gadakéan basin) 
 “ Gurung (Gandakéan basin) 
 “ Magar (Gandakéan basin) 
 “ Newár (between Gandakéan and 
Koséan basins) 
 “ Murmi (between Gandakéan and 
Koséan basins) 
 “ Limbu (Koséan basin) 
 “ Kiranti (Koséan basin) 
 “ Lepcha (Tishtéan basin) 
 “ Bhutanese (Manaséan basin) 
 “ Chepang (Nepal – Terai) 
 “ Burmese (Burmah and Arakan)   
 
 
 
 
Lohitic 
 “ Dhimal (between konki and Dhorla)  
 “ Kachari-Bodo (Migrat. 80°-93½°, and 
25°-27°) 
 
 “ Garo (90°-91°E. long.; 25°-26°
N.lat.) 
 
 “ Changlo (91°-92°E. long.)  
 “ Mikir (Nowgong)  
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Appendix B. – Continued. 
LIVING LANGUAGES 
DEAD 
LANGUAGES BRANCHES CLASSES 
T
u
ra
n
ia
n
 F
a
m
ily. 
S
o
u
th
e
rn
 D
iv
is
io
n
 
Dialects of the Dophla (92°50’-97°N.lat.)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lohitic 
 “ Miri (94°-97° E. long.?)  
 “ Abor-Miri  
 “ Abor (97°-99°E. long.)  
 “ Sibsagor-Miri  
 “ Singpho (27°-28° N. lat.)  
 “ Naga tribes (93°-97°E. long.; 23°N. 
lat. [Mithan] East of Sibsagor) 
 
 “ Naga tribes (Namsang)  
 “ Naga tribes (Nowgong)  
 “ Naga tribes (Tengsa)  
 “ Naga tribes (Tablung, North of 
Sibsagor) 
 
 “ Naga tribes (Khaü, Jorhat)  
 “ Naga tribes (Angami, South)  
 “ Kuki (NE. of Chittagong)  
 “ Khyeng (Shyu) (19°-21° N. lat. 
Arakan) 
 
 “ Kami (Kuladan R. Arakan)  
 “ Kumi (Kuladan R. Arakan)  
 “ Shendus (22°-23° and 93°-94°)  
 “ Mru (Arakan, Chittagong)  
 “ Sak (Nauf River, East)  
 “ Tunglhu (Tenasserim)  
 “ Ho (Kolehan)   
 
Munda 
 “ Sinhbhum Kol (Chyebossa)  
 “ Sontal (Cheybossa)  
 “ Bhumij (Cheybossa)  
 “ Mundala (Chota Nagpur)  
 “ Canarese   
 
 
 
Tamulic 
 “ Tamil  
 “ Telugu  
 “ Malayalam  
 “ Gond  
 “ Brahvi  
 “ Tuluva  
 “ Toduva  
 “ Uraon-kol  
Source: Müller, Lectures, vol.1, 452. 
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